{"id":62131,"date":"2026-10-24T00:26:27","date_gmt":"2026-10-23T21:26:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=62131"},"modified":"2026-10-24T00:26:27","modified_gmt":"2026-10-23T21:26:27","slug":"sudans-forces-of-freedom-and-change-from-revolutionary-legitimacy-to-a-crisis-of-political-vision","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2026\/10\/24\/sudans-forces-of-freedom-and-change-from-revolutionary-legitimacy-to-a-crisis-of-political-vision\/","title":{"rendered":"Sudan\u2019s Forces of Freedom and Change: From Revolutionary Legitimacy to a Crisis of Political Vision"},"content":{"rendered":"

Ambassador Dr. Muawiya Al-Bukhari writes<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

An evaluative analysis of alliances, power, foreign intervention, and fragmentation (2019\u20132026)<\/strong><\/p>\n

Introduction: Between Revolution and a Project of Governance<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

If the first article examined the emergence of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), its evolution, alliances, and divisions, completing the picture requires moving beyond historical documentation to a political and strategic assessment of the experience. The question is no longer limited to how this alliance emerged or how it succeeded in representing a broad segment of the popular movement that toppled Omar al-Bashir\u2019s regime in April 2019. It now concerns what the alliance accomplished when it approached power and whether it was capable of transforming revolutionary legitimacy into a sustainable national project for governing the state.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The December 2018\u2013April 2019 Revolution marked a watershed in Sudanese political history. It gave expression to a long accumulation of economic, social, and political grievances and reflected the aspirations of broad segments of Sudanese society to end that era and establish a civilian state founded on freedom, peace, and justice. At the heart of this movement, the Forces of Freedom and Change emerged as a political umbrella bringing together political parties, professional and civil forces, and various components of Sudan\u2019s political society. The alliance helped provide the movement with a negotiating leadership.<\/strong><\/p>\n

However, the legitimacy of leading a revolution does not necessarily imply possession of a fully developed governing project, just as success in mobilizing the streets does not guarantee the ability to manage state institutions or build the consensus required for a transition. This is where the fundamental paradox of the FFC experience begins: an alliance with considerable capacity for mobilization, political pressure, and mass organizing, yet one that encountered profound difficulties when it moved from opposing the regime to participating in the management of the state, and from the unity of slogans to the complexities of competing interests and divergent visions.<\/strong><\/p>\n

First: From a Protest Alliance to the Dilemma of Political Representation<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The Forces of Freedom and Change comprised a diverse political spectrum, bringing together traditional parties, newer political forces, professional associations, independent figures, and other civil society groups. This broad-based arrangement enabled the alliance to unite around a set of demands, particularly the overthrow of the regime and the establishment of civilian rule. At the same time, however, it concealed fundamental differences in ideological foundations, economic priorities, the desired nature of the state, relations with the military establishment, and the limits of a possible political settlement.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The first challenge was that the alliance was neither a unified political party nor an electoral coalition with a detailed, agreed-upon platform. Rather, it was a coordinating framework comprising forces that differed in popular support, social reach, and organizational capacity. It was therefore unsurprising that their positions began to diverge as soon as discussions turned to power-sharing, the priorities of the transitional government, the distribution of positions, and the relationship between civilians and the military.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This brought the question of representation to the fore. Did the FFC represent all the forces that had participated in the revolution, or was it simply the most prominent political umbrella among several coalitions and platforms? Was its revolutionary legitimacy sufficient to authorize it to manage an extended transitional period without electoral mechanisms or a broader national consensus defining the scope of that mandate and the means of reviewing it?<\/strong><\/p>\n

