The Dilemma of Priorities in Sudan’s War

Moatasim Agraa

Broadly speaking, the liberal, modernist, and pro-democracy camp—whether liberal or leftist—has split into two distinct positions. One faction openly or covertly supports the foreign-backed Janjaweed invasion, viewing it either as the last available path to democracy or as the lesser of two evils compared to military rule. I commend this group for the clarity of its position, even though I have no respect for those who support foreign aggression while pretending to be neutral.

There is, however, another faction within the modernist and pro-democracy camp—both liberals and leftists—that sincerely opposes both the Janjaweed’s foreign-backed aggression and the military government. In principle, this is the correct stance, as we should always strive for democratic governance under the rule of law. Yet framing the issue this way and stopping there is the easy part.

The difficult question—one this faction avoids confronting publicly—is this: What should take priority now: opposing foreign aggression or opposing the de facto government? Sudan is facing one of the fiercest cases of foreign aggression in post-colonial Africa. The state is being shaken to its foundations and struggling for survival. Civilian infrastructure is being bombed by neighboring states. Mercenaries from various regions are descending upon Sudan to kill its people. Externally funded Janjaweed militias are committing widespread sexual violence, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. Under such circumstances, what should be the priority?

I understand the argument that our duty is to oppose both foreign aggression and military rule once the war ends. But what about now, while bombs are falling, drones are destroying power stations and hospitals, and the very existence of the Sudanese state—not merely the government—is under threat? The question of priorities is not a theoretical abstraction; it directly shapes the tone and focus of daily political and media discourse.

I understand the position that we can oppose both aggression and military rule after the war. But what about now, while bombs continue to fall, drones destroy critical infrastructure, and the state’s survival hangs in the balance? The liberal-left faction that genuinely opposes the Janjaweed’s foreign-backed aggression continues to evade this issue, acting as though no challenge of prioritization exists. They prefer the easy position of opposing both sides simultaneously, believing this preserves their moral integrity.

Yet this is a false integrity. Foreign intervention was always present—politically and militarily—during the rule of Omar al-Bashir’s Islamist government. At that time, prioritizing the overthrow of the military regime was a position shared by virtually everyone.

No one feared being accused of siding with foreign intervention, which included harsh economic sanctions, significant political pressure, and even the arming of rebel movements against the government. Today, however, this same faction has become paralyzed, terrified that prioritizing resistance to foreign aggression in order to preserve Sudan’s state institutions will lead to accusations of supporting military rule.

During the years of opposition to Bashir, when foreign pressure against his government was largely ignored—or even welcomed—by liberals and leftists, no one worried about being branded an agent of foreign intervention.

The realities of that period clearly favored overthrowing the regime and working toward democratic civilian governance. Today, however, anyone who prioritizes defending the Sudanese state against a fierce foreign assault is immediately accused of siding with military rule.

This persuasive form of moral intimidation frightens many liberals and leftists and effectively removes them from the sphere of meaningful resistance to imperial aggression. In practice, it places them on the side of that aggression through silent complicity or through the habit of condemning “both sides of the conflict” with equal intensity, regardless of their stated intentions.

In a recent article published in Jacobin magazine titled “For Iranians, Despair Is Not a Strategy,” the young Iranian radical Hoda Katebi wrote: “Our future cannot truly be in our own hands unless Iran is freed from the constant threat of external annihilation.” Perhaps Katebi’s observation—that a people cannot determine their own destiny while living under the threat of destruction from abroad—offers a useful starting point for unpacking the question of priorities.

It goes without saying that foreign aggression does not produce democracy or human dignity. History consistently demonstrates this fact. It is for the same reason that Leon Trotsky once argued that if democratic Britain were to attack a fascist Brazilian government, he would not hesitate to defend Brazil. Quite simply, Britain’s democratic system would not magically generate democracy in Brazil. Instead, the likely outcome would be a new dictatorship, adding yet another layer of exploitation. The Brazilian citizen, already exploited by a military government, would then also be exploited by an external power across the ocean.

And since it has become fashionable these days to associate Marxists with Islamists, it is perhaps only fair to balance our references to Trotsky and the leftist Hoda Katebi with a quotation from the Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, who famously said: “The wise person is not the one who merely distinguishes good from evil, but the one who knows the better of two goods and the lesser of two evils.”