The Ethiopian Trap: Drones in the Sky… and a Regional Agenda on the Ground

As I See

Adel El-Baz

(1)
Why did Ethiopia launch UAE drones from Bahir Dar toward Khartoum, Kosti, and other cities? And why now, specifically?
The answer does not lie in the act itself, but in understanding its objective and timing. At their core, these strikes are not aimed at toppling the government, nor at weakening it in a direct military sense. They are also not merely an attempt to spread panic, as some assume. Nor do they appear, on the surface, to be part of a plan to escalate the war or coerce the government into accepting a ceasefire imposed through the Quartet’s framework. What is happening runs much deeper than that.

(2)
The launching of UAE drones from Ethiopian territory cannot be read as an isolated military act. Rather, it is part of a more complex effort aimed at dragging Sudan into an open regional conflict—the most dangerous objective of all. Once the confrontation reaches that level, it becomes possible to promote the idea that Sudan has turned into a threat to regional security, thereby justifying international and regional intervention to impose a ceasefire—even if the government rejects it.

This trajectory follows the failure of diplomatic pressure attempts carried out through conferences in London, Geneva, and Berlin, as well as through IGAD and the African Union.

These drones could have been launched from within Sudan—as indeed happened in earlier stages—but choosing Ethiopian territory this time is not incidental. It is a calculated step designed, first, to test regional and international reactions, and second, to reshape the nature of the conflict itself by probing the feasibility of dragging Sudan into a war with Ethiopia.

This move serves multiple objectives simultaneously. Foremost among them is rescuing the militia from its deteriorating battlefield position amid mounting pressure as military operations advance toward its strongholds in Kordofan and Darfur. These attacks are not intended to secure direct victory so much as to occupy the army, slow its advance, and disperse its efforts.

Politically, the aim is to impose a settlement that reinstates the militia and its leadership at the center of power and decision-making—stronger than before—as if nothing had happened since April 15, 2023.

At the same time, these strikes function as a practical test of Sudan’s air defense systems. Launching drones from a relatively distant location—such as Bahir Dar—allows for measuring detection depth and early interception capabilities, as well as gathering precise intelligence on vulnerabilities in preparation for any future escalation. Repeated attacks also contribute to exhausting air defense systems by forcing them to expend costly munitions against low-cost targets—a well-known attrition strategy in modern warfare.

(3)
The implications extend even further. Drawing Sudan into a confrontation with Ethiopia could in turn pull Egypt into the conflict, opening the door to a broader regional escalation that serves an agenda of igniting the entire region.

Domestically, these strikes target critical infrastructure—not only to inflict material damage, but also to sow public frustration, particularly as civilian casualties result from drone attacks.

Internationally, the use of Ethiopian territory is presented as evidence that the conflict has transcended national borders, creating a ready-made pretext for internationalizing the crisis under the banner of a “regional threat,” and giving organizations such as IGAD and the African Union justification to intervene.

This trajectory cannot be separated from earlier failures in the Blue Nile region, where the militia—despite the support it received—was unable to achieve a qualitative breakthrough that would significantly affect the balance or distract the government. This has led to the search for alternative tools, including the use of drones to strike cities.

(4)
Against this backdrop, the key question becomes: how can this plan be thwarted?

The fundamental principle is to avoid being drawn into a war with Ethiopia, regardless of escalating provocations. Dragging Sudan into such a conflict is the central strategic objective of these attacks. Therefore, the real response should not be a direct military reaction, but rather a balanced approach across three fronts:

First: The diplomatic front
A broad and proactive diplomatic effort becomes a necessity—not only at the African level, but also regionally and internationally—to present the full facts to the global community. It may even be wiser to delay withdrawing the ambassador from Addis Ababa, as engagement within the African Union remains crucial. The recent address by the foreign minister reflected a high degree of balance and prudence, which can serve as a foundation for a coordinated diplomatic campaign involving all Sudanese embassies.

Second: The media front
This battle is no less important. A well-crafted strategy is required to target African, regional, and international media, exposing the reality of what is happening with evidence, facts, and imagery. Platforms in Cairo and Riyadh can be leveraged to expand outreach, alongside regular regional press conferences addressing public opinion directly.

Third: The intelligence and security front
This remains decisive in monitoring and preempting such operations through available tools and networks.

(5)
So far, some regional responses appear positive—particularly the positions of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which have condemned the attacks and warned against the dangers of escalation. This is a gain that should be quickly built upon and developed.

Ultimately, however, the real challenge is internal: how can Sudan manage this provocation without falling into the trap? Being swept up by emotional rhetoric and uncalculated reactions could achieve for others what they have failed to accomplish militarily and politically.

Despite the blatant nature of the Ethiopian aggression and its denial, entering into a direct conflict with Ethiopia at this stage would not serve Sudan’s interests. Rather, it could open the door to a broader regional war for which this is not the right moment. The priority today is clear and unequivocal: defeating the rebellion and restoring the state.

• Experience has shown that Sudan is capable of managing complex crises through its diplomatic and intelligence tools. Patience with Chad, for instance, eventually led to undermining its position and defeating it on the intelligence front, while diplomatic efforts—through Egyptian mediation—helped contain Libyan aggression. Today, using the same tools, Sudan can weaken and isolate the Ethiopian position diplomatically, politically, and in the media—without being pushed into a war that others seek.