These questions do not diminish the alliance\u2019s role during the revolutionary moment. Rather, they place its experience in the proper context. Popular mandates that emerge during moments of protest require clear political institutions and rules if they are to develop into sustainable governing legitimacy, supported by a cohesive domestic political base.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Second: Internal Alliances and the Contradictions of the Political Project<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The FFC\u2019s crisis lay not merely in the diversity of its components but also in the nature of the relationships among them. The same umbrella brought together forces that agreed on overthrowing the regime but did not necessarily share the same ideological foundations, vision of the alternative political system, position on compromise with the military establishment, views on relations between the center and the regions, or ideas about Sudan\u2019s economic system, the future of its institutions, and the distribution of wealth and power.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Subsequent alliances also exposed a gap between political representation and the actual social weight of some constituent groups, as well as the difficulty of balancing historical political parties with professional, youth-led, and independent forces. As disagreements widened, the consensus forged through opposition to the former regime became less capable of withstanding the pressures of exercising power, distributing responsibilities, and responding to the people\u2019s demands and priorities.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The deeper problem was that disagreements were not always resolved through transparent internal institutions or a binding political program supported by clear decision-making mechanisms. Instead of developing the alliance into a political front with agreed-upon rules for managing differences, divisions widened and competing alignments emerged over leadership, negotiations, and relations with the military component.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Thus, the flexibility that had enabled the FFC to unite diverse political constituencies during the revolution became a fundamental weakness when the alliance was required to make binding decisions on matters of state governance, war and peace, the economy, and the country\u2019s future direction.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Third: The Transition to Power and the Test of Political Effectiveness<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The settlement that followed al-Bashir\u2019s ouster produced transitional arrangements under which civilian forces and the military component shared power amid enormous economic, security, and institutional challenges. The circumstances were exceptionally difficult. The incoming government inherited a state burdened by crises, a fragile economy, institutions characterized by overlapping loyalties and jurisdictions, and military and security power centers that were not all subject to a unified civilian authority. It also faced foreign interventions and their associated agendas.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Yet difficult circumstances do not exempt political forces from an assessment of their choices. An alliance that had led the drive for change was expected to establish a clear program addressing urgent priorities, strengthen national consensus, build institutions capable of managing the transition, define the relationship between civilian authorities and military components, and address foreign relations and the country\u2019s regional environment.<\/strong><\/p>\n

In this context, the FFC experience faced criticism over the slow response to worsening living conditions, weak communication with social constituencies outside its political circles, a declining ability to accommodate forces that did not belong to its umbrella, and disagreements over appointments and the management of state institutions.<\/strong><\/p>\n

It would be inaccurate to hold the alliance solely responsible for all the failures of the transitional period. It was a partner in an unequal power-sharing arrangement and did not possess exclusive control over the instruments of power, the economy, or security. Nevertheless, the limitations of its actual authority made it necessary to build broader national understandings rather than simply compete for positions within arrangements that had failed to settle the question of sovereignty over state institutions. Instead, the FFC became preoccupied with secondary issues and the allocation of positions.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The contradiction between revolutionary legitimacy and the capacity to govern became apparent. The former confers a political and moral right to participate, but it cannot substitute for institutional effectiveness, consensus, or the subordination of power centers to established and mutually agreed constitutional and legal rules.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Fourth: Relations with the Military Component and the Crisis of Partnership<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Relations between the FFC and the military component were among the most complex issues of the transition. The settlement rested on a reluctant partnership between two sides with different sources of legitimacy, centers of power, and ultimate objectives. While civilian forces drew their legitimacy from the revolution and the demand for civilian rule, the military component possessed organized coercive power and networks of influence within the state, as well as the means necessary to consolidate control.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The partnership was unequal in terms of each side\u2019s ability to enforce decisions or exercise control over security and economic institutions. Disputes over security-sector reform, the unification of the armed forces, authority over military agencies, and accountability for those responsible for violations remained among the principal sources of tension.<\/strong><\/p>\n

At the same time, civilian forces failed to develop a unified and consistent position on how to deal with the military component. Their approaches ranged from escalation and popular pressure to negotiation, interim compromise, and demands for the complete transfer of power. As divisions within the FFC widened, managing relations with the military establishment became increasingly complicated, and the alliance\u2019s capacity to negotiate from a unified civilian position diminished.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The coup of October 25, 2021, also referred to by its proponents as a \u201ccorrection of the course,\u201d exposed the fragility of the transitional arrangements and brought the struggle for power to a more dangerous stage. The coup represented a setback for the civilian transition and demonstrated that previous agreements had failed to establish institutional safeguards capable of protecting the transition or resolving the relationship between civilian authority, military power centers, and the priorities of the transitional period.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Fifth: The External Factor and the Independence of National Decision-Making<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

An assessment of the FFC experience would be incomplete without examining the external role surrounding its emergence, rise, and political activities. Given its geopolitical location, natural resources, regional neighborhood, and international ties, Sudan has long been an arena of competition in which the interests of multiple major powers intersect, ranging from neighboring states to Gulf and Western powers, as well as international institutions.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The popular movement coincided with intensive diplomatic activity. In May 2019, the entry of civilians into diplomatic missions and visits by European and American diplomats to the General Command sit-in site prompted objections from Sudanese officials. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs called on Western diplomatic missions to respect Sudanese sovereignty, diplomatic conventions, and international law. This was not merely a matter of protocol; it revealed a clear disagreement over the limits of diplomatic presence during a transitional crisis in which institutions had yet to stabilize.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also engaged in political contacts and initiatives concerning Sudan\u2019s future. In April 2019, the two countries announced a support package worth $3 billion for Sudan following al-Bashir\u2019s ouster. The package included a deposit into the Central Bank and in-kind assistance. The initiative was criticized as support for the military council that had assumed power, and it raised concerns that economic assistance might be used to influence the balance of power during the transitional period. That period also witnessed contacts and meetings with Sudanese political forces, including groups associated with the civilian movement, concerning the positions of the various parties and the future of the transition. These developments coincided with revealing British and American positions on events unfolding on the ground, the extent of coordination among external powers, and the clear implications of that coordination following the outbreak of war in April 2023.<\/strong><\/p>\n

