Interviews
Al-An News publishes the most critical and powerful interview with General Yasser Al-Atta
General Yasser Al-Atta, assistant to the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese army and a member of the Sovereignty Council, stated that the situation on the ground across Sudan’s entire theater of operations is clearly, significantly, and rapidly shifting in favor of the armed forces. He affirmed that the army is advancing confidently and steadily toward achieving its goals and ending the rebellion, not only in the capital but also in Al-Jazira, North Kordofan, Darfur, and all other fronts.
In an exclusive interview with Al-Shorouk during a visit to the city of Omdurman, his first interview with an Egyptian newspaper since the outbreak of the war, Al-Atta denied claims made by the commander of the Rapid Support Forces militia, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” regarding the involvement of Egyptian aircraft in the fighting against his forces. He said, “This is an accusation made by a liar and ignorant man to justify his defeat, to express his hatred for the Egyptian people, and to serve the regional policies of Ethiopia and some allied countries.”
Al-Atta confirmed that Islamists did not ignite the war and have no connection to it. Hemedti was the one who sought support and an alliance with the leaders of the Islamic movement to win power in the elections.
Here is the full interview:
How is the current situation on all fronts in the capital’s triad (Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman), especially given the recent developments with the army’s progress?
The situation across the entire Sudanese theater of operations is clearly, significantly, and rapidly shifting in favor of the Sudanese armed forces. In the past periods, the armed forces have destroyed the militia’s hard power by carrying out defensive operations, then counter-offensive operations, and executing special operations that have tipped the balance of power in favor of the army in terms of the number of fighters and combat capabilities. While the number of rebel militia fighters has been decreasing, and their combat capabilities destroyed, the Sudanese state has been recruiting, mobilizing, training, and acquiring combat equipment. At present, our forces are moving to execute offensive and special operations, advancing confidently and steadily toward achieving their objectives and ending the rebellion, not only in the capital but also in Al-Jazira, North Kordofan, Darfur, and all fronts.
Why has the war prolonged despite earlier talks of resolving the battles within days of their outbreak?
The Sudanese armed forces, by their nature, have duties to protect the entire country’s borders, states, and vital areas, meaning that our forces are not only in Khartoum but are spread throughout Sudan. Meanwhile, the militia called up all its forces and capabilities, abandoning its positions and amassing its troops in Khartoum. Therefore, at the onset of the aggression against the state, the balance of power was initially in their favor. Additionally, the difficulty of urban warfare and the militia’s use of civilians as shields have delayed military operations and the resolution of the rebellion.
Regarding the claim by the Rapid Support Forces militia leader, “Hemedti,” about Egypt bombing his forces, how do you respond to his allegations?
I do not listen to the speeches of this ignorant liar and those around him. They lie even to themselves and believe their lies; their lives are filled with deceit and fraud. The relationship between the peoples of the Nile Valley in Egypt and Sudan extends back thousands of years and continues to this day. He cannot affect this historical, strong relationship. The history of the Sudanese Air Force began in 1956 and has evolved to the present moment, with our MiG-29 and Sukhoi jets participating and still participating in the Arab coalition to restore security to our brothers in Yemen. Hemedti knows the extent of our air capabilities, but his accusation is for several reasons, the most important of which are to justify his defeat, express his hatred for the Egyptian people, and serve the regional policies of Ethiopia and some allied countries. It’s also a naive and foolish attempt to gain more support from his backers and to alleviate international pressure on those parties for their support of war crimes and the killing of Sudanese civilians.
If Egypt had wanted to intervene, would it have waited a year and a half? And with the capabilities of the Egyptian Air Force, would it take long to destroy the militia? Therefore, this accusation is illogical, baseless, and disconnected from reality. Hemedti is known for his ignorance, lies, and deceit.
Some on social media spoke about a “massacre” in Halfaia, accusing Al-Bara Battalion of executing citizens due to their cooperation with the Rapid Support Forces.
This claim is entirely false and is part of false counter-propaganda with political motives by known political entities supporting the rebellion. I personally oversaw the Sudanese army’s crossing from Omdurman to the Halfaia area in Bahri. There were light and sporadic clashes due to the element of surprise in timing and location, resulting in militia casualties during the confrontation. No forces from the Popular Resistance Support Battalions participated.
On the second day, a small group from the Al-Bara Battalion crossed from Malak, one of the formations of the Popular Resistance, to take positions in specific locations to open the road with our forces in the Kaddaru area. No clashes or killings occurred, and the battalion’s responsibility does not include apprehending collaborators; they are fighters against the armed militia opposing the army.
