Mawlana Ahmed Haroun: A Trial or a Public Humiliation?!

Abdullah Ali Ibrahim
January 3, 2023
(The trial has dragged on for four years, during which the defendants have grown older and begun to show signs of age-related ailments, while calls for its expeditious conclusion continue to mount.)
If former President Omar al-Bashir’s recent testimony before the court trying those accused of the June 1989 coup has any merit, it is that it reminded people that this trial, which began more than two years ago, is still underway. Those impressed by his testimony praised his courage in assuming full responsibility for the coup, despite the arguments he advanced condemning the parliamentary system whose demise he himself brought about through the coup. Others, however, believed that by accepting responsibility for the coup, he was acting out of compulsion rather than heroism, since he had merely stated what was already necessarily known about him and his coup. Had he said anything different, his testimony would have lost all meaning.
Al-Bashir’s testimony in court about the coup prompted many people to turn their attention back to the proceedings, if only briefly, after a prolonged period of disengagement. The trial’s excessive duration, or rather its seemingly endless prolongation, had exhausted people at a time when political, economic, and health crises were piling up and compounding one another, leaving them with little appetite to follow the hearings. Even the demonstrations by supporters of the former regime, who used to gather outside the courthouse to express solidarity with their detained leaders as they arrived for hearings, had dwindled or disappeared altogether.
Nevertheless, the legal profession, both the prosecution and the defence, must bear responsibility for the public’s declining interest in this important trial. The defence has yet to come to terms with the judicial nature of the proceedings, having dismissed them as nothing more than a purely political affair orchestrated by a government—the post-revolutionary transitional government—that had usurped power. Matters were made worse by violations of the Constitution and principles of justice, which we shall address below.
As a result, the defence strategy was built around refusing to engage with the substantive charge: that their clients had participated in carrying out the coup. Accordingly, the defendants, in keeping with this strategy, either refused to give statements before the investigation committee or dated their roles in the Salvation regime to a period after the coup had taken place. The military defendants, in particular, could hardly deny having participated in the Salvation regime in various capacities, as this was unavoidable. Indeed, one defendant even retracted a statement he had previously made in the investigation record in order to align himself with the defence team’s strategy of boycotting what it described as a political court exercising authority over its clients.
Once the defence team had concluded that there was no substantive case before the court worthy of litigation, it effectively transformed itself into a daily political demonstration. Anyone patient enough to watch recordings of the court sessions would repeatedly hear the judge attempting to calm or discipline members of the defence team with expressions such as: “Nobody is to speak,” “Sit down,” and “Please sit down, counsel.” When the judge’s patience wore thin, he would call out: “Do we need to take action against you?”
The judge did, in fact, take action against one lawyer for doing more than merely standing up and speaking without the court’s permission. The lawyer had insisted that the investigating officer should not mention the name of any defendant, or anyone associated with the coup, without first addressing them by an honorific such as “Dr.” He also insisted that those who had passed away be mentioned with an appropriate prayer for God’s mercy.
At one point, the judge suspended the hearing, withdrew with the other members of the court, and returned with a decision to expel defence counsel from the courtroom. The defence team avoided the expulsion by issuing a collective apology to the court. Two lawyers apologized, although one would have been sufficient. The court accepted the apology and allowed the lawyer who had been ordered out to remain in the hearing.
On more than one occasion during the proceedings, I also sensed a division within the defence team itself: between those representing members of the National Congress Party and those defending members of its rival, the Popular Congress Party, which split from it in 1999.
The defence team’s disruptive conduct eventually reached the level of an outright demonstration during one hearing. What provoked the lawyers was the prosecution’s description of their tactics for obstructing the proceedings as “disregard” for the court, citing several examples. A group of defence lawyers stood up simultaneously, each seeking to protest the use of the word and respond to the prosecution’s accusation. Their voices rose in such confusion that no one could hear anyone else. The scene continued for approximately four minutes, during which the judge repeatedly raised his voice, saying: “Sit down. Please sit down, counsel. Nobody is to speak. Respect the court.”
When his appeals proved futile, he adjourned the hearing to confer with the other members of the court. When the proceedings resumed, the judge read the following warning to the defence team:
“The defence team has repeatedly refused to comply with the court’s decisions and has frequently interrupted its proceedings. Maintaining order and managing the hearing are matters that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court and its judges, or the presiding judge. Respecting the court means respecting the judicial authority and the justice institutions, including the judiciary, the Public Prosecution, and even the Sudanese Bar Association.
“The court is capable of maintaining order during its hearings. Its silence does not indicate weakness, nor does it mean that it is unfamiliar with the law. It possesses sufficient legal authority to ensure that proceedings are properly conducted and managed.
“What you are doing—excuse me, I mean some members of the defence team, not all of you—constitutes criminal conduct and a violation of Article 138. It may even amount to obstructing the course of justice, which is a complete criminal offence punishable under the Criminal Act of 1991.
