Ending Sudan’s War Urgently Does Not Mean Surrendering to Barbarism

Dr. Abdelwahab El-Affendi

A few weeks ago, I met a Western diplomat who carries the title of “Special Envoy to Sudan.” One might borrow the question posed by Abu Firas al-Hamdani through the lips of his sarcastic beloved when he introduced himself as her “slain victim”: “Which one? There are many.” Indeed, there are more than a dozen special envoys from Western, Eastern, and African countries assigned to Sudan (or “East Africa”). If we also count envoys from regional and international organizations, the number becomes difficult to tally.

I have met several of these envoys, either in meetings or individually, usually accompanied by aides, ambassadors, and others. I will not identify any of them for two reasons: first, to respect the confidentiality of such discussions; and second, because there is little meaningful difference in the questions they ask or the arguments they repeat. For my part, I invariably give the same answer to their recurring question about the quickest way to end the war in Sudan: decisively confronting barbarism. I continue to hope that one day one of them will finally understand it.

There are minor differences among them, but these hardly work in favor of those who diverge, since they often reveal a startling degree of ignorance. One envoy, after I briefly explained why residents of Khartoum and other regions had fled the horrific abuses committed by the militia against civilians, asked whether conditions were not essentially the same in areas controlled by the army. I nearly gathered my papers and left without comment, stunned that a diplomat in such a position could display such ignorance. Instead, I stayed a few more minutes to explain a distinction that many illiterate people already understand and suggested that he assign one of his many assistants to verify the claim for himself.

Another diplomat justified his country’s inability to pressure the militia into halting its atrocities by arguing that a Gulf state supporting the militia provides essential services to the United States in relation to Gaza. I replied that the last time I reviewed the principles of the European Union and international law, I found no provision stating that genocide, mass rape, looting, and crimes against civilians require permission from a third country before they can even be condemned, let alone confronted. Had not his own country imposed sanctions on numerous states, including Sudan, over accusations not far removed from these?

A Group This Barbaric Cannot Become Part of a Modern State

To clarify, my repeated answer to international diplomats who ask about the fastest and most effective means of ending the war is that major powers and influential regional and international organizations must exert coordinated pressure on the militia to stop the war crimes in which it has become deeply immersed.

A unified message is needed: the continuation of such atrocities disqualifies the militia from earning a seat at any negotiating table. A group that behaves with this level of barbarity cannot under any circumstances become part of the structure of a modern state. The primary duty of any state is to protect its citizens from precisely this kind of savagery. A state betrays that duty if it accepts such a group as a partner or yields to its coercion.

Can it seriously be imagined that the leaders of such a faction should become part of a modern state’s leadership without first acknowledging responsibility for the crimes committed, expressing genuine remorse, and removing those responsible? Should they receive salaries and benefits funded by the very people who have been violated, bereaved, widowed, orphaned, impoverished, starved, and displaced?

Even this would be the bare minimum. Ideally, such a criminal organization should have no place in the state at all, let alone govern it. Note that I am not calling for an end to the war itself, but rather an end to its crimes. Some uninformed observers repeat the claim that war crimes are inseparable from war itself. Neither international law nor the Qur’an supports such an assertion.

All of these conversations took place before the tragedy of El Fasher. After El Fasher, I spoke to only two or three of these envoys, telling them that what happened there merely confirmed what many of us had been saying all along: coexistence with such a violent criminal entity is impossible.

The catastrophe of El Fasher was not solely the responsibility of the barbaric militia and its entourage of self-proclaimed democrats and intellectuals. It was also the responsibility of major powers, the African Union, and the international community as a whole. The genocide unfolded over more than two years, while the perpetrators documented their actions on video—the only aspects of modernity they seem to have mastered, apart from drones. Anyone possessing a voice and even a fragment of conscience issued warnings. Yet the envoys continued visiting the dens of these criminals or inviting them to neighboring capitals for coffee and conversation, listening to their rhetoric about democracy and fighting Islamists. Then each envoy returned to collect his allowances until the next catastrophe occurred.

