Rabah Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi: The Current Scene Warns of Sudan’s Disintegration Due to External Interventions and Internal Divisions 

The political and civil forces need to move away from the binary thinking that the Salvation regime implanted, which divides people into patriots/good/competent versus traitors/bad/incompetent. They must abandon the idea that these “bad” people (the Islamists in much of the discourse of democratic forces, and the RSF and the coup in the opposing discourse) can be completely uprooted from Sudan.

The Islamists are deeply ingrained in the rhetoric of the war in an unpleasant way, with hate speech being their usual mode of communication. What’s surprising is that some have adopted their zero-sum mentality, uniting their camp with the “either us or them” mentality. We need to be like the “mother of the child” in the story of Solomon. The slogan “No to war” requires pouring water, not oil, on the fire of hatred, with rhetoric that calls for everyone to compromise for the sake of the nation—its survival, and the safety of those who remain trapped, starved, terrified, and dying from bombings, shootings, disease, and hunger. This is also for the sake of the displaced and refugees who have lost everything and are living in terrifying conditions. It is also to end the fall of the nation as its enemies pounce on it like hungry wolves on their prey.

The rhetoric adopted by most actors in the Democratic Bloc and Taqaddum (Progress) is closer to being drawn towards or sympathizing, if not allying, with one side of the war. Since the coup of October 25, 2021, civilians have become more like extras in a military-dominated field. This is especially true for the Democratic Bloc, which openly aligned with the army. As for Taqaddum, since the Addis Ababa Declaration in January of this year, it has drawn closer to the RSF, in ways that contradict the roadmap it approved, and it also tends to follow perceptions held by certain international actors, especially the idea of reducing the role of political parties in favor of civil society. They are more focused on diplomatic engagements and less concerned with the humanitarian crisis and the suffering of the Sudanese people. This has distanced them from the pulse of the Sudanese street. In their statements, they delay and hesitate in mentioning the horrific violations committed by the RSF while quickly and enthusiastically exposing the army’s violations and military intelligence.

Therefore, neither the position nor the rhetoric adopted by the Democratic Bloc or Taqaddum helps much in creating a conducive atmosphere to stop the war and counter the rhetoric of hatred, polarization, and alignment with one side of the war.

We need to maintain an equal distance from both sides, condemn violations regardless of who commits them, and call for everyone to sit down to stop the war.

No, I am not satisfied with the position of some party leaders nor with most of the party’s statements published on social media. Unfortunately, the party’s website has declined, despite being the first website of a Sudanese party, established in 1996 through the efforts of the party’s office in London at the time, led by beloved Abdullah Al-Sadiq Abdullah. In 2007, as the digital media secretary, I oversaw the addition of a massive digital archive that included the party’s documents, books, and information about its conferences, among other things. That effort has now faded in favor of an almost empty site, with performance limited to statements issued without institutional consultation on social media platforms. These statements do not reflect the spirit and approach of the party; they only reflect the views of those who wrote them. Decision-making has become so centralized in the General Secretariat that it refused to publish a statement issued by the Coordinating Council disassociating from individuals participating in the RSF’s civilian administration in Al-Jazirah State. Despite the General Secretariat’s justifications for not publishing the statement, its page, filled with comments on secondary issues, lacked any clarification of the party’s announced position of non-participation in managing either side. It also failed to condemn the RSF’s grave violations, including shooting a political bureau member and other leaders and cadres who were killed in various regions, while it did not hesitate to condemn the arrest of cadres by military intelligence. All these actions are bad for civilians in general, and it is right to stand against them and appeal to both sides to keep their hands off civilians. Statements like “they claimed” and other disgraceful positions will undoubtedly be accountable one day, if not within the institution, then by the grassroots and the public, and on the Day of Judgment.

Calling for accountability and not allowing impunity seems like the only logical step after the misery this war has brought us and those responsible for it. However, the path to accountability is fraught with many calculations. Can we, as a people, stop the war by force? Or will it stop through negotiation and talks with everyone? I believe the war will stop through negotiation, so transitional justice will take forms that may not be exactly like what happened in South Africa, Rwanda, Spain, or other countries but will be Sudanese formulas that deal with these crimes in different ways under the banner of preventing impunity. Some will be tried, while others will face conditional pardons in exchange for revealing the truth. As for the leaders who ignited the war, the question will be whether we can hold them accountable through trials or whether we will be forced to adopt formulas that exclude them from the equation altogether. In any case, even if trials are impossible, there should be no repetition of the idea of including them in any future arrangements, unlike the flawed document leaked from the Manama talks months ago, which was described as a proposal by the Sudanese Professionals Association to Dr. Abdullah Hamdok.

In summary, accountability and preventing impunity are necessary, and restorative or transformative justice might impose formulas that replace punitive justice with other forms.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has entered this war as a direct participant, and its role cannot be compared to any other country supporting the army or the RSF. Despite repeated denials from the UAE, an Emirati official recently stated that their country stands against the Muslim Brotherhood and protects its interests in Sudan. The UAE’s military support for the RSF has been documented by credible global newspapers and research centers, and most importantly, by the UN Panel of Experts report published in January this year.

The UAE’s active diplomatic efforts with Chad, Egypt, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Libya strongly aim to contain Al-Burhan’s government, stop supporting it, or support the RSF depending on the state’s position. Of course, Al-Burhan and Hemedti have worked together in the UAE’s axis during the Yemen war, and the UAE supported them together in their coup against the transitional government. This perhaps explains Al-Burhan’s weak stance in condemning the UAE’s position, possibly in the hope of changing its stance. The government only recently moved to complain about this.

International media platforms and UN reports were ahead in observing and condemning this position, not the other way around. Likewise, a significant portion of the Sudanese population realized early on that the UAE is a major player in the war that has tormented them, even if it operates under popular revolutionary slogans like fighting the Muslim Brotherhood or restoring civilian democracy. I don’t think many Sudanese believe that the RSF or the UAE genuinely care about democracy.

Unfortunately, the position representing the majority of the Sudanese people is distant from the military leadership, which seems indifferent to civilian casualties, fails to protect them, and even exacerbates their suffering through indiscriminate shelling. It is even further from the RSF leadership, which appears to be waging its war primarily against the Sudanese people by occupying their homes, looting, and committing other crimes like rape.

Political forces are not required to align themselves but should use their means and connections to stop any support that fuels the war and worsens the suffering of the Sudanese people. At the very least, they should halt the close ties we see some politicians maintaining, for they have neither advised the UAE in a way that it would heed nor have they severed their vital connection with it.

“If” opens the door to endless possibilities, but let’s say that Imam Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, may Allah bless him, was deeply concerned about the growing rift between Al-Burhan and Hemedti. He received signals about this and tried to mend the rift between them, succeeding in doing so until his painful passing. He believed that the escalation of their conflict would spell disaster for the country. Unfortunately, after his death, some politicians, believing that their status and influence would be enhanced by inflaming the conflict between the two sides, worked to intensify the strife, which never truly ceased. My statement does not mean to reiterate the oft-repeated accusation that the Forces of Freedom and Change threatened or ignited the war. The statements made by some leaders of the Forces of Freedom.