In this context, political accounts and testimonies have referred to meetings held inside diplomatic missions in Khartoum and to external roles in supporting the daily activities of the sit-in and financing some of its needs. Where supported by specific documents or testimonies, these allegations merit consideration as part of the historical assessment of the FFC experience, particularly regarding the boundaries between political and logistical support and influence over national decision-making. The presence of diplomats at the sit-in site and their publicly acknowledged contacts with the parties to the crisis also raise legitimate questions about the nature and extent of such influence.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Strategic analysis, however, requires a distinction between documented events\u2014such as diplomatic visits, publicly announced assistance, and political meetings\u2014and more specific allegations, including claims that the sit-in was financed in its entirety from abroad or that the alliance\u2019s decisions were directed externally. Such questions cannot be settled through inference alone; they require verifiable evidence, documents, and testimony.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Domestic political and public circles have continued to discuss these matters, including claims concerning the financial support Hamdok received for his office.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The importance of this issue becomes even more apparent when examining the violent dispersal of the General Command sit-in on June 3, 2019. Human rights organizations and independent investigations documented the participation of the Rapid Support Forces and other forces in the violent assault on protesters, which resulted in deaths, injuries, and serious abuses. The incident raised widespread questions about the positions of regional and international powers and their ability or willingness to influence the course of the crisis before and after the massacre.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Connecting these events does not mean that the Sudanese revolution was an externally manufactured undertaking. It emerged from genuine grievances and broad popular aspirations, but, in the author’s assessment, it was subsequently hijacked and diverted from its original course and the people’s aspirations. Nor is it appropriate to attribute responsibility for the dispersal of the sit-in to an external party without direct evidence establishing its role in planning or execution. Nevertheless, it is legitimate to scrutinize the foreign relations of Sudanese political actors and examine how regional interests affected the balance of power, transitional arrangements, and the ability of civilian forces to preserve their independent decision-making.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The strategic issue is not the existence of foreign relations in itself, which is a normal feature of international affairs, but rather the limits and transparency of those relations and whether they serve the national interest or enable external powers to tip the balance in favor of one side over another. Accordingly, evaluating the FFC requires examining the external factor and its publicly acknowledged dealings with some of the powers alleged to have supported it, alongside the responsibility of Sudanese elites for their own choices. Such an assessment must avoid both denying international influence and using it as an excuse to absolve domestic actors of their shared responsibility for political failures, financial and ethical corruption, the adverse impact on young people and resistance committees, and the ultimate outcome of the experience.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sixth: The Framework Agreement and the Attempt to Restore the Civilian Transition<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Following what became known as the October 2021 coup, Sudanese political forces entered a new phase of negotiations over the future of the transition. In December 2022, civilian and military forces signed the Framework Political Agreement, which sought to pave the way for a new political process and the formation of a civilian government.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The agreement reflected an attempt to rebuild the transitional process, but it failed to produce an inclusive national consensus. Political and social forces remained outside the process or opposed to it, while disagreements persisted over fundamental issues, including security- and military-sector reform, the integration of the Rapid Support Forces, command-and-control arrangements, transitional justice, and the position of the military establishment in the future state.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The agreement also faced criticism concerning the breadth of political participation, the extent to which it represented Sudan\u2019s diversity, and its ability to address the root causes of the crisis rather than simply redistribute power among the forces most prominent in the negotiations. Critics also questioned the exclusivity of its conception of civilian rule and the pursuit of positions and political spoils in the name of the revolution, despite shortcomings in experience and competence.<\/strong><\/p>\n

