A Five-Way Framework with a Six-Sided Problem!!

As I See 

Adel El-Baz

1.

The world that came to help Sudanese unite found itself scattered in all directions because of them! The Sudanese situation is astonishing. Disagreement appears to be the norm, and the contagion of their divisions has spread to organizations, states, and political groups—from the “Quad” to the “Quintet,” and even to the Wilton Park meetings in London (July 22–24, 2026), which became mired in theoretical discussions about the “future of governance” and systems of administration at a time when artillery was the only audible voice across the plains of Kordofan.

These meetings faced sharp criticism over what was described as the sidelining of national sovereignty and an attempt to engineer a new political reality away from any consensus among the forces that actually wield influence on the ground. While delegations shuttle between capitals and become immersed in debates over political formations and representation, Sudanese citizens pay the highest price. Sudan has become a theater for the region’s largest conflict and a massive displacement crisis. This bitter disconnect between the noise of conference halls and the suffering of people in displacement camps reflects a political and moral failure on the part of the international community.

Despite intensive efforts and continuous meetings, the “Quad” failed because of Sudan’s firm position rejecting any mediation that includes countries supporting one of the parties to the conflict. Distrust prevailed over the Quad’s initiative, which the United Arab Emirates was seen as steering from behind the scenes while providing generous support to the militia. Conflicting interests among the four countries created deep differences in their respective visions for Sudan. While Egypt and Saudi Arabia insisted that the state should be governed by institutions rather than militias, the mechanism failed to unify these positions or exert balanced pressure.

Thus, the Quad was transformed from a mechanism that had been expected to help halt the fighting into a political framework with limited influence, while the war continued to impose new realities on the ground, moving far faster than the pace of diplomacy.

2.

As for the Quintet initiative, which brought together the United Nations, the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Arab League, and the European Union, it was more complex and sprawling, reflecting the state of diplomatic confusion. Its story was even stranger.

Consultative meetings were held in Addis Ababa from June 3–5, 2026, bringing together a broad range of political parties, political forces, individual figures, and civil society organizations to discuss the formation of a preparatory committee for national dialogue. However, the meetings failed to achieve any genuine breakthrough.

The mechanism was like someone gathering firewood in the dark, placing influential forces alongside others with little political weight in the same basket. Although it announced that it would collect written proposals and lay the groundwork for a preparatory committee for broader Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue, it acknowledged the depth of the divisions and said that consultations would continue.

Ultimately, it failed to produce consensus among forces divided over fundamental issues, including the legitimacy of state institutions, the identity of participants, and the sequencing of priorities between ending the war and pursuing political transition. With military operations continuing, the outcome remained closer to preliminary consultations than to a substantive political process.

The complications began with the list of invitees. Some political forces objected to the inclusion of new parties, and Sudanese political groups entered the meetings already divided, with alliances holding conflicting positions on the war, legitimacy, and the shape of the transitional period. They could not agree on a common agenda.

Some forces accused the mechanism of bias or of attempting to impose an international vision, while others criticized it for failing to make decisive choices. The controversy over the participation of Islamists even led to threats of withdrawal. Eventually, a committee arrived at what can only be described as a “strange workaround”: excluding the National Congress Party and Tasis from any political dialogue, even though Tasis had not originally been among those invited.

This was an attempt at exclusion that repeated an earlier approach—one that will not produce stability. I will return to this issue in a separate article.

3.

Thus, the chapters of the Quad and the Quintet were closed, just as the chapter of the Jeddah Declaration had been closed before them, because of the international community’s biases and its inability to impose serious sanctions on the militia—not to mention its reluctance to designate it a “terrorist militia,” while other political forces have been branded as such without credible charges.

The international community failed to halt the UAE’s provision of money and weapons to the militia. It also failed to pressure neighboring countries that have opened their borders to training camps, or those whose territories have become transit routes for weapons and logistical support to the militia. Others have simply stood by as spectators—or benefited from the prevailing security vacuum.

The conflicting regional agendas, ranging from those seeking geopolitical influence to those coveting Sudan’s resources, have turned Sudan’s borders into black holes that drain state sovereignty and prolong the war.

The conference spectacles staged in more than ten capitals have ultimately produced nothing—mere ashes despite all the noise and money spent. Sadly, the international community appears less interested in pursuing peace than in riding the train of misinformation and obfuscation.