The Anniversary of the Quarrelsome Partners: Was Al-Burhan’s Action on October 25 a Necessary Step?

In early October 2021, the area around the Presidential Palace in central Khartoum was filled with protesters, creating a vibrant revolutionary atmosphere. Tents were set up as if camping in a place of pilgrimage.

At that time, El-Tom Hajo, head of the Central Path, took to the platform, clasped his four fingers, and appeared to amend his previous slogan, “We’re not leaving until the statement is released,” adding, “from Hamdok himself.” Meanwhile, Darfur Governor Minni Arko Minawi stated they were delegating authority to the violated constitutional document to resolve the conflict.

Just days later, on October 25, Transitional Sovereignty Council Chairman Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan appeared on national television to announce the dissolution of the partnership with the Forces of Freedom and Change (Central Council faction), the dissolution of both the Sovereignty and Ministerial Councils, the dismissal of governors and ministry undersecretaries, and the freezing of the Empowerment Removal Committee. Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, though a partner in this separation, remained behind the scenes until he reappeared in November alongside the military component, signing a political statement before the media and with the diplomatic community in Khartoum present. He resumed his position at the Council of Ministers on Nile Street, engaging in numerous press interviews defending his new position without a political coalition, refuting claims of a military coup against the constitutional document, which remains in effect to this day. Opinions remain split: some view the events as a military coup, as evidenced by Sudan’s suspension from the African Union, while others see it as a much-needed corrective attempt since the civilian forces that took power were neither elected nor fully representative of the Sudanese political spectrum.

Three years have passed since those turbulent events. While the debate surrounding them has waned, it has been overshadowed by even more critical events, including the RSF rebellion, allegedly supported and incited by the Forces of Freedom and Change, now rebranded as the “Taqaddum Coordinating Body.” This group is currently accused of being the political sponsor of the Dagalo-led militia, with two agreements defining their relationship: the December 5, 2022, Framework Agreement and the January 2023 Addis Ababa Declaration. These developments have widened the gap between the Sudanese Armed Forces and Taqaddum, with arrest warrants issued for some of its leaders, including Hamdok, who is accused of war crimes, according to a statement by the Attorney General.

In a statement today (Friday), Taqaddum accused the so-called October coup of being the first step towards the April 15 conflict, furthering the militia narrative of who fired the first shot. In a surprising twist, RSF leader Hemedti recently claimed that the Framework Agreement itself was the catalyst for the war.

Taqaddum’s statement also condemned what it called the “Port Sudan Group” for attempting to gain legitimacy through warfare after the coup failed to achieve the participants’ goals. Taqaddum renewed its call for the so-called “forces of the revolution” to unite around their goals and work earnestly to end the war, address its repercussions, and establish a sustainable path toward civilian and democratic transition.

Notably, there was a near consensus among leaders of Sudan’s transitional government—both civilian and military—on the deteriorating economic, political, and security conditions. All openly acknowledged the disastrous reality, often stating, “Yes, we failed, but we continue,” as if persistence equated to success—or as doctors joke, “The operation was successful, but the patient died.” Opponents of the partnership argue that the slogans and mass mobilization were merely tools to elevate leaders, who then returned to their seats, leaving the people behind. The outcome was a failed system marred by corruption and settling political scores. The most notable product of these quarrelling partners was a deadlock: their disagreements were problematic, but their unity was catastrophic, ultimately leading to the deadly game of musical chairs.

The partnership between the military and the Forces of Freedom and Change faced significant challenges, primarily in attempting to balance the conflicting interests of both sides. This arrangement resembled a forced marriage resulting from an “illegitimate union,” with the continued exercise of power lacking popular legitimacy. The constitutional document was breached and amended multiple times under the pretence of peace requirements. At the same time, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were given considerable influence over state institutions, effectively quashing any prospect of elections.

Without legislative councils representing the people’s collective will, the media is often deprived of accurate information and restricted. Political opponents are detained without trial, or their bank accounts are frozen. Homes were confiscated by unauthorized committees (whose decisions were later overturned by the judiciary), and a select group began making all the decisions, as Stalin famously said. Anyone opposing this new authoritarian system was labelled anti-revolutionary, silencing them indefinitely. This was akin to chefs masking spoiled meat with hot peppers and spices so no one would detect the rot—the corruption had infected the transitional government itself, hidden beneath the scent of revolutionary “spices.”

Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok repeatedly used slogans like “We will prevail” in his speeches, betting on unfulfilled promises of international support and donor dollars. Meanwhile, Deputy Sovereignty Council Chairman Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) echoed statements like, “We have been patient long enough; this can’t go on; we have failed miserably,” as if failure was a badge of honour. Whenever Hemedti had an opportunity for an overseas visit, he would fully assume sovereign powers. Still, at any sign of domestic unrest, he moved quickly to suppress it, expanding his reach daily with civilian partnerships until he nearly engulfed all state institutions—only to later rebel against them.

During the early months of the transition, attempts were made to reform laws affecting society and religious matters and to normalize relations with Israel, sparking public outrage and backlash from religious leaders. Foreign interference in Sudanese affairs was evident, with international missions influencing political decisions, led by the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) under Volker Perthes.

Sudanese Army Commander Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan waited nearly three years to pronounce the death of the military-FFC partnership and approximately ten months to announce the army’s withdrawal from politics, calling on national forces to form an independent technocratic government, dissolve the Sovereignty Council, and establish a Supreme Military Council, according to his brief statement to the Sudanese people. However, none of these decisions materialized, including the formation of an independent non-partisan government. Observers had long expected the partnership to falter, as each side was wary of the other—even within the military component itself, where Hemedti later declared that things hadn’t gone as planned and expressed regret over his role in what he termed the “October 25 coup.”

Most critically, the military component disregarded Sudan’s historical precedents for transitional governance, where the army led a transition for no longer than a year before transferring power to an elected government, as exemplified by Field Marshal Abdel Rahman Swar al-Dahab after the April 1985 revolution that toppled Jaafar Nimeiri, and the October 1964 revolution that deposed General Ibrahim Abboud.