In this context, the Framework Agreement should be regarded as an incomplete and prematurely developed political initiative, rather than the sole cause of the war that erupted on April 15, 2023. The outbreak of war resulted from the interaction of accumulated military, institutional, and political factors, foremost among them the existence of competing armed forces, conflicting centers of decision-making, disagreements over integration and restructuring arrangements, and the failure of the transition to establish a national authority capable of monopolizing the use of force in accordance with the law. Other factors included the influence of certain foreign powers, regional sponsorship of the rebellion, and the overlapping interests associated with the first and second Quad groupings, the Quintet, and other mechanisms of external diplomatic engagement that produced little tangible progress while diverting attention from the concerns of ordinary citizens.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Nevertheless, political forces remain accountable for assessing how successfully they managed negotiations, broadened the basis of consensus, addressed the risks inherent in military power-sharing, and prevented political disagreements from escalating into a devastating armed confrontation\u2014which is precisely what happened.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Seventh: War and the Fragmentation of the Alliance<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The complex war imposed on the country and unleashed in April 2023 fundamentally transformed Sudan\u2019s political landscape, reshaping political alliances, centers of influence, and the positions of civilian forces. Groups that had previously operated under the FFC umbrella became divided over how to characterize the war, their positions on the Sudanese Armed Forces and the rebel Rapid Support Forces, the conditions for a cessation of hostilities, and the nature of the political authority and settlement that should govern the subsequent phase.<\/strong><\/p>\n

As divisions widened, the alliance\u2019s ability to present a unified position on sovereignty, national unity, the parallel government, the future of military institutions, justice and accountability, and peace arrangements declined. The positions adopted by some of its components toward the parties to the war also raised questions about their consistency with the slogans they had promoted during the revolution, particularly the establishment of a unified national army and an independent civilian state.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Not every disagreement in this context should be interpreted as evidence of abandoning principles. Political actors differed in their assessments of how to stop the war, protect civilians, establish conditions for negotiations, and determine the responsibilities of the armed parties. Nevertheless, the divisions exposed the absence of a unified political reference point and institutional mechanisms capable of managing differences at a moment when the highest possible degree of national consensus was required.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The FFC\u2019s crisis was therefore no longer merely a dispute over leadership or the allocation of positions. It had become a dispute over the nature and stability of the state, relations between civilians and the military, how to end the war, the limits of a possible settlement, and the definition of the national interest amid regional and international interventions. The author further argues that external actors tightened their grip on the political landscape through the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), the subsequent UN envoy, and the promotion within the Security Council of a narrative advanced by the UAE at the expense of the national narrative, thereby exerting influence over the international political discourse on Sudan.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Eighth: From Revolutionary Slogans to the Record of the Experience<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The December Revolution raised the slogans of freedom, peace, and justice. These expressed profound national aspirations that belonged to no single party or alliance. The FFC experience should therefore not be measured by its ability to claim ownership of those slogans, but by its success\u2014or failure\u2014in translating them into sustainable institutions, policies, and practices.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Freedom requires a constitutional order that protects rights and guarantees the peaceful transfer of power. Peace requires addressing the root causes of conflict and building national security institutions. Justice demands an independent judiciary and accountability for those responsible for violations, alongside economic reforms that ease the cost of living and protect the most vulnerable rather than safeguard vested interests and corruption.<\/strong><\/p>\n

