The Designation… and What Is Intended From It Inside Sudan (1)

As I See 

Adel El-Baz

1
When I read the designation decision, it seemed clear to me that it was necessary to look beyond it. In politics, major decisions are rarely merely legal or procedural acts; behind every decision lie layers of political calculations, interests, and conflicts. The decision to designate the Islamic Movement is no exception to this rule. It has long been known—and openly discussed—that the United Arab Emirates and the groups associated with the “Sumoud” camp, with their well-known agenda, had been working for months, indeed years, to push the United States toward making this decision. As Cameron Hudson noted, the Emirati–Zionist lobby succeeded in persuading Washington to take that step.

But why now? Why with such speed? And what is the ultimate objective?

To answer these questions, and to understand what lies behind the decision, we should look closely at the sanctions that are typically imposed when an entity is designated as a terrorist organization:

• Freezing all assets within the United States or those that pass through the U.S. financial system.
• Prohibiting any financial or commercial dealings between U.S. citizens or companies and the designated entity.
• Severely restricting access to the international banking system, since most transfers pass through the U.S. dollar or banks linked to the American financial system.
• Criminalizing any material or financial support to the organization.
• Allowing prosecution of any individual or institution that provides support, even outside the United States.
• Restricting travel and visas for anyone associated with the organization.

There is no doubt that the United States—and those who pushed it to make this decision—know perfectly well that the Sudanese Islamic Movement has no assets in the United States or abroad passing through the global banking system. Nor does it conduct commercial dealings with any American entity or citizen, and there is no publicly declared source of support for it. In other words, all the sanctions that would result from this decision are, in practical terms, largely devoid of real effect, which makes the decision appear—on the surface—like little more than empty theatrics.

Yet the truth is that this decision carries other objectives far more dangerous for Sudan—not for the Islamic Movement itself—and it may have significant consequences if the idea behind it succeeds and its aims are realized.

2
The most important message in this decision is directed at the Sudanese government—or at the state itself—to place it under American pressure. How? And why?

Because the United States and the parties that sought the designation aim to create discord within the army’s camp—the so-called “Karama” camp. The targeting of the Al-Baraa Brigade, in particular, is not coincidental. The message to the army is that it should distance itself from the Islamist groups operating under its command—in effect removing thousands of hardened fighters from the battlefield.

Under the designation framework, some fighters from the Justice and Equality Movement may also be pushed out of the conflict, since, according to the Emirati view, it too is regarded as an Islamist group. In this way, the army could find itself forced to weaken its own camp—unless matters escalate to the point of sparking internal discord between those groups and the army itself.

The real target here is not the Islamic Movement as such, but the dismantling of the military and social environment fighting alongside the army. In other words, the aim is to pressure the army into emptying its ranks of supporting forces and stripping away the backing of thousands of young fighters at a time when recruitment and preparation of alternatives are difficult, while its adversaries are mobilizing thousands from inside Sudan and beyond.

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If that happens, the first objective will have been achieved: dismantling the army’s camp in order to weaken and isolate it. When the army is forced to fight its battle alone while its natural allies are pushed aside, the balance of power on the battlefield gradually shifts in favor of its opponents. Eventually, the army may even find itself confronting political and social forces that had previously supported it.

In short, what is desired is a weakened army with no popular backing, making it more susceptible to the imposition of a pre-prepared agenda.

4
Now, if the army responds to the designation and aligns itself with it, the process will not stop there. The same forces behind the decision already describe the army itself as a “Kizan army” or an “Islamic Movement army.” Accordingly, the next step would be a return to the plan of dismantling the army itself.

This is one of the hidden implications of the designation. If the army accepts the decision and dismisses the forces supporting it, it may later be asked to dismantle the military institution itself under titles such as “restructuring” and “reform.” The same logic would apply to the intelligence service and other state institutions.

All of this ultimately aims to pressure the army and hollow out its camp in order to implement the agenda of U.S. envoy Massad Boulos. It was therefore hardly surprising that immediately after the designation was announced he reiterated his call insistently: “The time has come to stop the war and reach a ceasefire agreement.”

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Thus, in essence, the decision is less a legal instrument than a political tool to reshape the balance of power inside Sudan. The issue now is not the designation of the Islamic Movement—whatever one may think of that designation. The real question is not why the Islamic Movement was designated, but what this designation is intended to accomplish inside Sudan, particularly within the army’s camp.

That is where the real story begins—not with the text of the decision itself. The real issue now is not the decision per se, but how the state will deal with it, and whether it will alter the balance of power within the army’s camp. That is something the coming days will reveal.

If these are some of the objectives the designation seeks to achieve, there are also other political aims behind it.

To be continued.