The War and The Positions of Sudan’s Neighbouring Countries

By Al Sadiq Al Rizaigi

There is no argument that the current war in the Sudan has started from its first day as a regional war. There was no way preventing it from expanding, with the involvement of states, international organizations and regional agencies who have been fanning its ambers. All these parties have been working to achieve their own vested interests and their objectives. Accordingly, they tend to take overt or covert positions, giving birth to alliances amongst them. The current vicious fighting taking place in the land of the Two Niles, has shown the amount of greed and voracity regionally and internationally, have targeted the Sudan its resources and its geological location. The war has been used to effect geopolitical changes in the most important region in Sub-Sahara Africa and the Horn of African, so as to control its resources.

The Sudanese scene has been in perpetual preparation for this war and its predators in line with wild strategic visions, since the demise of Bashir regime in April 11, 2019. This was the time when appetites were at their peak, the international parties forged their alliances, the lines were intertwined at home, deals were concluded with some neighboring countries, and directions were set over the past four years and when the war broke , the ranks quickly closed and lined up neatly, as the required positions were taken, and the unveiled is exposed, showing regional and international alliances and understandings were revealed, and all the playing cards were placed on the table.

It is possible to read the positions of Sudan’s neighboring countries according to one criterion: the type, size, and intensity of the greed to gain interests and ambitions between the internal and external components.

So it goes without saying that the geographic factors – including Sudan’s location on the continent, the greed for natural resources, the requirements of the regional and international security systems, and the political balances in the region – played a role in fanning, fueling, and prolonging the flames of the war, until it achieved its goals in a country that was the largest among the African and Arab countries, and still remains one amongst the largest countries, even after the secession of South Sudan.

The positions and trends of Sudan’s neighboring countries could be summarized as follows:

– Eritrea

President Isaias Afwerki’s suspicion of the Rapid Support Forces has remained since 2015, after its participation in the Yemen war and its role in the Darfur battles against the rebel movements at the time. When the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Commander, Major General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, paid a visit to Kasala in the company of the then new governor of the state, Adam Jamaa, in June 2016, questions were raised in Eritrea about the significance of the Rapid Support Commander’s participation in the state’s celebrations. Is there a desire on the part of Khartoum to expand these forces eastward and work to recruit members of the eastern Sudanese tribes into its ranks? More than one Eritrean official expressed concern during repeated visits to Khartoum, especially after the deterioration of relations between the two countries and the closure of the border from the Side of the Sudan in 2016.

But these Eritrean fears quickly dissipated somewhat after relations between the two countries returned to normal, and when the Rapid Support Forces became involved in combating illegal migration of people fleeing from the countries of the Horn of Africa across Eritrea and Ethiopia borderlines to Libya, and then across the Mediterranean Sea to the European Union countries. Khartoum made an effort to reassure the Eritrean side. Furthermore, following the change of April 11, 2019, the departure of Al-Bashir, and the arrival of the Rapid Support Commander to the position of second-in-command in the country, conditions were created for Hemedti’s and President Asias Afwerki of Eritrea to have direct relationship.

Meetings took place between them in the two capitals, and the region was supportive of the change in Sudan alongside some Gulf states, of which some worked to encourage a kind of understanding between Eritrea and RSF. At the same time, Asmara had good relations with the army leadership in Sudan, and there are security and political files that rule the course of this understanding.

Some regional countries, based on their relations with Eritrea, have tried to integrate the Rapid Support issue as an active file between them, in addition to the file of the war in the Ethiopian Tigray region and the Eritrean role in it. Steps were taken by the Rapid Support Forces to invest in Eritrea. And Eritrea cooperated with some countries in establishing a center for the assembly and transit of some of the Rapid Support forces that participated in the Yemen war through the ports of Eritrea

Only one month prior to the outbreak of war, Hemedti paid a visit to Eritrea, March 13, 2023, in light of escalating tension, signs of war, and mobilization operations. During his meeting with Isaias Afwerki, he launched a harsh attack on Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Sudanese Armed Forces, and he hinted at their intention to carry out decisive military action if the army led by al-Burhan failed to sign the Framework Agreement in its final form. Afwerki responded by not entering into this losing adventure, and stressed that things are not easy in the Sudanese army.

Despite Hemedti’s mockery of the Sudanese army and his criticism, Afwerki ended the meeting by advising him not to get involved into this destructive step, saying this was in Hemedti’s interest first, and then in the interest of the Sudan.

When the war broke out, Eritrea declared a clear position calling for the war to stop and to avoid the conflict from escalating.

Asmara underlined its call for ending the war, preventing its escalation, and avoiding its internationalization, and stressed the need for countries neighboring Sudan to contribute positively to finding solutions that guarantee the safety of Sudanese territory. Eritrea also highlighted eastern Sudan, cultural and tribal relations, and historical ties between the two countries, and the need to take into account the repercussions of the Sudanese conflict on the Horn of Africa region.

Recently, Eritrea’s relationship with the Sovereign Council, the government and the Sudanese army has strengthened, as coordination took place on many issues and files. The coming period could witness important developments in the Horn of Africa region. Due to the Somali-Ethiopian conflict and the visit of the Somali President to Eritrea a few days ago. Therefore, Eritrea will find itself in the middle of complex conflicts, and may be forced to announce positions that may impact the situation in Sudan.

Ethiopia

From April 2019 until the outbreak of war in April 2023, Ethiopia entered into a close investment and financial relationship with RSF. This relationship began with commercial investments and large financial deposits, and this cooperation has manifested itself in many aspects, from political support to multi-directional cooperation. In 2020, 12 RSF soldiers were absorbed for flight training in Ethiopia, and several RSF companies were registered in Addis Ababa in the same year.

This relationship also included investment in real estate projects, as Rapid Support purchased Ethio-Tabib Hospital and began expanding its business into real estate investment projects. In addition, Rapid Support purchased a chain of Kuriftu resorts in various regions in Ethiopia, and the deal also included a luxury resort known as “Alalla resort” in the city of Awassa in southern Ethiopia.