The Sudanese War in Its Third Year: An Analysis of the Military Institution’s Resilience

Dr. Abdelnasser Salim Hamid

Since the outbreak of armed conflict in Sudan in April 2023, the military institution has been subjected to an unconventional test in a complex, urban, and open combat environment—lacking institutional support and coordinated political backing. Despite the significant collapse of civilian infrastructure and the decline of state institutions, the Sudanese Armed Forces have managed to maintain their effectiveness as a regular force. This raises the question: what has enabled them to endure?

Initial indicators suggest that the stability of the military command chain and the continued effectiveness of command and control systems were the most crucial factors in preserving operational performance. There were no organizational breakdowns in the command hierarchy, and units continued to execute their tasks based on a sequential chain of field orders, reflecting the continued functionality of the internal organizational structure.

Additionally, the army faced severe logistical challenges, particularly the disruption of major supply lines and a shortage of operational resources. Nevertheless, it was able to carry out tactical repositioning and flexible resource distribution—militarily known as “operational flexibility.” The combat environment posed further challenges in urban engagement, where civilians and adversaries were intermingled. This necessitated precise tactics, including phased withdrawals and re-deployment within strategically prioritized zones.

Engineer Corps units, for instance, played a significant role in securing safe passageways behind frontlines and in establishing temporary infrastructure to support combat movements. Infantry units adopted flexible deployment mechanisms using small, multi-directional groups—an approach requiring high levels of discipline and field control.

In one front in the city of Omdurman, a small infantry unit remained besieged for five days without direct support or stable communications. Yet, it maintained its position under field orders and successfully secured the evacuation of civilians before reinforcements arrived. Incidents like this, though simple in nature, reflect the depth of organizational discipline under pressure.

Field leadership was the cornerstone of operational cohesion, with field officers granted the autonomy to make decisions within the broader strategic framework—militarily referred to as “Tactical Autonomy.” This is a rare attribute in armies plagued by weak doctrinal formation or heavy bureaucracy. What also distinguished the Sudanese army was its horizontal organizational cohesion, as sectors continued coordinated operations laterally even in the absence of constant centralized directives.

At the organizational level, no incidents of division or mutiny based on regional, political, or tribal grounds were reported—reinforcing the notion that the military doctrine within the Sudanese Armed Forces remains effective and constitutes a primary barrier against internal fragmentation. Notably, front-line soldiers continued fulfilling their duties despite a near-total absence of material incentives, delayed salaries, deteriorating living conditions, and severe psychological strain. Still, no mass desertions or collapses were observed—an outcome best understood through the lens of “military duty ethics,” which are cultivated over years of systematic training rather than acquired overnight.

This discipline under pressure is what granted the military institution its ability to persist while other state organs crumbled. However, such resilience has not come without cost. Prolonged stress, the absence of rotational assignments, and the psychological exposure experienced by soldiers in an unstable environment all have lasting effects on the long-term readiness of combatants. Some soldiers went months without leave or regular contact with their families, constantly under threat. This cumulative moral erosion must be taken seriously in any future evaluation phase, as neglecting it could impact discipline in the post-war period.

On another front, the army played non-combat roles, including securing civilian facilities, protecting medical centers, and managing local conflicts in areas where state institutions had withdrawn. This role, commonly referred to as a “legitimacy-enhancing security function,” helped bolster the army’s image among broad segments of the population. While other actors engaged in chaotic or regionally driven behavior, the army upheld a minimum level of institutional conduct—making it a preferable option in the eyes of many.

Compared to the experiences of armies that collapsed after the first shock—such as in Libya and Yemen—the Sudanese army preserved two critical elements: unity of command and stability of organizational doctrine. Despite limited support and a lack of political coordination, field performance remained cohesive. These attributes are what later distinguished armies that recovered from conflict, such as the Colombian military after its long struggle with militias or the Iraqi army post-2014. In those cases, internal cohesion allowed for reconstruction based on an existing framework, not from scratch.

The central question after all this is not just how the army survived, but how this resilience can be transformed into lasting institutional stability. The next challenge is not just maintaining combat readiness, but restoring balance between military and civilian roles. Any institution emerging from a long war is steeped in an emergency mindset, which requires true institutional regulation to prevent the exception from becoming the norm.

In conclusion, the Sudanese army’s experience—marked by both hardships and achievements—offers a realistic model for how an institution can endure amidst the collapse of its environment. This resilience is not only military but also organizational and ethical. If properly invested, it could form the cornerstone of state rebuilding—not just its defense. Endurance alone is not enough unless it is codified and harnessed as a foundational element for building a state, not merely as a temporary military condition.

The success of any army in enduring a prolonged war is not solely measured by its battlefield presence, but by its ability to maintain internal cohesion, societal legitimacy, and readiness to evolve into a force that guarantees stability rather than perpetuating conflict. If the war imposed harsh choices on the Sudanese army, the post-war era will place upon it even more complex responsibilities—starting with reorganization and ending with redefining its relationship with the state and society.