The New Imperialism and the “Weaponization” of Investment in Africa (2–3)

By: Al-Tijani Abdel Qadir Hamid

(4) The UAE in Africa

Observers note that the United Arab Emirates has, over the past two decades, adopted an expansive economic strategy in Africa. This has taken the form of massive investments across diverse sectors, ranging from infrastructure, energy, and food security to defense and security. These investments have struck a nerve in some of the world’s major economies and frequently make global headlines. The New York Times, for instance, has described how the UAE is “pouring money into Africa in search of resources,” while the Financial Times published a detailed report on the “UAE’s growing influence in Africa.” The latter highlighted Abu Dhabi’s pledge of $97 billion in African investments during 2022–2023 across renewable energy, ports, mining, real estate, telecommunications, agriculture, and manufacturing—triple the commitments made by China.

Numerous reports also point to extensive UAE land acquisitions in Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Tanzania, a practice often labeled as “land grabbing.”

Another key feature of Abu Dhabi’s Africa strategy is its “chain of ports” policy. Through bilateral agreements or outright purchases, the UAE has gained control over the construction and management of at least 12 ports along Africa’s coastline.

Its expansion into the financial sector is equally notable. In Egypt, for example, analysts note that the UAE has become a shareholder in five of the country’s most important banks, acquired other financial institutions, penetrated the real estate and healthcare markets, and taken ownership of several hotels. The much-publicized Ras El Hekma project, described in Western media as a “rescue plan for Egypt,” is but one episode in this broader Emirati economic expansion.

Several factors, both internal and external, have fueled this trajectory. Domestically, the UAE is motivated by the strategic imperative of diversifying its economy beyond oil, requiring heavy investments in agriculture, energy, and logistics networks. Externally, the retrenchment of some major powers, coupled with Africa’s fragile political and economic conditions, the aftershocks of the Arab uprisings, and rising global demand for food and energy, have opened significant opportunities.

While there is no objection to genuine economic investment by the UAE in Africa or elsewhere, concerns arise over its underlying political goals and the instruments it employs. Analysts note that Emirati ventures often combine economic investment with security and military presence, as well as alliances with political and military actors—both in government and opposition. In other words, investments quickly transition from the economic sphere into the domains of security and defense.

In fragile African states, the UAE is not merely purchasing land or building ports—it is constructing “walls of money” to shape political forces, elevate leaders aligned with its objectives, and secure loyal allies. This strategy has been evident in its support for President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Ethiopia, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in eastern Libya, and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemetti) in Sudan, as well as other figures in Chad, South Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya.

This “weaponization of investment” is particularly visible in Libya, Chad, Ethiopia, and Sudan.

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(5) The “Weaponization” of Investment

Libya:
Following the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime and the subsequent political and territorial fragmentation, the UAE placed its bets on Khalifa Haftar, backing him with money and arms. Researchers argue that Abu Dhabi went further—financing mercenaries, recruiting remnants of the old regime and criminal networks, supplying military advisers and trainers, and securing bases. In effect, the UAE carved out a strategic enclave in Libya’s oil crescent, giving it leverage over regimes in Chad and Sudan while strengthening its ties with Egypt.

Chad:
In June 2023, the UAE signed a military cooperation agreement with Chad, supplying military hardware and security equipment under the pretext of counterterrorism and border protection. Since then, Chad has received Chinese-made FK-2000 surface-to-air defense systems. Chad also plays a key role in facilitating the transfer of military equipment to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) through Am Jarass airport.

Ethiopia:
The UAE’s interest in Ethiopia is rooted in its geopolitical and security ambitions, particularly its desire to secure ports along the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. When Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, Abu Dhabi immediately pledged $3 billion to stabilize his fragile economy. However, support soon extended into trade and direct military assistance, including training programs and arms deliveries. In 2021, as Tigrayan forces advanced on Addis Ababa and Abiy’s government faced collapse, the UAE rushed to supply drones that turned the tide, enabling the Ethiopian army to crush the Tigrayan advance and preserve Abiy’s rule.

Sudan:
Emirati ties with Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemetti) date back to 2015, when the RSF joined the Saudi- and UAE-led “Operation Decisive Storm” in Yemen. Abu Dhabi sought to strengthen this partnership for two reasons: economically, Hemetti controlled vast gold resources in Darfur, much of which was funneled to the UAE; politically, Abu Dhabi viewed Hemetti’s forces as a bulwark against what it perceives as the threat of “political Islam.”

When war broke out between Hemetti’s RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces, the UAE openly tilted toward Hemetti, supplying him with weapons—replicating its approach in Libya with Haftar and in Ethiopia with Abiy Ahmed.

The New York Times captured this contradiction in an article titled: “The UAE talks peace in Sudan while fueling its war,” revealing how a U.S. ally was using humanitarian aid as cover for military support. Although the UAE has denied arming the RSF, a UN Panel of Experts documented regular cargo flights from the UAE to Chad during the conflict, as well as overland routes channeling weapons into Sudan.