{"id":62231,"date":"2026-11-02T23:17:27","date_gmt":"2026-11-02T20:17:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/?p=62231"},"modified":"2026-11-02T23:17:27","modified_gmt":"2026-11-02T20:17:27","slug":"sudan-and-russia-from-the-wagner-legacy-to-the-stakes-of-the-red-sea","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/2026\/11\/02\/sudan-and-russia-from-the-wagner-legacy-to-the-stakes-of-the-red-sea\/","title":{"rendered":"Sudan and Russia: From the Wagner Legacy to the Stakes of the Red Sea"},"content":{"rendered":"

Ambassador Dr. Muawiya Al-Bukhari<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The visit by the Chairman of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to Moscow this week, and his participation in the proceedings of the Russia-Africa Summit, was neither a merely ceremonial appearance at a multilateral event nor a passing stop in the course of bilateral relations. It took place amid an exceptionally complex regional and international environment, where African security calculations intersect with competition among major powers, and military and economic interests converge with the strategic geography of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Although the Russia-Africa Summit provided the broader framework for the visit, its outcomes went beyond the general agenda of Russian-African relations to address a number of key Sudanese issues. Foremost among these were the war and its repercussions, military and security cooperation, the future of the Russian presence in the Red Sea, mining and natural resources, positions at the UN Security Council, and Sudan’s repositioning within the network of its international relations.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The visit came at a moment when Sudan is seeking to broaden its strategic options and rebuild its foreign relations on foundations that safeguard its sovereignty and the unity of its institutions, while Russia is seeking to strengthen its presence in Africa and expand its partnerships in a region whose importance in international competition is steadily increasing.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is why the visit should be understood as a milestone in the process of reshaping relations between the two countries, rather than simply an occasion for exchanging positions and reaffirming the depth of historical ties at a time of intense international change.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Seventy Years of Relations: The History That Explains the Present<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Sudanese-Russian diplomatic relations date back to 1956, the year Sudan gained independence. Over the past seven decades, they have passed through different phases of rapprochement and distance, while retaining a significant record of political, military, educational, and economic cooperation.<\/strong><\/p>\n

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union contributed to building part of Sudan’s military and technical capabilities, through arms supplies, training, and the provision of technical expertise. Relations also extended to education, medicine, academic and technical cooperation, and cultural exchange.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Military systems of Soviet and Russian origin have historically formed part of Sudan’s arms inventory. As a result, technical cooperation, maintenance, modernization, and spare-parts supplies have remained ongoing issues in the relationship, even as Sudan diversified its sources of arms procurement over the past decades.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Moscow was also involved in Sudan’s economic sectors, particularly mining and gold, where commercial and investment interests intersected with considerations of geopolitical influence.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Accordingly, efforts to develop relations today are not starting from scratch. They build on a long history of shared interests and experience, although the current war has added more sensitive and complex dimensions to the relationship.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Sudanese War and the Reshaping of Russian Calculations<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Since the outbreak of war on April 15, 2023, Sudanese-Russian relations have entered a new phase, shaped by the nature of the conflict, the involvement of multiple external actors, and Sudan’s geopolitical importance in the strategic calculations surrounding the Red Sea and Africa.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Military cooperation is at the forefront of these issues, given the Sudanese Armed Forces’ needs in arms procurement, maintenance, rehabilitation, training, and the development of defensive capabilities, particularly since some of their military systems rely on Russian and Soviet technology.<\/strong><\/p>\n

However, an assessment of this issue would be incomplete without examining the experience of the Wagner Group, which represented one of the most complex chapters of Russia’s presence in Sudan.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Wagner maintained a presence in Sudan in the years preceding the war and, at the same time, had close ties with the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as well as economic and security activities, a significant part of which revolved around gold and mining. Its name was also associated with logistical and military support and training, while elements and networks affiliated with the group became involved in the field situation at the beginning of the war.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This was not simply a conventional Russian economic presence. Rather, it represented a model of influence exercised by irregular military and security formations outside the customary frameworks of formal relations between states.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Following the Wagner mutiny in June 2023 and the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August of the same year, a new phase began in the reorganization of Russia’s external presence. The group’s operational presence in Sudan subsequently came to an end, with its last contingent leaving the country or relocating to other parts of the African interior.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This made it possible to move beyond an exceptionally complicated phase in Sudanese-Russian relations, particularly given Wagner’s links with the RSF and the overlap between economic and military interests in the wartime environment.<\/strong><\/p>\n