“I hope we will not be compelled to take such action in the future. I ask you to respect the court. The court is capable of inviting anyone to speak and granting everyone an opportunity to be heard. It is conducting a fair trial for the defendants. The court is not acting arbitrarily; it is operating in accordance with the law. Any conduct that disrupts the proceedings will not be tolerated. I hope we will not be forced to take such measures in the future.”
It is clear that the judge had endured more than anyone could reasonably be expected to tolerate from the defence. Indeed, he himself had taken over from a previous judge who had apologized for being unable to continue presiding over the same court due to health reasons.
What has truly discouraged people from following the trial of the 1989 coup leaders, however, is the refusal of lawyers aligned with the revolutionary camp to follow the hearings or comment on either their procedural or substantive aspects. This trial offered a rare opportunity for an entire generation of Sudanese to witness the public legal accountability of rulers who violated the Constitution and overthrew a parliamentary system that the people had restored through the 1985 revolution, ending Jaafar Nimeiri’s 16-year dictatorship. Accountability, as everyone knows, is a cornerstone of democracy.
The country’s intellectual elite have often attributed the repeated collapse of democracy in Sudan—on three occasions since independence in 1956—to the absence of a democratic political culture. This is a sweeping and unsupported assertion. No people living in a democratic country today were born with democracy already on their lips. Democratic culture, like all forms of culture, develops and flourishes among people over time. It is the product of knowledge and experience acquired through the struggle against authoritarian regimes.
One such experience is bringing a dictatorship to an end, as happened in our case, and transforming the experience of putting its leaders on trial into a culture that gradually permeates people’s minds and hearts. Such a culture provides them with an intellectual and moral immunity against the temptations of those who secretly covet power.
Although the defence team transformed the proceedings into a political demonstration, as we have seen, it nevertheless raised issues that deserved serious consideration by lawyers aligned with the revolution. They should have addressed these issues publicly and offered their legal opinions, thereby helping to nurture democratic culture among the wider public.
Among the defence’s strongest arguments for describing the trial as politically motivated was the fact that the Attorney General, who established the investigation committee, had himself filed a complaint against their clients, along with others, accusing them of the very same coup before assuming the office of Attorney General. The defence argued that this circumstance cast serious doubt on the fairness of the proceedings. It also objected to the presence of one of the judges on the court, on the grounds that he had participated in the revolution against their former regime.
On the substantive side, the defence argued that the coup charge had become time-barred after 30 years. They further contended that the charge was undermined by the fact that all the other political parties had, in one way or another, subsequently participated in the coup regime. If the coup was a crime, they argued, then the participation of those parties in the regime made it a continuing crime.
The argument that a crime becomes continuous when others who did not commit it initially later participate in it is reminiscent of an argument made by Hassan al-Turabi in 1965. While condemning those responsible for the 1958 coup but opposing their prosecution, he argued that if such a trial were to take place, the entire army and major political parties that had supported the coup would also have to be put on trial. This is the kind of argument that dissolves the specific into the general, a tactic we Sudanese call “losing the trail in the water.”
There is, of course, nothing in the defence’s objections outlined above that is particularly difficult to answer. Consider, for example, how the concept of recusal became widely discussed at precisely the time when the defence team representing the 1989 coup leaders was raising concerns about the Attorney General’s political animosity towards their clients.
At the time, Jeff Sessions, the United States Attorney General, had recused himself from overseeing the investigation into contacts between President Donald Trump’s campaign and Russia because he himself had communicated with Russian officials during the election campaign.
Those who belonged to the generation of the 1960s will remember how fascinated they were by legal terminology during the televised trial of the perpetrators of the failed 1959 coup. It was then that they first encountered terms such as “circumstantial evidence” and learned what they meant. They also became familiar with legal authorities such as Indian jurist Ratanlal, whose name frequently appeared in the discussions of lawyers in the courtroom. It was an enriching educational experience.
This trial has gone on for far too long. Over its four years, the defendants have grown considerably older, with the ailments of old age beginning to take their toll. One cannot help but feel distressed at seeing them in such visibly frail condition, despite the special arrangements the court has made to enable the proceedings to continue. The trial has dragged on to such an extent that even the defendants themselves have begun demanding that it be expedited.
The trial was expected to reach its conclusion by now, allowing everyone to understand its true nature and distinguish its substance from its outward appearance. The COVID-19 pandemic undoubtedly contributed to the prolonged proceedings. On one occasion, the defence even requested a full two-month postponement of the hearings as a precautionary measure.
Nevertheless, the defence team’s responsibility for prolonging the trial is by far the greatest. Judging by the conduct of its members in court, it appears that after stripping their clients’ case of its substantive content by dismissing the proceedings as a political conspiracy, they collectively resolved to defend the leading figures of their political movement by exhausting the court, dragging out its proceedings, and undermining its standing.
Perhaps they became so consumed by politics that they forgot that most of their clients are already well advanced in old age and may not be able to withstand further attempts to exhaust the court through endless procedural manoeuvres. Indeed, at one point, the defence itself submitted a motion requesting that the case against one of its clients be dismissed on the grounds that he was no longer medically fit to stand trial.
The defence team must find a way to expedite this long-running trial, in the best interests of its own clients, as it should have done from the outset.



