Written by Tom Gardner

**16//** Even though China has stated that it is on the path to economic recovery after the COVID-19 pandemic, it has reduced its financial assistance and loans to African countries. In 2021 and 2022, China scaled back its lending, but by early 2023, it resumed offering $4.61 billion in loans to African governments. Egypt and Nigeria were the largest recipients of these loans, each receiving $1 billion. However, Sudan was completely absent from this round of financing due to its debt issues.

**17//** As preparations for the fourth China-Africa Forum began in late 2023, China’s National Foreign Exchange Administration issued an official statement detailing the status of African debts owed to China. The statement revealed that by the end of 2023, African countries had accumulated $45.2 billion in debt, with nine countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana, Zambia, and Sudan, being listed as the most heavily indebted. Sudan’s overdue debt stood at over $6 billion, placing it seventh among the most indebted African nations. Despite these figures, China has not ruled out signing new agreements with African countries for infrastructure projects.

**18//** The return of Sudan’s military leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, from Beijing following the fourth China-Africa Forum in September 2024 brought promising news. He oversaw the signing of bilateral agreements in the fields of infrastructure, mining, agriculture, and defense industries. These developments offer hope in light of Sudan’s current dire circumstances, where regional and international powers have been limiting Sudan’s economic capabilities. However, Sudan must remain cautious. While China is quick to sign agreements, it is often slow to implement them, especially with countries that have high debt levels and are embroiled in internal conflict.

**19//** It is unwise to build high hopes on what China can deliver, particularly in a war-torn country like Sudan. The ongoing militia rebellion, which has devastated the country’s infrastructure, has also shattered Sudan’s civil service, leaving ministries understaffed and struggling to function. This environment makes it difficult to persuade China or any other country to invest large sums of money in infrastructure projects that could be destroyed by random bombings from insurgents.

**20//** Moreover, it is not practical to expect that post-war reconstruction in Sudan will automatically favor China and Russia, as recently suggested by Sudan’s Foreign Minister. Reconstruction is not about distributing opportunities but about securing the necessary resources and identifying the entities capable of providing those resources under technically sound conditions. Sudan cannot allocate grants or loans based on its preferences but must rely on whichever international partners are willing to assist under fair terms.

**21//** Finally, it is important to recognize that China does not give loans as charity. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while aiming to improve infrastructure globally, is also designed to secure access to the raw materials that China needs to support its growing population and expanding economy. As such, China’s main priority is to quickly secure access to African resources, including those in Sudan. However, given the ongoing war and violence in Sudan, the pressing question remains: where are Sudan’s resources now, and how can they be used for economic and developmental purposes amidst the conflict?

**22//** Ultimately, cooperation with China remains circular: it cannot advance without resolving the issue of Sudan’s unpaid debts. The ongoing war, which has devastated Sudan’s human and material resources, further complicates the possibility of a quick resolution. Sudan’s leadership must consider carefully before entering into any agreements that could hand over control of the country’s assets to Chinese companies, especially as many experts have warned of the dangers of China’s so-called “debt trap” diplomacy.

**23//** As for reaching a strategic level of cooperation with China, there are no current signs that this is likely to happen anytime soon. Sudan’s unresolved debt issues, the ongoing war, and China’s negative voting patterns at the United Nations, particularly in the Security Council, all suggest that a strategic partnership between the two countries remains a distant and unlikely prospect. Therefore, Sudan must focus on resolving its debt issues and stabilizing the country before expecting significant strategic cooperation from China. The road ahead is long and filled with obstacles, but traditional cooperation may still bear fruit if the necessary steps are taken.