Ali Askouri
The wrong assumption that led to the destruction and crushing of the militia was their firm belief that the other peoples of Sudan (the soft Sunnis) did not know how to fight and wage war, and therefore would not withstand their violence. Thus, they recklessly launched an unprecedented barrage of fire on everything, thinking it would be a walk in the park, and that within hours they would control all of Sudan.
From the very first moment, the militia collided with an extraordinary resistance from the small force in Khartoum, which compensated for its small numbers with unparalleled courage that even armies could not match. With this heroic courage, the armed forces repelled wave after wave of the militia’s frenzied attacks. It soon became clear to the militia that the army they had assumed was composed of “soft Sunnis” was, in fact, a ferocious lion and solid steel that neither desert scorpions nor their forces could break or bend.
Now the militia has faced the army and the people, and they now know their strength. “How do you find us?” is what the Sudanese army and people say to the defeated militia.
The militia was founded and relied on a single combat tactic: heavy fire and fighting in the deserts against armed groups with limited supplies. They also relied on the support of the army in many areas during their few battles. Thus, they developed a false belief that they were invincible. This is the same belief that many historical emperors, including Napoleon, held—believing their army was invincible, which led to their expansionist ambitions. Napoleon, for instance, ventured into Russia, gambled with Moscow, and soon returned defeated, dragging the humiliation of defeat. Of course, the militia, unaware of the lessons from history, made the same mistakes—invading civilians in their areas, killing them without reason, and now the tables have turned on them.
The militia and their supporters failed to realize that in their suicidal gamble, they would face a regular army with a long and proud history, a force with honor beyond measure. They forgot that the Sudanese army is one of the oldest in Africa, second only to the Egyptian army, and that defeating it in its capital is nearly impossible. If the militia had remembered these facts about the Sudanese army and the resilience of its people, who were willing to endure hardships rather than be ruled by the militia, they would never have dared to enter such a deadly and unprecedented gamble in African history.
Without a doubt, every corner of Sudan has become a battlefield filled with the bodies of their soldiers who fled, leaving them exposed in the open. Is there a greater disgrace than fleeing and leaving your comrades’ bodies to be eaten by stray dogs and scavengers? But that is the behavior of the scum—they leave their comrades to die like beasts.
It is worth mentioning that the Sudanese army had little to no experience in urban warfare, and neither did the militia. Therefore, both sides started with equal lack of experience in the theater of battle, with the militia initially having a huge advantage in resources and manpower. However, as the battle progressed, the difference in tactics became evident between the professional army and the desert scavengers.
As fighting broke out in the capital, the army followed a professional defense strategy for its bases, absorbing the heavy fire. The militia attacked with massive forces, but with each assault, they suffered enormous losses in equipment and personnel, only to return in the same way, repeatedly defeated by the army’s defenses. The army broke their backs and killed tens of thousands of their fighters.
As a result of the well-executed plan, the militia failed to seize any of the army’s command centers they targeted. They failed to capture the General Command, the Armored Corps, the Engineers, the Signal Corps, the Camel Corps, etc. They had attacked these sites dozens of times, only to be repelled with huge losses in men and equipment. This is the difference between a professional army and the desert thugs, who know nothing of military tactics except pressing the trigger.
When the militia clearly faltered, unable to launch further waves of attacks on army positions, the army moved to the second phase of its plan, transitioning from defending its bases to attacking the militia, which was now on the brink of collapse.
What baffles me most is the militia’s assumption that the Sudanese army and people were soft and weak, easy to defeat in a matter of hours. How could they think they could defeat the Sudanese army and control the country? Who encouraged them to engage in this suicidal venture? Although I have read a good deal of history about wars and the pitfalls of daring leaders, I have never come across an example that matches the level of stupidity and suicidal mentality displayed by the militia. What they did is truly unprecedented in the history of warfare. I sincerely hope that some of our military academy students will dedicate their research to understanding the military stupidity of the militia, not only for the benefit of the armed forces but also so that the world knows that there is a new level of military stupidity, created by the militia, which is both laughable and shows unprecedented military ignorance. I have no doubt that what they did deserves a spot in the Guinness World Records for military stupidity! Truly, stupidity kills! This ignorance will be exposed after the war ends, and the world will know the extent of the militia’s casualties and losses in men and equipment.
Leaving aside the martyrs of the armed forces, the security forces, and the civilian victims, the question remains: how could one risk the lives of an entire generation in such a disastrous situation? This war has not weakened Sudan or its people or its army; instead, it has strengthened their unity, and they are capable of rising again quickly. As for the militia’s supporters, their youth has perished, and those who survived have lost limbs, becoming crippled. It will take decades for these groups to regain vitality. I believe it will take half a century or more for new generations to rise! Who is responsible for this, and why? These are questions that need to be answered by the enlightened members of these groups.
I had written to them last February after the liberation of the radio buildings, urging them to surrender to save lives, but at the time, I failed to realize I was addressing idiots who possessed an unprecedented level of stupidity. And so, they chose suicide instead of saving their lives.
Contrary to the militia’s assumption that the Sudanese army and its people were soft and weak, they discovered that their flesh was as bitter as gall. As soon as the army and other forces transitioned to the offensive, it became clear that the militia was fleeing.
I wrote this article before the liberation of Madani. And now, the Battle of Madani proves once again that the militia does not understand defense tactics and only knows how to attack with heavy fire. It is no surprise, then, that their defenses crumbled like the fall of palm trees, and the domino effect took hold—one stronghold after another fell.
Our rendezvous is in Khartoum, and we want our army to engage in a battle that leaves no one behind, with no mercy. This is our capital, and we cannot allow anyone to overtake us in the coming years, as Amr ibn Kulthum said:
“Let no one be ignorant of us,
For we will outdo the ignorance of the ignorant.”
Complete destruction is the slogan of the battle for the capital. This is what the people demand from their army, special forces, joint forces, and the mobilized reserves. This land is ours.
Quoted from “Sudanese Echoes”
