Have the Bells of Regional War Begun to Ring?
Amin Hassan Omar
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s recent remarks before the Ethiopian Parliament, in which he spoke of an emerging tactical alliance—or “collusion”—between Eritrea, Sudan (represented by the Sudanese Armed Forces), and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), may signal a dramatic shift in the political and security landscape of the Horn of Africa.
This statement carries several highly significant geopolitical and security implications.
The first indication is the apparent collapse of the long-standing Ethiopian-Eritrean alliance. During the Tigray war (2020–2022), Eritrea and the Ethiopian federal army were close allies in their fight against the TPLF. However, following the signing of the Pretoria Peace Agreement in 2022, Asmara reportedly felt betrayed, believing that the agreement had failed to eliminate the TPLF—its historic adversary.
This was followed by Abiy Ahmed’s statements regarding Ethiopia’s desire to secure access to the Red Sea, as well as his accusations that Eritrea had committed atrocities in Tigray in an effort to distance itself from the bloodshed of the conflict. Against this backdrop, the prime minister’s parliamentary remarks may amount to an official declaration that Eritrea has shifted from being a “strategic ally” to a “direct threat.”
The second indication concerns the emergence of what could be described as an “alliance of necessity”—a tactical partnership that would once have seemed historically improbable. Eritrea and the TPLF share a long and bitter history of hostility. Yet current developments suggest that growing concerns within the TPLF over the federal government—particularly amid internal divisions and recent drone strikes—have pushed the group to seek quiet understandings with Asmara.
According to Abiy Ahmed’s assessment, Eritrea, the TPLF, and Sudan are now united by a common concern: apprehension over Ethiopia’s regional ambitions and foreign policy.
A further factor shaping this equation is the deterioration of Sudanese-Ethiopian relations and the broader repercussions of the war in Sudan.
Relations between Addis Ababa and Khartoum are currently experiencing one of their most strained periods. Sudan has accused Ethiopia of providing logistical and rear support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemeti. In response, the Sudanese army has reinforced its military presence along the border in Gedaref State.
Consequently, Abiy Ahmed appears to believe that Sudan is facilitating—or at least endorsing—any rapprochement between Eritrea and the TPLF as part of an effort to encircle Ethiopia from the north and west. The timing of these statements suggests that they may also be intended to mobilize domestic opinion and prepare the Ethiopian public for exceptional measures that the government could pursue.
Abiy Ahmed’s declaration before Parliament—“Even if Eritrea, Tigray, Sudan, and others come together, we will fear nothing regarding our sovereignty”—is clearly directed at a domestic audience.
The message appears aimed at rallying Ethiopians behind the leadership and justifying substantial military spending and mobilization at a time when the country faces serious security and economic challenges, including the Fano insurgency in the Amhara region and ongoing unrest in Oromia.
The Ethiopian prime minister’s comments may also reflect fears of a repeat of the events of 1991.
Analysts have drawn parallels between this hypothetical or tactical alliance and the historic coalition that emerged in 1991, when the Tigray People’s Liberation Front coordinated with the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front to overthrow the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam and the Marxist Derg government. Abiy Ahmed’s references—and his efforts to dismiss the possibility of a similar scenario recurring—suggest that the prospect of his government being challenged by a cross-border regional alliance has become a growing concern for policymakers in Addis Ababa.
There is little doubt that Abiy Ahmed’s remarks indicate that the Horn of Africa is moving toward a dangerous policy of brinkmanship, driven by regional rivalries in which strategies and alliances are being reshaped according to calculations that reflect entrenched regional and international struggles more than the interests of the peoples involved.
As a result, the risk of military escalation or proxy conflicts along the borders of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Eritrea appears to be increasing significantly.
Have the bells of regional war truly begun to ring? And if so, who is listening?