Does the Sudanese army believe that the formation of popular resistance units could lead to a scenario similar to the Rapid Support Forces, posing a significant risk to the unity of the country and the maintenance of a professional army?
The battle in Sudan is against a rebel militia that has brought in hundreds of thousands of Arab migrants from West Africa with the aim of settling in Sudan. They have also brought in tens of thousands of mercenaries from South Sudan, Libya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Syria, and the Russian Wagner Group to defeat the Sudanese people. The entire nation has risen to defend its land, creating a historical epic by uniting with its army. These young men come from all regions, tribes, and political spectrums of Sudan. The youth of the December Revolution, the resistance committees, and groups like “Angry” are at the forefront, alongside youth from the Umma Party, the Democratic Alliance for Social Justice, and the leftist and Islamist currents. Why focus only on the Islamist youth? Aren’t they Sudanese, with the right to defend their country and expel the new colonizers from the Arab migrants of West Africa, just like the youth from other social and political currents fighting under the banner of the popular resistance and led by army officers?
Could they have political demands in the future after the war ends?
These youth asked to join the fight in response to the general commander’s call for mobilization. Most of them work abroad in the Gulf countries and Europe, earning high salaries due to their academic qualifications. I met with them in Omdurman and concluded that after the war, they do not wish to join the regular forces, and we have no political commitments with them. The state leadership’s decision is that governance will be through elections only, and there will be no compromise or growth of any other militia, no matter what. Sudan has one independent army, and these are our red lines, which we will fight anyone who attempts to cross.
How do you evaluate the battles in El Fasher, and are concerns about Darfur’s secession valid?
The plans of those who ignited the war are significant, and they have alternative strategies. We have no option but to win the battle of El Fasher as a launch point to liberate the entire country. I affirm that the Darfur region will not secede; it is the beating heart of our beloved nation, and all Sudanese people will fight there, and we will be victorious.
Is the Sudanese army on the verge of liberating Madani and the Al-Jazira region?
All preparations and arrangements have been completed to liberate the city of Madani and cleanse Al-Jazira state.
In your opinion, is the constitutional document still in effect, or has it been suspended or canceled?
In my view, I do not recognize the document or its constitutionality. A constitution must be approved either through a popular referendum or by an elected parliament. The document was an agreement between two parties, military and civilian, and the civilian side rebelled against the state, supported, and fought alongside foreign invaders. So, what document and what constitution?
But what is the evidence that the civilian side is fighting alongside the invaders and foreigners?
There are elements from them currently fighting in Bahri, as shown in several videos, including members of the Sudanese Congress Party and leaders from the Freedom and Change Forces.
According to the peace agreement, the transitional period is 39 months from its signing date (October 3, 2020). So, what is the legal status of the agreement, given that 48 months have passed and it is still in effect? Will the transitional period remain open until the war ends?
The peace parties are present, fighting alongside their people, and managing the state’s affairs with other national components. After the war, we will sit down, as we have done periodically, to review and adjust the peace agreement in a way that moves the country toward peace, security, and prosperity. We will also sit with all loyal sons of the homeland to agree on a transitional period to build the Sudanese state that the youth dream of.
I mean that the agreement stipulated a timeframe for political participation during the transitional period, which is 39 months, granting the signatories the right to hold state positions. Is this legally and correctly established?
Yes, the 39-month period was for the integration of their forces,and after that, elections would be held. However, their participation continues until the elections.
So, have the movements completed the integration process?
Almost all forces have completed the necessary military files and procedures and have received military numbers, except for the forces located in Darfur due to ongoing operations. The only remaining steps are integrating them into units and distributing them. All their forces present in the northern, eastern, and central regions, and all fronts are now part of the Sudanese armed forces, except for those fighting in El Fasher.
Legally, does General Al-Burhan have the authority to dismiss any member of the Sovereignty Council affiliated with the movements that signed the agreement?
There are certain crimes such as rebellion against the state, treason, crimes related to honor and integrity, or incapacitating illnesses that prevent duty fulfillment. In such cases, the president has the right to summon the Sovereignty Council and the Council of Ministers to decide on the matter. This applies not only to members from the Juba Agreement movements but to all members of the Sovereignty Council.
There is strong talk about the participation of Islamists in the decision-making center and that the mobilized fighters are Islamist youth, especially with the appearance of some of their elements with you on various occasions. How do you respond to this?