Dialogue Is Meaningful Only with Those Possessing Humanity and Reason

I would also point out that militia leaders and their defenders routinely excuse these atrocities by claiming that the perpetrators are merely “rogue elements” beyond the militia’s control. If that excuse is true, then any agreement with the militia is meaningless because those same rogue actors will continue their violations regardless of any deal.

The more accurate assessment, of course, is that the militia itself is a rogue entity, incapable of restraining its own impulses toward looting, killing, and sexual violence. This reality demands a moral rejection of any agreement that would restore such a force to the center of Sudanese political life. Before that, it requires a determined international effort to deter this brutality. At the very least, militia leaders and their political supporters should be informed that their current conduct will never be a pathway to power or to acceptance by the region or the international community.

Such a stance is preferable to the illusion that ever greater brutality will somehow compel Sudanese citizens and the international community to submit to blackmail. Resolute action is preferable to hypocrisy and complicity. It should begin with preventing the looting of humanitarian aid and extend to stopping attacks on civilians, ethnic killings, and the destruction of health, education, and administrative services upon which life itself depends.

During one meeting, an aide to an envoy interpreted my criticism of diplomats’ meetings with the Janjaweed as opposition to dialogue with them. He argued that diplomats must speak with all parties. I replied that my position was precisely the opposite. I encourage engagement with the militia, but without flattery, appeasement, or evasion of the central issue—the barbarity of its conduct.

What is needed is a firm and unified message: the international community will not tolerate genocide, nor will it elevate those responsible for it—or their sympathizers—to positions of power under international sponsorship. This is not some novel principle we have invented. It is simply what international law and the laws of these very states require.

The militia is a lawless entity incapable of restraining itself from looting, killing, and sexual violence. That reality imposes a moral obligation to reject any arrangement that restores it to the heart of Sudanese politics.

It is true that in the post-Gaza era we have witnessed not merely indifference toward genocide but active participation in it through money, weapons, and endless justifications. Yet that does not mean such behavior has become the new law of international relations, particularly since those involved continue to rely on denial and deception.

On another occasion, one diplomat remarked that there could be no military solution to this conflict and that dialogue was the only path forward. I responded that if Sudanese people had accepted this logic and continued pleading with the Janjaweed to leave their homes, hospitals, schools, and farms in Khartoum, Wad Madani, Al Jazirah, Sennar, and elsewhere, the barbarians would still be sitting comfortably, continuing their abuses and mocking their victims.

Instead, those territories were reclaimed through the determination and sacrifices of fighting men and women. Millions of displaced residents have begun returning—not because the perpetrators graciously permitted it, but because they were forced out. Dialogue becomes meaningful only with those who possess at least a measure of humanity and reason, and within an international environment that demonstrates some commitment to justice and fairness.

The diplomat and his companions responded with silence. They had been repeating these clichés for so long that they had ceased to examine them critically. Yet these same governments support Ukraine’s right to defend itself against a nuclear superpower and support Israel—a nuclear power as well—on the grounds that a few hundred Palestinian fighters supposedly threaten its existence. In Sudan, however—and often in Gaza as well—the prescribed solution is for people simply to accept barbarians as their rulers.

This reflects an underlying belief that we ourselves are barbarians who can be governed only through the whip and the sword. We reserve the right to disagree.

Postscript: Unfortunately, much of what has been said about international diplomacy applies even more directly to that segment of Sudan’s political elite that has effectively become the political wing of the Janjaweed militia. These figures provide political cover for militia leaders and their sponsors, defending even the gravest crimes without offering so much as a word of advice—let alone criticism—regarding the need to stop genocide, looting, rape, and the brutal practices that have accompanied the militia wherever it has gone.

They persisted in this stance even when their own villages and extended families became victims of looting, humiliation, and displacement, and even after senior Janjaweed commanders themselves began distancing themselves from the militia’s promised “democracy,” acknowledging its crimes and expressing remorse. Charity, after all, begins at home.