Sudan and Russia… Al-Burhan’s Visit (2)
Dr. Osama Mohamed Abdelrahim
(From Arms Deals to Building Defence Capabilities)
Sudanese-Russian military relations raise a strategic question that goes beyond the types of weapons Khartoum might obtain from Moscow to encompass the future of Sudan’s own defence capabilities. The war that Sudan has been experiencing since April 2023 has exposed profound challenges related to armaments, maintenance, supplies, and technology, bringing renewed attention to the importance of establishing an industrial and technical base capable of supporting the Armed Forces and reducing their dependence on external sources. The recent visit to Moscow by the Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, has brought this issue back to the forefront from a more pressing perspective: what the Russian partnership can offer in rebuilding Sudan’s defence capabilities, and what Sudan should receive in return for its strategic commitments.
For decades, Sudan has relied on Eastern military systems, with Soviet- and Russian-origin aircraft, helicopters, armoured vehicles, and air defence systems constituting a significant part of its Armed Forces’ arsenal. This relationship enabled the accumulation of technical and operational expertise, but it also created ongoing requirements for spare parts, upgrades, and technical support. With successive economic and political crises and the imposition of sanctions, maintaining the operational readiness of these systems has become a challenge that goes beyond the ability to purchase equipment to ensuring its sustainable operation.
One of the most important lessons of the war in Sudan is that possessing weapons represents only one aspect of the military power equation. The effectiveness of the Armed Forces depends on the efficiency of command-and-control systems, the integration of information and intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities, the speed of maintenance and replacement, and the continuity of supplies under prolonged operational conditions. Contemporary wars have demonstrated that technological superiority loses part of its value when systems cannot be operated, maintained, and upgraded in accordance with battlefield requirements.
From this perspective, thinking about defence cooperation with Moscow should focus on building integrated capabilities. This should begin with assessing existing systems and upgrading those that remain serviceable, extending to the development of air defence systems, electronic protection, and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as rehabilitating the technical and engineering infrastructure of the Armed Forces. These areas are becoming increasingly important with the growing use of drones and precision-guided weapons, and the challenges they pose to protecting vital facilities, population centres, and infrastructure.
However, the strategic value of any long-term defence cooperation is determined by the extent to which it moves beyond equipment supplies towards the transfer of knowledge and technology. Sudan has accumulated significant engineering, technical, and industrial expertise, and its defence institutions have gained substantial experience in manufacturing, maintenance, and development over recent decades. This expertise could provide a foundation for rehabilitating industrial and technical facilities damaged by the war, restoring their production capabilities, and developing maintenance, repair, and spare-parts and component manufacturing activities, while giving research and development a prominent role in reconstruction programmes.
This approach requires establishing a national research and development system linking defence industry institutions with universities, research centres, and engineering colleges, thereby enabling the qualification of personnel and the development of local technological solutions. External partnerships should also be based on specific industrial projects, implemented gradually in line with available resources and subject to performance indicators measuring progress in rehabilitation and local production. Restoring Sudan’s industrial capabilities represents a long-term investment in the independence of its defence decision-making.
This vision also requires rethinking the very concept of military procurement. Purchasing an advanced system without guarantees covering training, maintenance, upgrades, and the availability of spare parts may impose financial and technical burdens that persist for many years. Accordingly, any new agreements should cover the equipment’s full life-cycle costs, local maintenance rights, the training and qualification of national personnel, and guaranteed continuity of supplies, while taking into account the constraints that Russia’s defence industries may face as a result of the war and international sanctions.
Moscow, for its part, views military cooperation with Sudan within the framework of broader interests relating to its presence in Africa and the Red Sea. In this context, the proposed Russian naval facility on the Sudanese coast stands out as an issue that has remained subject to negotiations and review over recent years. The project was initially proposed as a technical and logistical support facility for Russian vessels, although some political and media descriptions have expanded its designation to include the term “naval base.” The distinction between these two descriptions is important from both legal and operational perspectives, since the nature of any actual facility is determined by its authorized uses, the number of troops and quantity of equipment permitted, the degree of control over its facilities, and the duration of the agreement.
This issue calls for a careful assessment of Sudan’s national interests, beginning with identifying the strategic benefits the country could obtain from any maritime arrangements with Moscow. Areas of cooperation could include rehabilitating naval maintenance and repair facilities, training crews and technical personnel, developing maritime infrastructure and services, and strengthening national capabilities in surveillance, search, and rescue. However, these potential benefits must be weighed against the scale of the sovereign, security, and political commitments arising from the agreement, as well as its potential impact on Sudan’s regional and international relations.
Sudan’s priority in this area should be rebuilding its naval forces and developing their capabilities to protect the coastline, ports, islands, territorial waters, and maritime economic interests. Sudan’s possession of an extensive coastline and its strategically significant location on the Red Sea create requirements for maritime surveillance, the protection of facilities, combating smuggling, and securing the sea lanes connected to its ports. Any cooperation with Russia or other countries should therefore be assessed according to the extent to which it contributes to strengthening these national capabilities.
Another issue concerns the balance between the urgent needs imposed by the war and the requirements of long-term defence development. Sudan needs to maintain the operational readiness of its forces and confront existing threats, but it must also avoid arms procurement decisions driven by exceptional circumstances that could impose strategic commitments extending over decades. Achieving this balance requires a national plan defining rehabilitation priorities, sources of financing, levels of local manufacturing, and areas of cooperation in which partners can be diversified.
These calculations cannot be separated from the nature of international relations. Russia is a major power with its own interests, commitments, and alliances, and it deals with Sudan in light of considerations that extend beyond bilateral relations. Diversifying sources of arms and technology also gives countries greater flexibility in managing their defence requirements, provided that technical compatibility between systems is maintained and complications in maintenance and supply are avoided. Consequently, relations with Moscow require clarity regarding interests and commitments, rather than assumptions of permanent political guarantees or reliance on broad, general understandings.
Ultimately, the decisive factor is Sudan’s ability to manage this relationship through its national institutions. Defence cooperation requires a vision led by the relevant military and technical authorities, based on an objective assessment of capabilities, threats, and available resources, with major agreements subject to legal and institutional review. The localization of knowledge and the development of Sudanese expertise should also constitute an integral part of every project, ensuring that its benefits and outcomes accumulate within the country’s national military and industrial institutions.
The future of Sudanese-Russian defence cooperation should be assessed by what it adds to the Armed Forces’ operational readiness and the sustainability of their technical and industrial capabilities, as well as by the extent to which it contributes to protecting national sovereignty and strengthening the independence of military decision-making. Weapons delivered today may address an urgent requirement, but the knowledge transferred, the institutions developed, and the capabilities built within Sudan are what will determine the level of strength the country can retain tomorrow.
This is where Khartoum’s strategic challenge lies: moving beyond managing arms procurement needs towards building the foundations of national power that protect the state and safeguard its independent decision-making.
