Waiting for the Central Bank’s “Corpse”: How Is the Hidden War Against Monetary Policy Being Waged?
As I See
Adel Al-Baz
1. A Clash of Wills: The Central Bank and Economic Power Centers
The recent monetary measures introduced by the Central Bank of Sudan were far more than a routine package of administrative decisions. They amounted to an explicit declaration that an inevitable confrontation had begun with entrenched power centers that have long dominated key sectors of the economy. This conflict extends beyond exchange-rate figures; it is a battle of wills between a state striving to reclaim sovereignty over its resources and “mafia-like” alliances that regard the economy merely as spoils. Sudan now faces a real test of the future of its monetary policies and their ability to withstand the temptations of disorder.
2. The Mafia Alliance and the Impact of the New Policies
When the Central Bank launched its new exchange-rate measures, I immediately realized that a campaign against it would begin as soon as those policies showed signs of success. The reason is simple: these measures intersect with the interests of three ruthless mafias—the oil mafia, the banking mafia, and the gold mafia—all of whom are directly affected by the new policies.
My prediction proved correct. The alliance of these groups moved swiftly to undermine the measures, particularly after they achieved notable success in stabilizing the exchange rate. Not only did the exchange rate stabilize, but it fell below the 4,500-pound level that prevailed before the measures were introduced, reaching 4,300 pounds today.
3. How the Central Bank Imposed Control
Before examining the actions of these mafias, an important question must be addressed: how did the Central Bank manage to regain control over the exchange rate, and where did it obtain the funds it injects into banks on a daily basis?
Through a series of smart policies and measures, the Central Bank succeeded in closing key loopholes. It restricted oil imports by imposing qualification requirements on importers, including a condition that companies provide 200 kilograms of gold. It also abolished import permits that had previously opened wide avenues for corruption. In addition, the bank began purchasing gold at international market prices.
Perhaps the most important step was setting prices for petroleum products sold to consumers, although the Ministry of Oil and Energy has yet to officially announce those prices. At the same time, the Central Bank has been injecting hundreds of thousands of dollars and dirhams into Sudanese banks every day. By yesterday, the total amount injected had reached one billion dirhams over the twelve days since the program began.
4. The Central Bank’s Sources of Funding
The crucial question remains: where did the Central Bank obtain these billions?
It is almost certain that the monetization of the bank’s gold reserves—acquired through daily purchases from companies, in addition to the steady inflow of gold from local markets—accounts for approximately 95 percent of the resources now available to the Central Bank. Government-owned companies and private-sector entities have played a role in purchasing this gold on behalf of banks.
These resources have enabled the Central Bank to supply commercial banks with the foreign currencies required by importers. Curiously, some banks have not requested any foreign exchange from the Central Bank at all, despite earlier complaints about severe shortages. The reason appears to be that they already possess sufficient export proceeds in reserve.
5. The Oil Mafia’s Response: Attempts at Sabotage
These policies have disrupted—and in some cases completely dismantled—the interests of the various mafias, making a coordinated response inevitable.
The oil mafia’s first line of attack was to undermine the Central Bank’s importer-qualification policy. Critics argued that the requirement to provide 200 kilograms of gold was excessive and unjustified and that companies would be unable to meet it. They warned that oil imports would grind to a halt, triggering a national crisis that would force the government to abandon the policy and return to what the author describes as the old system of “armed plunder disguised as illicit profiteering,” where a single shipment could generate profits of up to $8 million.
Indeed, many companies refused to comply. Out of 45 firms already registered with the Ministry of Oil and Energy as technically and financially qualified importers, only six applied to satisfy the Central Bank’s financial qualification requirement.
These companies could have formed alliances to pool the required amount of gold, but they chose not to, allegedly because their objective was to sabotage the policy rather than seek practical solutions.
Nevertheless, the policy has so far endured. There appears to be no immediate risk of fuel shortages, as ten oil tankers are currently waiting at the port to unload their cargo.
According to the author, had the Ministry of Oil and Energy properly assessed market conditions, it would have quickly authorized qualified companies to import oil when the cost of a shipment fell to $20 million during the previous three weeks. Instead, prices have risen again following statements by President Donald Trump threatening to abandon understandings with Iran, pushing oil prices higher and driving the cost of a shipment to $80 million.
The lack of coordination between the Central Bank, as the architect of monetary policy, and the Ministry of Oil, as the executor of technical measures, has created gaps that organized interests can exploit, transforming an economic struggle into a bureaucratic conflict whose costs are ultimately borne by ordinary citizens.
6. The Banking Mafia’s Position
What has the banking mafia done?
Most Sudanese banks have responded positively to the new measures and have met their clients’ demand for foreign currency. However, a small group of banks—described by the author as the “banking mafia”—has not requested foreign exchange from the Central Bank, despite having previously complained bitterly about shortages.
These institutions suddenly discovered that they possessed sufficient export proceeds to satisfy their customers’ needs and were therefore able to operate without relying on the Central Bank’s daily injections. They now complain that they no longer profit from providing foreign currency services and are effectively operating without financial gain.
Many of these banks have largely suspended financing activities and are holding on to their export earnings while waiting for the Central Bank’s policies to fail. Their calculation is that the Central Bank will eventually be unable to sustain foreign-currency injections at current levels, allowing them to resume currency trading through the export proceeds they control and thereby reap greater profits at the public’s expense.
7. The Gold Mafia’s Strategy
The gold mafia, naturally allied with the oil and banking networks, has adopted its own strategy.
According to the author, the new policies threaten not only the profits of gold traders but their entire business model. They undermine the foreign-exchange trade and disrupt the sale of export proceeds to oil importers, who previously purchased them at highly attractive prices.
As a result, the gold mafia has declared war on the Central Bank by purchasing gold at prices higher than those offered by the bank—and even above international market rates—in an effort to force the Central Bank out of the market. The aim is to reduce the bank’s capacity to supply foreign currency to commercial banks and ultimately pressure it into reversing its policies and once again allowing oil companies to purchase export proceeds directly from banks.
Although this strategy has inflicted losses on gold traders, they reportedly consider them temporary and expect to recover their profits once the Central Bank’s measures collapse. For now, they are waiting, in the author’s words, for the Central Bank’s “corpse” to appear on the opposite bank of the river.
8. The Future of Economic Reform
Against this backdrop, public opinion has an important role to play in recognizing that these measures represent a path toward breaking the dominance of entrenched economic interests.
The battle for economic reform is not merely about monetary indicators and exchange-rate figures; it is fundamentally a struggle between a state seeking to restore its strength and centers of power that thrive on instability.
For monetary policies to endure, Sudan now requires unprecedented institutional coordination to close loopholes and prevent exploitation. It also needs a national awareness that understands that confronting these networks is an unavoidable task.
According to the author, any retreat by the Central Bank from policies that are beginning to yield results would signify more than the failure of a financial institution. It would mean the country’s return to a cycle of chaos in which ordinary citizens once again become hostages to interests driven solely by profit and personal gain.
