{"id":62030,"date":"2026-09-02T20:32:51","date_gmt":"2026-09-02T17:32:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=62030"},"modified":"2026-09-02T20:32:51","modified_gmt":"2026-09-02T17:32:51","slug":"sudans-stability-the-first-line-of-regional-security","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2026\/09\/02\/sudans-stability-the-first-line-of-regional-security\/","title":{"rendered":"Sudan\u2019s Stability: The First Line of Regional Security"},"content":{"rendered":"

As I See<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Adil El-Baz<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

1<\/strong><\/h3>\n

If the militia were to prevail in its war against Sudan, or even secure a degree of influence over the country\u2019s political authority, Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be putting their national security at serious risk. How?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The expansion of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allies in Sudan is not merely an internal Sudanese crisis. It creates direct strategic risks to the security of the Red Sea, the Gulf, and the Nile Basin. Egypt and Saudi Arabia therefore need to adopt a clearer position and become more actively engaged.<\/strong><\/p>\n

If the militia were to seize power, it would effectively mean that the UAE had gained control of a 750-kilometer stretch of Sudan\u2019s eastern Red Sea coastline. This would pose a direct threat to Saudi Arabia and to NEOM, on which Saudi Arabia is currently spending billions of dollars and which could potentially come within range of drones operated by the UAE-backed militia.<\/strong><\/p>\n

If the militia, its allies, and UAE-backed actors were to take power in Sudan, they could potentially mobilize millions of Arabs in the diaspora, who would be placed under Israeli-UAE leadership. Such a force would exert enormous security pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf as a whole.<\/strong><\/p>\n

We must also remind our brothers in the Gulf of the alleged plan to invade Qatar during the blockade, when RSF forces were reportedly deployed near the Qatari border in preparation for an invasion. General Yasser Al-Atta could be asked about the conspiracy he refused to participate in.<\/strong><\/p>\n

In this way, the UAE would effectively choke the Gulf and control the security of the Red Sea. Is this not a plausible scenario? Saudi strategic policymakers must therefore conduct a careful assessment of developments in Sudan and, accordingly, adopt a stronger and more engaged position toward the crisis.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Once again, if the militia were to emerge victorious, Egypt would suffer an unprecedented blow to its strategic depth. The militia\u2019s seizure of power\u2014or even the expansion of its sphere of influence and that of its allies\u2014would mean an unprecedented Israeli presence, influence, and reach in the Nile Basin.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Through its relations with South Sudan and Uganda on the one hand, and Ethiopia on the other, Israel would become the most influential power in the Nile Basin and could even achieve effective control over it in cooperation with its ally, the UAE. Is there anything more vital to Egypt than the Nile, such that it could afford to leave it to an adversary to control and thereby determine Egypt\u2019s fate and future?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sudan is not asking Egypt or Saudi Arabia to help it out of charity or as a favor. Rather, it is asking them to defend their own national security from an advanced position and not allow adversaries to move the battlefield to their borders or into their territories. National security cannot be bought at any price, and hundreds of billions of dollars invested here and there cannot justify exposing it to danger or threats.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The threat to Saudi Arabia lies in the possibility of Sudan\u2019s coastline becoming a hostile or unstable sphere of influence on the opposite shore of the Red Sea, increasing the security sensitivity of maritime routes and strategic projects in the northwestern part of the Kingdom. For Egypt, the danger lies in the expansion of the influence of its adversaries and their regional networks within Sudan and the wider Nile Basin, at a time when the water issue and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam are already becoming increasingly sensitive.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Egypt knows what it means to be surrounded by Israel. It is now the only power that Israel is directly targeting, after Iraq, Palestine, and Syria have been devastated. I fear that Egypt could be struck from behind\u2014from the very source of its lifeblood, the Nile\u2014through control over the sources and basin of the White Nile, after control over the Nile\u2019s headwaters in Ethiopia has already been reinforced through the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.<\/strong><\/p>\n

What, then, is Egypt waiting for as it watches Chad support the rebels against Sudan from the west, while Ethiopia has already entered the war against Sudan? I advise Saudi and Egyptian strategic planners to read Dr. El-Tigani Abdel-Qader\u2019s article, \u201cHas the Decisive Moment Arrived?\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

What is required of Egypt and Saudi Arabia is neither to fight Sudan\u2019s war on behalf of the Sudanese nor to impose guardianship over their national decision-making. Rather, they must recognize that Sudan\u2019s stability is an integral part of their own immediate national security.<\/strong><\/p>\n

There is no doubt that Egypt and Saudi Arabia are currently doing a great deal for Sudan, both openly and behind the scenes. However, the scale of the challenges and risks has now expanded considerably.<\/strong><\/p>\n

To the west, Chad is currently massing its forces along the border and claims that Sudan attacked it before the incident has been properly investigated. Security circles have warned of the possibility of a war led by Chad, in coordination with RSF militias, to continue the aggression against Sudan.<\/strong><\/p>\n

To the east, satellite imagery from the American company Maxar reportedly shows Ethiopia currently mobilizing thousands of troops, hundreds of pieces of military equipment, and drones at military camps in preparation for an attack on Damazin.<\/strong><\/p>\n

At a time when risks are escalating and Sudan\u2019s very existence as a state is under threat, fraternal powers whose own security is also at stake should move swiftly to support the Sudanese Armed Forces.<\/strong><\/p>\n

What is required from Cairo and Riyadh is not limited to direct support. It also requires them to lead a regional diplomatic effort aimed at containing and isolating external expansion and interference in Sudan.<\/strong><\/p>\n

A regional alignment must be created to put an end to states using Sudanese territory as a platform for threatening neighboring countries. Diplomatic pressure should also be mobilized through international forums to demonstrate that Sudan\u2019s stability is not merely a domestic matter, but an indispensable pillar of international maritime security in the Red Sea and of the stability of food and water supplies throughout the region.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The threat is not confined to the military dimension. It also extends to undermining major economic projects. Given its current circumstances, Sudan represents the strategic depth of development projects in both Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Any prolonged instability or control by hostile forces would mean higher maritime insurance costs and place major agricultural and industrial investments at risk. This makes the stability of the Sudanese state an urgent economic necessity for Riyadh and Cairo, just as much as it is a security and existential necessity.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Leaving the Sudanese arena open to militia expansion and foreign intervention will make the cost of addressing the crisis later far greater. It could also shift the risks from Sudan\u2019s periphery to the Red Sea, the Nile Basin, and the Gulf.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Therefore, the position required today is to support Sudanese state institutions, halt illicit arms flows, and address international interventions by compelling the international community to adopt measures such as expanding the arms embargo and other relevant restrictions. Protecting Sudan means protecting Egyptian and Saudi national security.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Ultimately, the Sudanese crisis is no longer merely an internal struggle for power. It has become a regional \u201cstrategic fulcrum\u201d that will shape the geopolitical balance of the region for decades to come.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Egypt and Saudi Arabia\u2019s water and maritime security cannot be separated from the security and integrity of the Sudanese state and its institutions. Strong and effective initiatives by regional powers to strengthen the resilience of the Sudanese state are therefore not merely acts of solidarity. They are essential preemptive measures to protect the strategic depth of Riyadh and Cairo and to prevent hostile powers from turning Sudan into a permanent platform for threatening its regional neighbors.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

As I See Adil El-Baz 1 If the militia were to prevail in its war against Sudan, or even secure a degree of influence over the country\u2019s political authority, Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be putting their national security at serious risk. How? The expansion of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allies in …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":58017,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-62030","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/62030","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=62030"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/62030\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":62031,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/62030\/revisions\/62031"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/58017"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=62030"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=62030"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=62030"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}