From this perspective, the experience revealed a gap between the strength of revolutionary rhetoric and the weakness of efforts to build sustainable political consensus; between the demand for civilian rule and the difficulty of placing armed power centers under state authority; and between calls for national independence and the complexities of relations with foreign powers.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Fairness nevertheless requires that the FFC not be held solely responsible for the outcome of a process involving multiple military, security, and political actors, amid structural weaknesses inherited by the Sudanese state after decades of authoritarian rule and wars. Nor should the realities of repression, conflict, and restrictions on political activity faced by other civilian forces be overlooked.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Acknowledging these circumstances, however, does not eliminate the need for criticism and accountability. Forces that seek to lead change and claim a monopoly on political leadership must subject their record to scrutiny, particularly their practices of exclusion and marginalization, unlawful abuses, corruption, and the capture of civilian institutions, replacing professional competence, experience, and citizenship-based standards with loyalty to a new political camp. They must review their organizational and political mistakes and distinguish between what circumstances imposed upon them, what resulted from their own ill-considered choices, what powerful institutions prevented them from achieving, and what they themselves failed to accomplish.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The FFC and Failure as an Inevitable Outcome<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The experience of the Forces of Freedom and Change cannot be examined separately from its moral, political, and historical responsibility for the faltering of the revolution and the squandering of a substantial part of the aspirations of the Sudanese people, who took to the streets demanding freedom, peace, and justice\u2014not the replacement of one form of authoritarianism with another, nor the monopolization of the revolution\u2019s gains in the name of a particular alliance.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The hunger for power displayed by some of its components, the prioritization of quota-sharing and political rivalries over state-building, the absence of an overarching vision and a consensual national project\u2014even at a minimal level\u2014and the failure to agree on programs for managing the transition all contributed to weakening the civilian political base, eroding popular trust, and opening the way to options that posed even greater dangers to both the state and the revolution.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The situation was further complicated by external influence during the transitional period and by the opportunities for international actors to influence the transition\u2019s agenda and trajectory through the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS). Assessing the extent of that influence and the responsibilities of the parties involved, however, requires distinguishing documented facts from political interpretations.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The failure of the experience was therefore not the product of an exclusively external conspiracy or an exclusively domestic one. Rather, it resulted from the interaction of internal weaknesses and external pressures at a time when a unifying national will was absent and competition for power took precedence over consensus on the state itself.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is the central paradox: forces that raised the slogan of saving the revolution contributed, through their mistakes, divisions, and inability to produce an inclusive national project, to squandering its opportunities and opening the way to outcomes far more costly for Sudan and its people. These included the Framework Agreement and the devastating war, which has now lasted more than three and a half years.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Conclusion: Lessons Learned\u2014When the Pursuit of Power Takes Precedence over the National Project<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Perhaps the most profound lesson from the experience of the Forces of Freedom and Change, under all its names, alliances, and transformations, is that revolutions are not defeated by force alone. They can also be derailed when their leaders fail to transform popular momentum into an inclusive national project and replace a domestic agenda with reliance on external leverage through advocacy, sponsorship, funding, and influence.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The experience exposed a gap between segments of the political leadership and the realities and aspirations of the nation, as well as the absence of even a minimum level of consensus on managing the transition and building the state. This stood in contrast to the intense competition for power and the distribution of positions, which undermined public confidence and squandered historic opportunities that could have spared Sudan many of its tragedies.<\/strong><\/p>\n

As the war continues and its humanitarian and national costs mount, reports and evidence increasingly point to the involvement of international and regional actors\u2014including states, entities, financing networks, institutions, individuals, and mercenaries\u2014to varying degrees and in different ways, through the sponsorship, financing, arming, or logistical and media support of parties to the conflict. The Sudanese tragedy can no longer be separated from the complex interaction of domestic and external interests.<\/strong><\/p>\n

In this context, there is a need to examine the political, regional, and international connections linking certain FFC components, through their different phases and under their various names, to actors that have sponsored or influenced Sudan\u2019s political landscape. This must be done without assuming that all FFC components shared identical positions or reducing their diverse political conduct to a single course of action. What matters is what the evidence establishes about converging agendas, positions, and choices\u2014not accusations alone. This also requires reviewing the impact of UNITAMS, the limits of its mandate, and the extent to which external influence shaped the transitional process, in light of what can be documented about specific events and practices.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The most important strategic lesson is that sovereignty cannot be safeguarded through slogans, popular legitimacy cannot be borrowed from abroad, and those who rely more heavily on external sponsors than on their own people and choices may ultimately become captive to those sponsors\u2019 agendas, even when they believe they are using them to advance their own interests.<\/strong><\/p>\n

When the appetite for power takes precedence over the responsibilities of leadership, and the national project gives way to calculations involving competing geopolitical alignments, the revolution becomes an arena of rivalry and the state becomes a prize contested by domestic and foreign actors.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Sudanese people have paid, and continue to pay, the heaviest price: lives lost, displacement, exile, destruction, and the collapse of the basic conditions of life.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Overcoming this tragedy therefore requires neither recycling the same alliances and political figures nor excluding one side in favor of another. It requires a courageous national reassessment that acknowledges mistakes and responsibilities, investigates external interventions on the basis of evidence, restores decision-making authority to the Sudanese people, and establishes a consensus whose purpose is not merely to divide power but to agree on the state, its institutions, sovereignty, territorial unity, and legitimate monopoly over the use of arms.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sudan is greater than the FFC, greater than any single party or political component, and greater than any geopolitical bloc. A revolution that fails to produce a viable national project capable of protecting the state, and leadership whose legitimacy derives from within the country, remains vulnerable to being hijacked in the name of the people\u2014only for the people themselves to be left alone to pay the price of that hijacking through the most horrific bloodshed and collapse.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Ambassador Dr. Muawiya Al-Bukhari writes An evaluative analysis of alliances, power, foreign intervention, and fragmentation (2019\u20132026) Introduction: Between Revolution and a Project of Governance If the first article examined the emergence of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), its evolution, alliances, and divisions, completing the picture requires moving beyond historical documentation to a political …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":51305,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-62131","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/62131","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=62131"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/62131\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":62132,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/62131\/revisions\/62132"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/51305"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=62131"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=62131"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=62131"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}