The Biden Administration and the War in Sudan: The Cart Leading the Horses

In late July, U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, Tom Perriello, informed the Sudanese government of his intention to visit Sudan on August 8th, accompanied by Samantha Power, Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The purpose was to discuss ways to ensure the success of the U.S.-sponsored initiative to end the war in Sudan through negotiations scheduled for Geneva on August 14th.

However, Perriello stipulated an unusual condition for his visit: the discussions were to take place at Port Sudan airport under strict security provided by a special American security team, citing the unstable security situation in the country. This condition was rejected by the Sudanese government, leading to the cancellation of the visit.

Nearly four months later, Perriello requested another visit, this time without preconditions. The Sudanese government agreed, implicitly acknowledging its legitimacy and the stabilization of the security situation. The visit took place recently, during which Perriello met with General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, at his office in Port Sudan, as well as Vice Chairman Malik Agar and Foreign Minister Ali Yusuf. He also met Sultan Saad Bahruddin of the Dar Masalit, although the meeting was reportedly limited to condolences and expressing regret over atrocities committed against the Masalit people by the RSF militia.

According to Sudanese Ambassador to Washington, Mohamed Abdullah Idris, discussions with the U.S. envoy focused on a roadmap to end the war, deliver humanitarian aid, repair the social fabric, and explore a political solution as a long-term resolution to the crisis.

Observers of Sudanese affairs have described Perriello’s visit as a “public relations” effort, aimed at addressing unresolved issues on President Biden’s desk before his departure from the Oval Office. Critics argue that the Biden administration and the Democratic Party sought to leave a legacy in the Sudan file but failed to engage with it seriously. Instead, they allowed smaller regional players, such as the UAE, to take the lead, exacerbating the crisis by providing financial, logistical, military, and media support to the RSF militia.

The U.S., as a global superpower with extensive resources, could have approached the Sudanese crisis with greater professionalism and efficacy, setting a regional precedent for conflict resolution. Yet, the administration missed the opportunity, scoring a self-goal in its final moments.

During his meeting with Foreign Minister Ali Yusuf, Perriello stated, “I see no political or military future for the RSF in Sudan.” This acknowledgment, nearly 19 months into a war marked by RSF atrocities, suggests a belated realization by the Biden administration. The administration supported the framework agreement that ignited the conflict and blessed the RSF’s plan to seize power on April 15, 2023, despite the foreseeable consequences.

Was Washington genuinely naive enough to align its vision with that of the RSF, believing that the operation would be a swift victory? Or did it proceed with full awareness of the potential consequences, prioritizing the interests of its smaller regional allies?

It is hard to discern the exact motivations behind the Biden administration’s alignment with the RSF and its political wing, Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC). These actors seemingly believed that democracy could emerge from the barrels of the RSF’s guns rather than the ballot box. They were supported by regional powers plagued by hubris and delusions of grandeur, convinced that money and violence could override sovereignty and international norms.

The Biden administration had the opportunity to lead Sudan’s crisis out of chaos with minimal costs, securing a legacy of bloodshed prevention and humanitarian relief. Instead, it allowed itself to be dragged along by the cart of a militia, driven by ignorance and arrogance, resulting in a wasted opportunity.

As for the future, it remains too early to predict how President-elect Donald Trump will handle the Sudan file after his inauguration in January. However, it is likely that his administration will adopt a more pragmatic and cost-effective approach. The Republican Party’s foreign policy is known for its pragmatism rather than ideology, emphasizing realistic solutions.

Trump’s favorable relations with Russia could also play a role, as Sudan enjoys strong ties with Moscow, evidenced by Russia’s recent UN Security Council veto against a British resolution calling for a ceasefire and civilian protection in Sudan. The resolution, deemed by Sudan as a prelude to international intervention, was rejected as a threat to its sovereignty.

In summary, it is likely that the Trump administration will manage Sudan’s crisis through careful coordination with Russia, diverging from Biden’s missteps and potentially achieving more sustainable outcomes.