However, the group’s departure does not mean that all its legacies, networks, and economic interests have disappeared, nor does it necessarily signal a decline in Moscow’s interest in Sudan. The more important question now concerns the model Russia will adopt in the next phase: Will it move away from the model of paramilitary formations and parallel networks towards direct government-to-government partnership with Sudanese state institutions?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sudan’s interest lies in ensuring that the future relationship is clearer and more disciplined, based on publicly disclosed agreements and official institutions, and free from parallel influence networks or arrangements that place economic interests above considerations of national sovereignty and the legitimacy of the existing state.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Naval Base: Geography That Remains Central to Moscow’s and the West’s Calculations<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The proposed Russian naval base in Port Sudan remains one of the most sensitive issues in relations between the two countries, given its direct connection to Red Sea security and international shipping lanes, as well as its implications for other influential powers in the region.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sudan has a strategically located coastline on the Red Sea, close to one of the world’s most important commercial and maritime corridors. This gives the country a significance that extends beyond its geographical and economic boundaries, particularly amid the impact of developments in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab on supply chains and food security.<\/strong><\/p>\n

In recent years, discussions have taken place over establishing a Russian naval logistics center in Port Sudan. The proposed arrangements included a presence lasting up to 25 years, within the framework of understandings involving military and technical cooperation.<\/strong><\/p>\n

However, the project has not evolved into an effective Russian military presence on Sudanese territory. It has remained subject to negotiations and political and strategic assessments, while reports have indicated that it was frozen and not pursued during earlier phases. Yet the fact that the project has not been implemented does not mean it has disappeared from international agendas and strategic calculations.<\/strong><\/p>\n

For Moscow, Sudan’s coastline represents an opportunity to strengthen its naval presence in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean and expand its strategic reach in a region where international competition is intensifying.<\/strong><\/p>\n

For the United States and Western countries, the possibility of a Russian base in Port Sudan is inseparable from their calculations concerning the security of maritime routes, the military balance in the Red Sea, and the distribution of international influence in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The proposed base will therefore remain on Russia’s agenda and within American and Western expectations and calculations, even if implementation is delayed or the project’s form changes. This makes the issue much larger than a bilateral military agreement: it is part of a broader geopolitical equation.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sudan, however, must approach the issue first and foremost from the perspective of its national interests, clearly defining the strategic, economic, and security benefits it would receive from any agreement, as well as the impact such an agreement would have on its relations with Red Sea countries and international powers.<\/strong><\/p>\n

International experience, the requirements of national sovereignty and the supreme national interest, and geography all give Sudan important bargaining cards. But they also impose a responsibility to manage those cards wisely, so that its strategic location does not become a burden on its sovereignty or an entry point for other countries’ conflicts and the revival of rivalries whose negative consequences could undermine the security of Sudan and the region.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The UN Security Council: Moscow Between Defending Sovereignty and Calculating Influence<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The UN Security Council is one of the most important arenas where Sudanese and Russian interests intersect. This dimension has acquired exceptional significance since the outbreak of the war.<\/strong><\/p>\n

On November 18, 2024, Russia used its veto against the British-Sierra Leonean draft resolution on Sudan, which called for a cessation of hostilities, enhanced civilian protection, and facilitated access for humanitarian assistance.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The other 14 members voted in favor of the draft, making the Russian veto a prominent diplomatic milestone in the course of the crisis.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Moscow justified its position by expressing reservations about wording it considered insufficiently attentive to the nature of the conflict and the Sudanese government’s position. It also objected to what it regarded as interference in Sudan’s internal affairs.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Russia also opposed expanding the arms embargo imposed on Darfur to cover the entire Sudanese territory, insisting that international measures should not be turned into instruments for pressuring the state and its national institutions.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The significance of Russia’s position for Khartoum is therefore clear, particularly in light of Western pressure related to the war, sanctions, and efforts aimed at influencing the future of power and political arrangements in Sudan.<\/strong><\/p>\n

An objective assessment, however, requires acknowledging that Moscow also acts according to its own international calculations and interests in its confrontation with the United States and European countries.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The real value of Russia’s position should therefore not be measured merely by its ability to block a draft resolution, but by Moscow’s willingness to use its diplomatic weight to support Sudan’s unity and sovereignty, prevent the fragmentation of its institutions, and contribute to achieving lasting peace.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sudan’s interests also require expanding the circles of understanding within the Security Council and avoiding the reduction of Sudanese diplomacy to reliance on the position of a single country, regardless of how important that position may be. Nevertheless, Sudanese-Russian rapprochement is intended to help establish an international safety net in the face of challenges and Western pressure, as well as the expansionist ambitions of certain influential parties within the Security Council.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Minerals and Gold: From a War Economy to a Development Partnership<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

