Leaders and Lost Time

As I See

Adel El-Baz

1. President Al-Burhan: Tamarind Juice at Omdurman Market Is Better Than Belayesh

News reports yesterday indicated that Mr. Belayesh, the African Union envoy, met with President Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and repeated the same tiresome refrain about de-escalation, ceasefires, and the futile initiatives of an organization that continues to suspend Sudan’s membership. Such rhetoric is part of the political theater upon which many African Union officials thrive, while the organization itself remains heavily dependent on the United Arab Emirates, which finances much of its activities and movements.

Given this reality, one must ask: what does Sudan—or the president himself—gain from spending time with an institution that has lost credibility and lacks independent decision-making power?

Reasonable voices argue that Sudan should not sever diplomatic ties and should continue engaging in political maneuvering, even while recognizing that such discussions are largely meaningless and ineffective. I agree with this view, but I also believe that the president should not squander his time on unproductive meetings. Such matters can be left to the foreign minister, who can host these officials and allow them to file reports that few, whether inside or outside the African Union, will ever read.

The president faces a decisive battle and has promised the Sudanese people victory. That struggle should remain his foremost priority, rather than spending precious time in meetings whose outcome he already knows will be fruitless.

Sharing coffee and tamarind juice with ordinary citizens in Omdurman market would, in my view, be more worthwhile than wasting time with Belayesh.

2. Kabashi and Boulos: The Front Lines Are Better Than Hotel Corridors

Seeing Lieutenant General Shams al-Din Kabashi among advancing military units is something that pleases the Sudanese people. But reports that General Kabashi traveled to Cairo to meet Massad Boulos—whom the author describes as an Emirati agent and political broker—have generated disappointment.

At a time of war, spending money, effort, and time on what are perceived as futile diplomatic tracks is a luxury that Sudan cannot afford. State leaders are well aware that only last week Massad Boulos appeared before the United Nations Security Council making accusations against Sudan and that his public statements have consistently been hostile.

According to the author, Boulos’s efforts within the Quartet mechanism have failed, and he is now engaged in maneuvering within the broader five-party framework, attempting to persuade Egypt to support a plan aimed at reintegrating the Rapid Support Forces through a ceasefire that would restore them to both the political and military arena.

The author questions the wisdom of devoting valuable time to discussions with such figures and asks why these matters are not left to diplomats of a comparable rank.

The Sudanese people, he argues, expect their leaders to achieve decisive results on the battlefield rather than attend meetings with political intermediaries in Cairo’s hotels while the war continues to rage at home.

General Kabashi, the author concludes, would be far more welcome leading military advances in Kordofan and Darfur than attending meetings in Cairo.

3. Agar: When Action Disappears and Paper Takes Its Place

Yesterday, I reviewed the initiative proposed by Vice President Malik Agar. It is, in many respects, a worthwhile proposal, and similar ideas—particularly concerning the five issues that should be placed on the table of national dialogue—had previously been advanced by Amjad Farid.

Yet, this is not the right moment for such initiatives.

I had expected to see Mr. Agar in the forests of Kurmuk, which was recaptured only yesterday, entering the area alongside the advancing forces. Instead, he remained in his office in Port Sudan—without electricity—issuing an urgent initiative aimed at solving Sudan’s problems.

While Kurmuk was being reclaimed through sacrifice and bloodshed, the author remarks, Agar’s office was reclaiming ground through statements and paperwork.

Sudan, he asks, does not suffer from a shortage of initiatives. What it lacks is determination and the mobilization of its people to liberate their country.

In his view, Agar would do better to leave initiatives and workshops to the many political figures in Port Sudan who thrive on such activities and who, both domestically and internationally, depend on them for relevance.

What confuses the author most is that the prime minister already has his own initiative and roadmap, which he has publicly promoted, alongside plans for an internal Sudanese dialogue with a clearly defined agenda. President Al-Burhan himself has repeatedly affirmed that such a dialogue will begin soon.

Why, then, is there a need for Vice President Agar to launch yet another initiative?

The author concludes with a broader criticism of the government, questioning how a state can function when every senior official appears to be moving in a different direction. He wonders when the national project will finally come together and ends on a pessimistic note, warning that a government without a coherent vision risks leaving the country itself without hope.