The decision-making center of the state is in the hands of the Sovereignty and Ministers Councils. Due to the war and the burdens of managing the state, the center includes the president, his deputy Malik Agar, General Shamseddine Kabbashi, Abdullah Yahya, the governor of Darfur, the finance and foreign ministers, and the director of the General Intelligence Service, along with military leaders responsible for war affairs. The rest of the members of the Sovereignty and Ministers Councils join for state civil affairs.
I appear with all our fighting forces—army, joint forces, security, reserve police, resistance battalions, support battalions (known as “Al-Bara’oun” and the “revolutionaries” and “angry ones”), and anyone who carries weapons to defend his country.
But there are concerns about the return of Islamists associated with the former regime, especially given accusations that they started the war and are supporting its continuation. What do you say about this?
Islamists did not start the war, and they have no connection to it. Hemedti met with the Islamic Movement leader Ali Karti twice before the war between July and September 2022, mediated and attended by the prominent Islamist leader and advisor to the Rapid Support Forces, Hasabu Mohamed Abdul Rahman. The first meeting took place at Karti’s brother’s house in the Shambat area of Bahri, while the second was held at one of the Rapid Support Forces’ centers in Khartoum 2, with the attendance of Hemedti’s brother, Abdul Rahim Dagalo, and several leaders of the Islamic Movement, including Osama Abdullah and Dardiri. The outcome of the two meetings was that they confronted Hemedti with his desire to seize power through a coup and fight the army. They told him, “If you fight the army, we will fight you and alongside the army. If you want to come to power through elections, you are free!” Hemedti then offered them an alliance through the ballot box, but they rejected his offer. Hemedti ultimately fought the army, and they fought with the army against him.
So, why is there a focus on Islamist youth only?
Currently, the youth of the December Revolution are fighting with us, including the neighborhood youth, the “Angry Ones,” and the resistance committees, with some of them martyred in battles. In addition, there are youth from the Mubarak Ardol Party and the Umma Party, who were part of the party’s army, most notably Walid Al-Tom.
After their participation in combat operations, I met with them twice, and they confirmed that they seek no rewards. In the second meeting, they expressed their only request: to participate in elections, regardless of whether people vote for them. From what I know, the Islamists are currently divided into several factions. There is a faction supporting the army and the Sudanese people, fighting alongside us, and there is a faction against us, which is Mohamed Atta’s group. Another faction supports and fights with the Rapid Support Forces, including the groups of Mohamed Hasabu Abdul Rahman and Ibrahim Baqal. All of these were cadres of the Islamic Movement.
After the revolution, when I was chairman of the Empowerment Removal Committee, we terminated the service of 305 officers in the army, police, intelligence, foreign ministry, judiciary, public prosecution, and media within government institutions due to their affiliation with the Islamic Movement. Hemedti then absorbed them. Most of the ambassadors whose services were terminated because of their ties to the Islamic Movement are now cells supporting Hemedti in America and Europe. There is also a media lobby backing him in Canada, Europe, Australia, Uganda, and Kenya. Additionally, some former members of the judiciary and prosecution defend him in international organizations in New York, Washington, Switzerland, IGAD, and the African Union.
Does the Sudanese army have any plans to integrate these Islamist factions, or is there a risk of them influencing the state again?
Our plan is clear: we will not allow the return of any militias or armed factions to control the state. We are committed to having a single, professional, and independent army. After the war, we will hold elections where all parties can participate, and the Sudanese people will have the final say. We are committed to a state built on democratic values, with no space for militia influences.
There are concerns that the political and security situation may lead to further divisions in the country. How does the army plan to address this?
Our priority is to ensure national unity and protect the sovereignty of the country. The Sudanese armed forces are working on stabilizing all areas of conflict, unifying the country, and rebuilding a sense of national identity and unity among all Sudanese people. We will not tolerate any attempts to divide Sudan or separate any region from the rest of the country.
What is the army’s stance on the continued presence of foreign forces and mercenaries in Sudan?
The presence of foreign forces and mercenaries is unacceptable. We will continue our operations until all foreign fighters are expelled, and we are working to cut off all their supply routes. Our aim is to reclaim Sudan’s sovereignty and ensure that no foreign entity influences or interferes in our internal affairs.
Is the Sudanese army planning to coordinate with international or regional allies to end the conflict?
We are open to cooperating with our regional and international allies, but only in a manner that respects Sudan’s sovereignty. We appreciate the support from our neighbors and allies who wish to see stability in Sudan. However, any cooperation will be based on mutual respect and the interests of Sudan and its people.