If military cooperation represents one of the historic pillars of Sudanese-Russian relations, minerals are among the most important drivers of their future economic dimension. Sudan possesses diverse mineral resources, foremost among them gold, alongside copper, iron, chromium, manganese, and other resources whose importance in the global economy is increasing.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Russian activities in Sudan in recent years have been linked to the gold sector, whether through companies, investment arrangements, or commercial networks. Some of these activities have raised questions about transparency and the relationship between mining, the parallel economy, and war financing. The current phase therefore presents an opportunity to reorganize this sector on a different basis.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Mining, energy, and agriculture featured among the issues raised during Al-Burhan’s discussions with the Russian leadership, alongside indications of readiness to expand opportunities for Russian companies to invest in extracting gold, copper, and other minerals.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The success of this approach, however, requires moving beyond the mere extraction and export of resources towards a comprehensive productive and development partnership that upgrades the capabilities of the mining sector.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sudan does not simply need a buyer of gold or a company that extracts minerals. It needs a partner that contributes to establishing processing industries, transferring technology, training national personnel, and developing infrastructure related to mining, energy, and transportation.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Investments should also be based on publicly disclosed agreements that guarantee the rights of the state and local communities, are subject to financial and customs oversight, and help curb smuggling and the war economy.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sudan’s mineral wealth could serve as an entry point for rebuilding the national economy, provided that the state manages its contracts and partnerships effectively and does not allow its resources to become the basis for unbalanced privileges.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Academic Recognition and the Kremlin Meeting: Messages Beyond Protocol<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

One notable development during the visit was the awarding of an honorary doctorate to Al-Burhan by a Russian public university, a step carrying academic, symbolic, and diplomatic significance.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Although the honor was presented in recognition of efforts to develop bilateral relations, its significance extends beyond the person of the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council. It reflects Russia’s interest in strengthening its relations with the Sudanese leadership at this stage and its recognition of the leadership’s achievements in managing the war and containing its effects.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The direct meeting between Al-Burhan and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin was the most prominent event in the visit’s political outcomes. The talks addressed ways to develop bilateral relations and cooperation in energy, mining, agriculture, education, healthcare, and trade, in addition to the situation in Sudan and developments in the war. The Russian side affirmed its interest in developing relations and contributing to support for stability, while Al-Burhan expressed his appreciation for Russia’s position at the UN Security Council and Sudan’s desire to elevate the relationship to the level of a strategic partnership.<\/strong><\/p>\n

These meetings are particularly significant in light of the composition of the Sudanese delegation, which included officials responsible for foreign affairs, finance, intelligence, and defense industries. This composition indicates that the visit was not confined to a single issue, but involved various centers of political, security, and economic decision-making.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Nevertheless, the true measure of its success will be the conversion of understandings into specific agreements and implementation programmes, rather than stopping at statements and promises.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Ukrainian Snipers in Kordofan: The Sudanese War in the Context of International Conflict<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

One development that warrants attention was Sudanese Foreign Minister Mohieddin Salem’s announcement that Ukrainian snipers and trainers had been arrested in the Kordofan region and weapons seized. He also accused Ukrainian personnel of participating in training the rebel Rapid Support Forces to operate drones and target civilian infrastructure.<\/strong><\/p>\n

These statements are significant because of their timing and context. They came during the visit to Moscow, amid a war that has become increasingly connected to military technology, intelligence, foreign training, and cross-border supply networks.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Raising this issue before the Russian media also places it within a broader context involving the Russia-Ukraine war, international competition, and the possibility that some of the instruments of that conflict may be transferred to African theatres.<\/strong><\/p>\n

It is essential, however, to distinguish between the official Sudanese announcement, which requires independent verification of the identities of those arrested and the nature of their involvement, and the confirmed presence of individuals holding a particular nationality. Establishing the latter does not, in itself, prove that the state to which they belong is responsible for their activities.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Nevertheless, if the details of the incident are substantiated, it raises an extremely important issue concerning the internationalization of the Sudanese war and the need to protect the country’s national territory from becoming a theatre for settling international scores.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sudan should not become a geographical or military extension of other countries’ conflicts, whether those involving Russia and Ukraine or any other form of international rivalry. This development, however, adds to previous reports, including those concerning Colombian mercenaries and the war imposed on the country.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sudan Amid American, Western, and Russian Rivalry: Multiple Options, Not Multiple Dependencies<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Russia’s presence in Sudan cannot be understood in isolation from the international competition for influence in Africa.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Russia is seeking to expand its political, economic, and military partnerships and strengthen its presence in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, capitalizing on the desire of several African countries to diversify their defense and economic relations.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The United States and European countries, meanwhile, view Russia’s expansion in Africa as part of a broader strategic rivalry involving the security of maritime routes, natural resources, arms supplies, and influence within international institutions. Sudan occupies a particular position in this equation because of its geographical location, its wealth, the links between its military establishment and Russian arms systems, and the nature of the current war and the involvement of multiple external actors.<\/strong><\/p>\n

These developments are unfolding amid American and Western sanctions related to the war, political and diplomatic pressure on Sudan, and differences among international actors over the nature of the conflict, the future of political authority, and the country’s political arrangements.<\/strong><\/p>\n

