From Janjaweed rebellion to Mercenaries’ Invasion 1-2

As I See it

By Adil Al Baz

1

There is a need to redefine the nature of what is going on in our country, so that we can come to the right conclusions. And here a question has to be asked: is what we have been subjected to an invasion or a rebellion carried out by the Rapid Support Forces(RSF)?? The RSF took the first step for which it has been planning for such a long time: taking over the state from within its center, Khartoum. But when this plot failed miserably, it veered to expanding the circle of war, resorting to financial, military and human assistance from outside the country. this change in the parameters of the war has never been thoroughly analyzed, as we continued to repetitively going around the definition of this was as a rebellion and that we have therefore to get in place the means to resist this rebellion. This is because he means to stave off rebellion differ totally from all other means and tactics and policies used in case of invasions, or so I would argue.

2

There is a huge difference between fighting Sudanese rebels and fighting invaders fitted out with foreign money and weapons, receiving international and regional political cover that clearly remarked by all and everybody, and are supported by huge media mechanisms managed from abroad.

Sudan has experienced various types of rebellions in its history since the dawn of independence, starting with the Torit rebellion in 1955, then the Anyanya rebellion in the 1960s, then the Garang rebellion in 1983, in addition to the rebellion of the Darfur armed movements. In all of these cases, we were fighting as Sudanese without having the feeling that we are experiencing today, that we are facing an invasion… even though those rebellions found external support, financing and arming, whether from Gaddafi’s state, neighboring countries, or even some Arab countries, so what makes the 1976 movement an invasion? What are the Janjaweed mercenaries doing now as a rebellion? Note that the 76 movement was a hundred percent Sudanese?

3

Now, today, the situation is different. This is because the basic features of the invasion have begun to become clearer, the first of which is that the fighters we are facing are not entirely Sudanese: The Arabs of the diaspora have been mobilized from six African states and they are presently in thousands positioned in our towns and villages pillaging, plundering and raping. Their pictures and videos are published in the internet. This war is also now witnessing an open –ended support for the invaders, starting with the camps that were established on the Sudanese-Chadian border, others on the Libyan border, and third on our border with Central Africa Republic for training, supplies and provisions deliveries. Wagner forces and Libyan forces also shoulder training in these camps on all types of weapons, including Israeli launcher drones, Emirati tanks, and others.

4

Military, food and medicine supply bases were also established in Chad and Central Africa Republic in Um Jaras. A military base and hospitals were established to evacuate the wounded and treat those injured from amongst the mercenary forces and the Janjaweed. Huge planes were made available for them to bring in all requirements, they wished. The New York Times counted 48 flights in just two months, all of which were supplies, ammunition and medicines, all hailing from the UAE.

5

Weapons flowed from the stores of (our sister) UAE, directly to the battlefields. A few days ago, a Helicopter plane landed near the town of Geneina carrying advanced weapons in order to strengthen the Janjaweed’s control over large areas in Darfur and Kordufan, a cart to be used as pressure on the table of negotiations.

6

External support was not confined to financial support, training, weapons and food alone, rather the support covered political arenas, as all countries, including (our brothers) the Arab, have declined to condemn the rebellion with any statement even if similar to rigorous mortis statements they used to issue in occasion good or bad, safe when the Janjaweed invaded our homes, they kept deaf and dump stands. They stood and watched the Sudanese people being slaughtered, and I do not exclude any of them but Qatar, which have been doing everything it could to support Sudanese people.

7

The stands of the African states are worse, as all neighboring countries took hostile towards the government and supportive positions for the rebellion. They opened their capitals to receive the rebels and their allies in the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC). One of the best elements contained in the statement delivered by President Al-Burhan Yesterday, was his warning to those countries from facilitating reception of the Janjaweed, starting with the leader of the Janjaweed who is now touring African capitals and being offered red carpet receptions!

8

The African organizations that Sudanese helped establish, starting from the African Union to IGAD, also played the role of protector and defender of the invasion of the Janjaweed and mercenaries, diplomatically and politically. The Troika countries, led by America, did not fail to embrace the rebellion, support the invaders, and try to save them from being crushed. They were even unable to press the Janjaweed and their mercenaries into honoring the outcomes of the Jeddah declaration and agreement which they signed and to which the Troika countries were witnesses.

8

This financial and military support, in terms of weapons and fighters, and political and media backing, on the other hand, contributed to this qualitative shift from a limited Janjaweed rebellion that could be defeated and controlled, to an unruly invasion that did everything to harm the people of Sudan.

If this is the scene nine months after the start of the war, then we must overcome the idea that we are facing an internal Janjaweed rebellion in order to know how to deal with the challenges of facing a full featured foreign invasion. How will we resist it? What are the appropriate tactics to defeat him? Is the army alone capable of defeating the invasion, or does it need more than the capabilities of the army alone?

To be continued