What message do you want to send to the Sudanese people in light of these ongoing battles?
To the Sudanese people, we assure you that the armed forces are committed to protecting the nation and its people. We are advancing steadily and with determination to restore stability and end this rebellion. We ask for your continued support and patience as we work toward a future where peace and prosperity prevail for all Sudanese.
How does the Sudanese army view the current international efforts and mediations aimed at resolving the conflict?
We are cautious regarding international mediation efforts. While we are open to any initiative that genuinely aims to achieve peace and stability in Sudan, we are wary of any attempts that may serve foreign agendas or impose unfair conditions that could compromise Sudan’s sovereignty. The Sudanese army is fully aware of the complexities and political interests involved, and we will only accept solutions that are in the best interests of the Sudanese people and that preserve the unity and integrity of the country.
What is the Sudanese army’s position regarding the international community’s pressure on humanitarian issues, especially given reports of civilian casualties and mass displacement?
We are committed to the protection of civilians and the safeguarding of humanitarian principles. The Sudanese armed forces take the issue of civilian casualties very seriously, and we are doing our utmost to minimize harm to civilians, despite the challenges posed by urban warfare and the tactics used by the militia, such as hiding among the civilian population. We welcome genuine humanitarian efforts to support the displaced and those affected by the conflict, but we also expect international organizations to maintain neutrality and not to be influenced by the propaganda of the rebel militias.
In light of the ongoing challenges, do you see a timeline for when the conflict might end, and what would be the next steps for Sudan’s recovery post-conflict?
We are making steady progress on all fronts, and we believe that, with the continued efforts of the Sudanese armed forces and the support of the Sudanese people, we will be able to conclude the military operations and eliminate the rebellion in the near future. Once peace is restored, our focus will shift to rebuilding the country, ensuring the return of displaced citizens, and revitalizing the economy. Our aim is to create a secure and stable environment where elections can be held, and where all Sudanese citizens can participate in building a democratic and prosperous nation.
Regarding the transitional government, how does the Sudanese army view the participation of opposition groups and other political entities in the post-conflict period?
Our position is clear: Sudan will only move forward through a democratic process where all political entities, opposition groups, and civil society organizations are given a fair chance to participate. The transitional government will work towards creating the necessary conditions for free and fair elections. We have no preference or bias toward any group; our aim is to uphold the will of the Sudanese people and ensure that the country remains united and sovereign.
How does the Sudanese army plan to handle the reintegration of rebel fighters after the conflict?
We are open to reintegration and reconciliation efforts for those who have been misled or coerced into joining the rebel militias, provided they surrender their weapons and pledge loyalty to the state. There will be programs for their rehabilitation and reintegration into society, with a focus on providing them with education, vocational training, and employment opportunities. However, those who have committed crimes against the Sudanese people or the state will be held accountable through legal channels. We are committed to justice and the rule of law.
Is there a vision for economic recovery, especially considering the damage caused by the war and the economic challenges Sudan was already facing?
Indeed, the war has further complicated the economic situation in Sudan. However, once stability is achieved, we plan to work with international partners to secure economic aid and investments that will help in rebuilding infrastructure and revitalizing key economic sectors such as agriculture, industry, and mining. We also aim to implement policies that encourage the return of Sudanese professionals and investors who left the country due to the conflict. Our priority is to build a resilient economy that can support sustainable development and improve the living standards of all Sudanese citizens.
Given the accusations of war crimes committed by both sides in this conflict, is the Sudanese army prepared to cooperate with international courts or organizations for investigations?
The Sudanese armed forces are committed to transparency and accountability. We are willing to cooperate with international and regional organizations in investigations, as long as they are impartial and not influenced by political motives. We believe that justice must be served, and those responsible for any violations, whether on our side or among the rebel militias, must be held accountable. However, we also expect these organizations to acknowledge the sacrifices made by the armed forces in protecting the Sudanese people and state.
Lastly, do you have any message for the international community regarding Sudan’s situation and what the Sudanese armed forces expect from their allies?
We urge the international community to support the legitimate efforts of the Sudanese armed forces in restoring peace and stability. Sudan is a sovereign nation, and we expect our allies and partners to respect our right to defend our country against external aggression and internal rebellion. We also ask that the international community provide humanitarian aid directly to those in need while ensuring that such aid does not fall into the hands of militias or those who seek to prolong the conflict. With the cooperation and support of our international partners, we are confident that Sudan will overcome these challenges and emerge stronger and more united.