Al-Hilu and Abdelrahim: Walking on the Edge of Collapse

Many observers believe that the military operations that took place around Kadugli this week carried, among their objectives, a key goal: breaking the power of Abdelaziz al-Hilu, who for 12 years had remained largely outside direct military confrontation under an annually renewed ceasefire agreement. That arrangement was effectively broken when al-Hilu signed an agreement with the Janjaweed, launching attacks on army positions and deployments. This move shifted the frontlines of fighting into his own areas, particularly after he and allied militia forces insisted on imposing sieges on Dilling, Kadugli, and other towns, while attempting to advance into central and northern Kordofan and participate in the siege of El Fasher. These developments forced the army to engage militarily against al-Hilu and his forces in order to halt both his and the militia’s ambitions, break the sieges on besieged cities, and open new fronts extending toward the Darfur interior.

Al-Hilu, who had stayed away from active combat operations for 12 years, reportedly rejected advice from local community leaders and his own military commanders to avoid any alliances with militia forces. They warned that if fighting reached his territories, he would struggle to defend them with his available equipment—much of it outdated and untested for years. Meanwhile, the war has brought the Sudanese Armed Forces and allied units modern weaponry, combat aircraft, and drones—capabilities al-Hilu cannot effectively counter using his aging arsenal. This imbalance, they argued, would make any confrontation decisively tilted against him. Moreover, opening his territories to militia forces could turn catastrophic, as he would lack the strength to stop them if they turned against him, given both his limited armaments and the lack of modernization among his fighters.

In what many saw as a belated move, SPLM Secretary-General Ammar Amoun denied any alliance between their forces and the militia, claiming instead that they maintain a neutral stance. The statement sharply contradicts realities on the ground, as well as images and documents that appear to show coordination with militia forces—leading many to interpret it as an attempt to abandon a sinking ship. According to observers, Amoun is now trying to distance himself as signs of collapse become increasingly clear. The movement has reportedly already begun withdrawing what remains of its limited forces from joint positions with the militia, in a move reflecting confusion and strategic disorientation. Analysts are raising questions about Amoun’s delayed recognition of the true nature of the situation.

Well-known activist Mirghani Surur highlighted key points while discussing recent events in the Nuba Mountains, noting that the latest developments are taking place there, with victims drawn largely from the region’s own ethnic communities. Surur stated: “A siege can be understood as the first phase of an upcoming military operation, but it cannot be sustained for long. During sieges, local communities suffer from the consequences and pressures of isolation and restriction.” He added: “If there is no clear military plan or intention to conduct large-scale operations to seize control, why not keep roads open and safe?” He continued: “Long sieges of cities do not target the army—they target communities. The army can supply its soldiers with food and medicine, but ordinary civilians are the ones who pay the price of prolonged sieges.” He concluded: “A large and decisive military operation is more merciful to civilians than an extended siege.”

The Sudanese Armed Forces recently succeeded in reopening the Dilling–Kadugli road after extremely intense battles with militia forces that lasted three days. Army units advanced toward the Deishol area, while heavy fighting took place in the Kou and Lisan Daqiq areas, eventually enabling forces to enter the city as militia fighters fled. The army had anticipated such a retreat and prepared an ambush by positioning forces outside Kadugli near former militia-controlled sites. The fleeing forces reportedly fell into a mobile ambush near El Obeid, which destroyed the unit and resulted in the capture of several fighters.

Reports have also indicated the withdrawal of militia forces from South Kordofan fronts following a series of collapses. One militia commander, known as “Qaja,” attributed these setbacks to poor management by militia deputy commander Abdelrahim Dagalo. He reportedly said that orders issued by Abdelrahim—under the influence of his close inner circle—led to unjustified human losses and caused the militia to lose operational initiative across most fronts. In meetings with some traditional community leaders, Qaja also claimed that internal purges are taking place within the militia, targeting commanders who speak out or deviate from Abdelrahim Dagalo’s line, particularly amid the absence of Hemedti from the scene. This, observers say, confirms that what is happening is not merely a difference of opinion, but a leadership struggle among the militia’s various components and ethnic factions.