After Entering the Palace… Has the Sudanese Army Ended the Rapid Support Forces?

By Al-Sadiq Al-Rizigi

The Sudanese Armed Forces expelled the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia from the Republican Palace in the heart of Khartoum on the morning of March 21, 2025, and pursued them through the capital, which now appears almost completely free of rebel presence following fierce and intense battles. This came just days after a video statement by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), the rebel leader, in which he declared that his forces would not withdraw from the Republican Palace or Khartoum State. He vowed to continue fighting and confidently predicted inevitable victory.

Regardless of the details of the battles that took place in central Khartoum and the army’s success in removing the rebellion from Sudan’s most important sovereign site, the Sudanese army’s sweeping of the Republican Palace and reclaiming federal ministries, government headquarters, commercial buildings, and banks signifies the closing of a chapter that began in April 2019 — the period during which the RSF occupied the Republican Palace and its surroundings, both before and after the war, when the militia seized the entire area following the outbreak of conflict on April 15, 2023.

The defeat of the RSF and their expulsion from the Sudanese seat of power and Khartoum State undeniably marks a decisive victory for the army and the end of the RSF’s reckless military adventure. The RSF had believed that their military arrogance and coup against the government on April 15, 2023, would allow them to seize control of Sudan, impose their will (and that of their foreign backers), and dominate a country rich in political and social dynamics and natural resources.

It is important to examine the implications of the army’s reclaiming of the Republican Palace and the deeper meaning of these military and field developments on the RSF’s political project and the foreign-backed plan to subjugate and divide Sudan.

To understand this, one must consider the stages of strategic plans drawn up for Sudan and the region by Western circles — including a key study prepared by the Washington Center for Strategic Studies in 1981. Writings by Bernard Lewis and other Western and Israeli strategic experts have long detailed how to reshape Sudan’s political and social reality or divide it into mini-states if the effort to strip it of its identity and steer it away from its civilizational roots failed. The ultimate goal was to transform Sudan into an African country devoid of its Arab and Islamic ties.

This project was initially attempted through the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) led by John Garang, which was founded in 1983. After Garang’s efforts failed, South Sudan was separated. Later, there were attempts through the Darfur rebellions in 2003, which also failed. The RSF was then prepared meticulously to carry out this project, but now it too has failed to accomplish its goals.

The Sudanese army’s victories in Khartoum — following earlier successes in Sennar, Al-Jazira, North Kordofan, and North Darfur — signal the collapse of the RSF, which had initially gained ground in the first year of the war but is now rapidly retreating. The militia is now engulfed in a cloud of repeated defeats due to several key factors: the absence of unified leadership, the loss of command and control centers, and the militia’s lack of professional military structure.

Internal disputes have intensified within the RSF, with accusations of betrayal among its ranks, growing frustration, and plummeting morale among its fighters. Large numbers of fighters — particularly the mercenaries recruited from sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and the Horn of Africa — have fled. The RSF has also lost many field commanders and a significant portion of its elite forces, which had been well-trained and equipped to seize the capital and consolidate control over state institutions. Hemedti was prepared to declare himself president of Sudan if the RSF had succeeded in its military campaign.

The RSF’s plan from the beginning of the war was to transition to a decisive phase. After one year of conflict, the RSF and allied political forces (notably the Taqadum movement) had developed a comprehensive plan with their foreign backers to establish a parallel government.

The plan was based on two pillars: maintaining control over the Republican Palace as a symbol of state sovereignty and using it as the center of political propaganda once the government was declared. The RSF had positioned elite, well-trained forces inside Khartoum and the palace and had brought in technicians and specialized mercenaries trained in air defense systems, artillery, jamming technology, medium-range missiles, and anti-armor weapons. Expert teams in communications and military technology were also deployed, alongside additional snipers in central Khartoum and around the palace.

A senior RSF leader told a group of participants at recent Nairobi meetings: “Since the Sudanese army shows no intention of bombing the palace or destroying it over our heads, we must exploit this advantage to maintain control over the palace as a symbol of power. When our government is announced in Nairobi, it is essential that the palace remains under our control to ensure the success of the plan.”

This explains why the RSF fought so fiercely to hold onto the palace, and why Hemedti insisted in his recent statements that his forces would not abandon it. He sought to boost the morale of his fighters defending the palace.

By losing the Republican Palace, ministries, and government headquarters in central Khartoum, the RSF has lost its strategic foothold in Khartoum State. This crushes its hopes of seizing power and leaves it to face the bitterness of defeat. The RSF’s repeated military failures have shaken the confidence of its foreign backers, who now see the RSF teetering on the brink of collapse. The militia now controls only parts of four Darfur states and portions of West Kordofan — but even those strongholds are under threat from the Sudanese army’s growing momentum.

The rebels are also facing shifting regional dynamics. Sudan’s government has gained increased support from the African Union and key neighboring countries. Western (American and European) positions now hinge on the military situation on the ground — especially as growing evidence emerges of RSF’s human rights violations and atrocities in Darfur and Khartoum State.

Kenya’s facilitation of the RSF’s meetings with its allies to establish a parallel government has triggered political backlash. Kenyan opposition groups, tea exporters (Kenya earns $250 million annually from tea exports to Sudan), business chambers, and parliamentarians are pressuring President William Ruto over his RSF ties, which have damaged Kenya’s relationship with Sudan and harmed its economic interests. Sudan’s government has even threatened to close its airspace to Kenyan airlines.

The mounting internal pressure on Ruto and diplomatic advice from regional powers are likely to reduce Kenya’s political support for the RSF as the militia’s military position weakens.

If the Sudanese government continues its decisive campaign against the RSF — as indicated by recent statements from the head of the Sovereignty Council and other officials — Sudan will likely succeed in eliminating the RSF’s presence in Darfur. The next phase of the war will shift toward Darfur, where the army will have the advantage in open terrain.

The army has mobilized large joint forces, security units, and volunteer fighters from Darfur for the decisive battle. The RSF’s expulsion from the Republican Palace and central Khartoum marks the beginning of the end for the rebellion and signals the collapse of the RSF and its foreign backers’ ambitions to hijack the Sudanese state.