About What Happens in Manama: Between Blaming and Regretting (3-3)

Public opinion has been preoccupied with many events regarding what happened in the Bahraini capital, including a meeting between the army leadership and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and at the level of the second “man” in each, as if the preoccupation of many in the civilian political movement with ending the war would not have been preoccupied with a meeting at this level, or addressing the desire of the two parties to meet to put an end to it, unlike a meeting in Djibouti between the two leaders.

For the first time, the army leadership was unable to defend the initial principles that were agreed upon in Manama, and it is not because it is divided or that (Kabashi) supports the negotiated solution and (Burhan) is subject to the control of the remnants, and therefore he either does not have his decision, and here some extremists in the pro-war camp requires the necessity of isolating him, even from non-Islamists and those affiliated with the revolutionary camp after the war divided it, or that his decision is to go to war according to political ambitions within the majority of the military leadership in power, not different from the ambition of Hemedti himself, according to the scenario of the two generals’ unjust war.  Hemedti also, for the first time, and according to my estimation, is willing to end the war, but he is unable!  Here I must point out that I have always been convinced, contrary to what is being exported as a civilian position, that Hemedti is able to accept an end to the war but is unwilling, and that the army leadership remained, and perhaps still is, willing to end it but is unable;  The ability of the army as an institution to end the war remained influenced by a strict institutional (and professional) legacy in dealing with its friendly (forces). It was always viewed as being (inferior) to the army, and the army absolutely did not care that it was the result of its circumstances, and preferred to believe that it was its creation.  The army gave up this legacy in the case of RSF before, and a long time ago when confronting Musa Hilal.  The army decided to eliminate the growing influence of Hemedti, and here it crossed a red line in the formation of elite armies, as the friendly militia is controlled by official forces only, and no official armies allowed conflict between the militias that it supported, unless the militia’s influence was higher than that of  the elite army, let alone supporting one of them in a conflict like this, also remained convinced within the officers and soldiers of the armed forces that defeating the RSF would be a matter of hours immediately after its rebellion, unlike the army leadership, and since the days of Al-Bashir, which doubted this, or delayed, as it always seemed to them that the confrontation with the RSF will be a confrontation with “Al-Bashir” himself, before Al-Bashir was shocked – after the arrest of Sheikh Musa Hilal, and the reward for the RSF Commander by bequeathing to him the Sheikh’s military power (border guard forces) and economic power (Jabal Amer gold mines) -, As Hemedti has become independent from him, Resistant to confrontation!  Consequently, as Al-Bashir, the army commander has continued to avoid any confrontation with the RSF and prefers to offer concessions and concessions to gain its satisfaction. Satisfying it has become a more difficult issue as its influence grows in the face of the state’s influence and its definitions.  After the revolution and at the borders of the framework agreement, and as a result of the naivety of its supporters and the stubbornness of its people, the concessions required to be made to the RSF Commander became the same as what he could achieve through war and more!  Aside from the sterile question of who fired the first shot in this war, these are the underlying conditions for the war before its inevitable start in light of the growth of Hemedti’s ambition, the atrophy of the imagination of other elites, and their ambition falling under the ceiling of the state as well.  Consequently, we are faced with a reality in which it is difficult for the army leadership to accept ending the war within the institution, whose members consider the war as an opportunity to get rid of a situation that is already abnormal for them. The leadership’s desire to accept it again or to return to it in any way is sufficient to overthrow the leadership itself, and this is something that has become clear since Bakrawi coup before the October 25 coup, and ending with what now appears to be discontent from the army officers and during the war, according to what was reported recently about the arrests of active leaders in the battles following an attempted coup against the current leadership of the army!  While Hemedti remained in control of his forces and through his family as if they were a family inheritance, ending the war was governed by his desire, but the continuation of the war throughout this period produced different dynamics in which the final word was no longer – within forces that fought for different reasons and motives and made huge sacrifices -,  For the Dagalo family alone, let alone that this war itself for many of the (Faza forces (RSF mobilized forces)) an end in itself, and that the issue of peace may collide with all those within the army and the RSF first, and more threateningly now to the ability of both parties to end it, whenever desire exists as a basis for the will to do this.

The failure to officially announce what happened in Manama remains the official position on another round of negotiations, regardless of the priorities of this war, even as it is the clearest contradiction to the state’s investment in violence. However, the conditions for ending it will not be without a greater investment in enforcing the rule of law over everyone, and they will be technical issues; Such as the removal of heavy and high-quality weapons is one of the conditions for stopping the fighting, which is necessary for both parties to control any discrepancies immediately after ending it. This is a matter that may require the deployment of international forces so that the conditions for stopping the fighting and disarmament should not be a reason for it to break out again according to the superiority of one of its parties as per the conditions of peace, and the most important thing is that the agreement should not be just a truce, and whatever motives there may be on the part of civilian parties, from within the Islamists, for example, to continue the war, something that may now be fueled by what is known as the general situation in the army and not their real influence within the army, as a result of the state of dissatisfaction that is clear now, but it is a position that will further weaken the army’s ability on war too!  Whatever illusions exist on the part of other parties that the RSF War was against the remnants of the former regime, it is now on the way to becoming a war against itself if the national parties do not help, before international pressure, strengthen the will to end the war and establish peace.

Europe, a description that preceded the dismantling of its empire after World War (I) and the division of its colonies as a catalyst among the colonial allies more in the Sykes-Picot Agreement than the division of Germany itself, and the targeting of Turkey itself after the Balkan countries were liberated from its grip and the denunciation of any European depth it has.

 **As happened in 1889, of displacement and demographic changes without economic conditions and according to political changes only, and the involvement of huge numbers in the wars of the Mahdist state after the liberation of Khartoum in 86 to extend its control internally and regionally as well, productive activity in Sudan declined, causing Sudan to lose more than 2 million  population (more than 25% of the total population at that time) due to famine (popularly known as the famine of the year six, corresponding to the Hijri year 1306). The same threats and dangers exist now due to displacement, the threat to agriculture and grazing, and the involvement of large numbers in war, thus impoverishing productive activity, and lack of ability to provide medical treatment services, that makes Sudan now, in addition to the existing risks of war, the threat of famine that has been classified by United Nations organizations, with more than twenty million facing a severe lack of food security, since August 2023, that is, before the resumption of negotiations in October, and also the spread of diseases and epidemics.  Recently, areas in eastern Sudan suffered from a limited spread of dengue fever in Port Sudan and Kassala!