However, Western positions should not be reduced to a single stance. Differences exist between Washington and European capitals in their assessment of priorities and instruments, just as Russia itself acts according to its own calculations and strategic interests.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is why Sudan must approach this competition from the perspective of sovereignty and national interest, rather than alignment with one side.<\/strong><\/p>\n

It would be unwise for relations with Moscow to turn automatically into a confrontation with Washington and European capitals, or for such an understanding to prevail. Equally, it would not serve Sudan’s interests to deprive itself of opportunities for cooperation with Russia out of fear of Western reactions.<\/strong><\/p>\n

What is required is a multi-track diplomacy that maintains channels of communication with all parties and manages international contradictions in ways that expand Sudan’s options rather than narrow them.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Prospects for Relations: From Political Understanding to Strategic Partnership<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The outcomes of participation in the summit and the visit to Moscow open the door to a new phase in bilateral relations, but they also place significant responsibilities on Sudanese diplomacy.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The most important future areas of cooperation can be identified under five headings:<\/strong><\/p>\n

First: Defense and security cooperation. Developing cooperation in arms procurement, maintenance, training, and military manufacturing, while prioritizing technology transfer and the development of national capabilities.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Second: Maritime and strategic cooperation. Reassessing the proposed Russian naval logistics center in Port Sudan in accordance with a comprehensive Sudanese vision for Red Sea security, in a manner that safeguards national sovereignty and balances Sudanese interests with regional and international considerations.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Third: Economic partnership. Moving beyond limited transactions in gold towards productive investments in mining, energy, agriculture, transportation, and infrastructure.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Fourth: Diplomatic coordination. Making use of Russia’s position at the UN Security Council while expanding Sudan’s network of international relations and support, and building shared understandings on Sudan’s unity and sovereignty and the rejection of foreign interference.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Fifth: Reconstruction and capacity-building. Opening the way for Russian universities, research institutions, and companies to contribute to rebuilding educational, healthcare, and industrial institutions, while benefiting from Russian expertise in energy, technology, and heavy industries.<\/strong><\/p>\n

These areas will continue to require implementation mechanisms, follow-up institutions, and specific agreements to prevent the strategic partnership from becoming a political description whose ambition exceeds its practical substance.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Conclusion: A Visit in a Regional Context, with Outcomes Touching the Core of Sudan’s Key Issues<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Al-Burhan’s visit to Moscow and his participation in the Russia-Africa Summit represent an important milestone in the course of Sudanese-Russian relations. This is due not only to the high-level meetings, academic recognition, and exchange of political positions that accompanied the visit, but also to the fact that it placed several Sudanese issues at the heart of dialogue with an influential international power.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The visit was multifaceted in its context and dimensions: African in its framework, regional in its consideration of Red Sea and Horn of Africa security, and international in the context of Russian-Western competition. Yet its outcomes directly touched on many Sudanese issues: the war, military cooperation, the future of the naval base, mining, positions at the UN Security Council, economic relations, and reconstruction.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Perhaps the most important revelation of the visit is that Sudan can no longer separate its domestic issues from the international transformations taking place around it. The war itself has become connected to regional and international balances, Sudanese resources are attracting growing interest, and the country’s geographical position gives it strategic importance extending far beyond its borders.<\/strong><\/p>\n

From Wagner’s legacy and its previous ties with the rebel Rapid Support Forces to the future of Russia’s official presence; from the proposed naval base, which has not become an operational reality but has not disappeared from strategic calculations, to the issues of gold, minerals, and the UN Security Council, the picture is one of a relationship that goes beyond conventional cooperation and forms part of a broader geopolitical equation.<\/strong><\/p>\n

At the same time, Sudan must recognize that its strategic location does not automatically confer an advantage unless it has the capacity to manage it. International partnerships should not be measured by the scale of statements or political symbolism, but by their impact on the country’s security, economy, and stability, and by their contribution to restoring peace throughout the country.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sudan does not need to replace Western dependency with Eastern dependency, nor to import other countries’ conflicts onto its territory. Rather, it needs to harness international competition to build balanced partnerships that safeguard its sovereignty, rebuild its state, and strengthen its legitimacy before the international community.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The real challenge is not for Sudan to choose between Moscow and Washington. It is to develop the strength of the state and the wisdom of its diplomacy to become a partner in shaping international balances, rather than a battleground over which international powers and competing agendas vie for influence.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Ambassador Dr. Muawiya Al-Bukhari The visit by the Chairman of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to Moscow this week, and his participation in the proceedings of the Russia-Africa Summit, was neither a merely ceremonial appearance at a multilateral event nor a passing stop in the course of bilateral relations. It took place …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":51305,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[19],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-62231","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/62231","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=62231"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/62231\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":62232,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/62231\/revisions\/62232"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/51305"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=62231"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=62231"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sudanevents.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=62231"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}