Media and War: “This Message is for Commander General Hemetti, May God Protect Him – Please Deliver it to Him” (2-2)

By: Abdallah Ali Ibrahim

Our media has failed to construct a compelling message to the world in its various languages that would convince it that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are truly a terrorist organization—although terror is, in fact, all they have to offer.

The appointment of media professionals at the Sudanese embassies in Cairo and Addis Ababa has brought to light the media’s role in war from one of its bleakest angles: the jurisprudence of function rather than the message itself. Among the core duties of media now is the call made by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, to align political and media efforts so that the world sees the RSF for what it really is: a force of terror, not a military entity to be equated with the national army—as mistakenly perceived by a feeble and disillusioned international community.

Continuing from yesterday’s discussion:

The ongoing war in Sudan is not one that aligns with the laws of warfare. These laws are based on the assumption of conflict between two military forces and emphasize professionalism as a means to reduce the destruction of war—not only for civilians but even for soldiers. These laws stipulate proportionality in attacking even military targets, let alone civilians. A force choosing to strike a military objective must calculate its firepower precisely to achieve its goal without causing excessive collateral damage. The essence of proportionality is to strike effectively, without overkill—and achieving this requires professionalism. The law explicitly states that combatants must be highly trained in military art to manage such targeting with precision. The law also insists on proper military intelligence, which can identify a legitimate target with skill, not guesswork.

Moreover, the law emphasizes training to prevent looting and theft. A report suggests that when looting occurs, it indicates poor training and weak leadership within the military force, exploiting the chaos of battle to steal from the powerless.

We do not see such professionalism in the RSF that would qualify them as a legitimate military force under the laws of war. Most fundamentally, they lack a command chain to ensure operational discipline. Sudanese citizens have been watching videos since the start of the war that clearly reveal the collapse of that chain of command, but dismiss them as “foolish noise” rather than acknowledging them as strong evidence of the RSF’s militia-like nature.

In these videos, individual RSF soldiers directly address their leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemetti), airing grievances, lodging protests, or offering unsolicited war strategies. Some urge a shift in operations from Khartoum to Nile or Northern States; others complain about neglect, stating that wounded soldiers are forced to pay for their own treatment. One soldier complains that weapons were not deployed in a Khartoum battle because they were in the custody of commanders spending time with their families elsewhere. Another criticizes the poor distribution of combat vehicles—left parked in desert areas with senior leaders while they were badly needed in Khartoum. He argues the vehicles should be en route to Port Sudan, the seat of the so-called “remnant government,” instead of idling uselessly. He even blames the war on “a conspiracy” involving Islamist remnants in eastern Sudan, using the local Darfurian term “Dar Sabah.”

Another angry video features a soldier addressing Hemetti after a defeat in Khartoum. He says only two brigades were actually present in the battle; others were missing along with ammunition and vehicles. He tells Hemetti that he’s doing his best, though perfection belongs only to God, and laments the lack of reinforcements or ammunition as the army advanced unhindered, killing civilians. He criticizes the absence of vehicles with mounted weapons—apparently withheld by commanders enjoying their new homes in Khartoum’s upscale Al-Manshiya neighborhood.

Some of these videos reveal explicit tribal tensions—particularly between the Messiria (from Kordofan) and the Mahariya (from Darfur). A soldier from the 40th Division, led by General Jalha (recently killed by the Sudanese army), identifies the unit as entirely Messirian. He claims Mahariya fighters hoarded vehicles meant for battle, leading to 52 casualties from his tribe. He names the fallen commanders and says they held their position on Al-Manshiya bridge until firing their last bullets. He does not hesitate to call their defeat a result of betrayal and manipulation—saying there was a “game” at play, while they alone fought for a real cause.

He also claims the seven vehicles lost in battle belonged specifically to the 40th Division, not to the RSF at large—emphasizing the independence of the Messiria within the RSF. He implies the battle was fought solely by his tribe, while others—perhaps the Mahariya, Hemetti’s own kin—stood aside, enjoying the spoils.

It’s hard, of course, to describe the relationship between RSF soldiers and their leadership as one befitting a legitimate military organization according to the law of war. There is no chain of command—no structure of discipline or professionalism. Each soldier seems to have his own war plan, and many openly speak of conspiracies that led them to destruction. Thus, framing Sudan’s war as one between two organized military forces is mistaken. The RSF lacks order and discipline and has revealed itself as nothing more than a terrorist force.

It is a positive step that Sudan has restored media positions at its central embassies in Cairo and Addis Ababa. However, it is concerning that these appointments have been framed more as jobs than as crucial media functions for a nation in an existential war. It’s undeniable that the government’s media apparatus has not nurtured a culture of initiative or eloquence—it was raised under long-standing dictatorships as nothing more than a megaphone for the regime.

Today’s government, in wartime, more than any before it, desperately needs a bold and capable media—not a loudspeaker but a sword—one that engages with global platforms, knowledge, and norms through compelling narratives:

For while some serve as the sword of the state, others are merely its drums and trumpets.