Hemedti, Why Have They Made Him?

Article (5)

By: Salma Hamad

Introduction:-
This series of articles aims to monitor and analyze the stages and reasons that transformed the Rapid Support (RSF) from a semi-regular force supporting the armed forces into a parallel force fighting the army… and how Hemedti’s ambition developed from seeking to gain the satisfaction of the leaders of the state and the army to seeking to lead the state and dismantle the army… and how and why local, regional, and international political forces played important roles in fueling this ambition and shaping this transformation.
*The Constitution of the South African Firm:-
After October 25, the scene was filled with initiatives, the most prominent of which were the initiative of the tripartite mechanism “the United Nations, the African Union, and IGAD” and the initiative of the people of Sudan under the auspices of Sheikh Al-Tayeb Al-Jedd, then the initiative of Malik Agar and the initiative of the Revolutionary Front. Finally, the “Quartet Mechanism” initiative – Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Britain, and America – then merged the initiatives of the Tripartite and Quartet mechanisms and was agreed upon by FFC, the Central Counci, Al Dagalo, and later the Armed Forces, according to conditions and amendments..
Al-Arabia 9/6/2022
With Saudi-American mediation, the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) met with the army. The meeting lasted 5 hours at the home of the Saudi ambassador in Khartoum.”
FFC meetings were held with Hemedti and Abdul-Rahim Dagalo under the supervision and coordination of the ambassadors of the Quartet and Volker Peretz. These meetings succeeded in reviving and renewing the old alliance, which resulted in an agreement with a South African Legal Firm to write a draft of a transitional constitution (this was stated by Maryam Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi in a TV interview). It was agreed with some members of the Steering Committee of the Bar Association to adopt the draft, some of whose members denied the Steering Committee relationship with writing the draft in a well-known press conference.

8/8/2022, The “Transitional Constitutional Framework” workshop was held at the Lawyers’ House, and the attendees were led by the ambassadors of the Quartet and the Tripartite group, the head of the UNTAMIS mission, Volker Peretz, and a number of ambassadors and envoys.
The day after the workshop, Hemedti issued a statement in which he welcomed the draft constitution without having seen it, as he said!!
13/9/2022, The Middle East News:
“The tone of ‘hostility’ between FFC and the RSF has clearly eased recently, which was clearly highlighted in the press conference held by the coalition at the beginning of this month, in which it equated the army with the RSF.”
13/9/2022, The Middle East News:
“The Vice President of the Sovereign Council, Commander of the RSF, Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), expressed his welcome to the draft transitional constitution prepared by the Steering Committee of the Sudanese Bar Association. The draft constitution stipulates that the powers that signed the draft constitution choose the leaders of the transitional civil government, including members of the Sovereign Council. The Prime Minister, ministers, members of the Legislative Council, state governors, heads of the judiciary, the prosecution, and the Constitutional Court.”
The forces that signed that constitution are the FFC (the Central Council), a faction of the Popular Congress. Mr. Hassan Al-Mirghani of the Democratic Unionist Party (the party announced its rejection of the Agreement), and a number of Darfur movements under the banner of the Revolutionary Front.

11/4/2022, Reuters:
“Army commanders in Sudan presented comments on the draft constitution as a basis for internationally mediated talks.”
Framework Agreement:—
12/5/2022, Al Jazeera News:
“Today, Monday, in the Sudanese capital, a “Framework” Agreement was signed between the military and multiple political forces, stipulating the launch of a political transition phase led by civilians for a period of two years and ending with elections.”
.The most prominent provisions of the framework agreement:-
The group that signed it has the exclusive right to choose the leaders of the transitional civil government (members of the Sovereign Council, the Prime Minister, ministers, members of the Legislative Council, state governors, heads of the judiciary, the prosecution, and the Constitutional Court. The Prime Minister is the one who heads the Security and Defense Council, and the security, intelligence, and police services report to him).
The army’s distance from politics and any economic activity (it did not mention the Rapid Support economic empire)
Integrating the RSF and the Armed Movement Forces into the army according to subsequent arrangements.
Reforming the judiciary and achieving transitional justice.
Evaluation and assessment of the Juba Peace Agreement.
Dismantling the June 30 Regime and reviewing the decisions of the Court of Appeal.
Approval of a permanent constitution for the country (before the elections) and holding elections within two years.
One of the provisions that sparked widespread controversy was a clause that stipulated that (the Sudanese state is a civil state that stands at the same distance from all religions), which was interpreted by extremist as secularism that excludes the Islamic religion and does not recognize Islamic law as a source of the constitution.
A number of major issues were referred to five workshops for discussion and approval before the final signing, which are (security and military reform, justice, eastern Sudan, the peace agreement, and dismantling empowerment).
Kholoud Khairallah, Director of the Confluence Advisory Foundation and accredited expert at the Malcolm Kerr-Carping Peace Center (in the Middle East), said in a study conducted by the Center on the Framework Agreement, in which the opinions of some experts were polled, January 12, 2023: (The champions of the agreement hope that the workshops will lead to the consensual work that was recently launched to discuss critical issues aims to gain the support of the Sudanese people on the supposed outcome of the agreement, and to sign a final agreement, which those familiar with the issue that has already been drafted, making the current workshops a mere farce.
Security and Military Reform Workshop:–
It was the time bomb that sparked the dispute.
29/3/2023, The Middle East News :
“Sudden withdrawal of Sudanese army leaders from the security reform workshop.”
13/4/2023, Al Jazeera News:
“The army demanded that the farce RSF be merged into one army and that there be a single command for the army after the merger.
The army also demanded that the RSF companies follow the Ministry of Finance and known government procedures.
29/3/2023 Reuters:
“The army presented its technical papers during the reform workshop, proposing a period of two years to integrate the RSF into the armed forces, while the RSF presented a paper demanding ten years while maintaining all its political and financial privileges.”

The opinions and requirements of the Armed Forces were not included in the recommendations of the final workshop, so their representatives withdrew and refused to sign the recommendations of the workshop, which made the duration of the merger ten years and granted the RSF complete independence as forces parallel to the Armed Forces, and did not oblige it to hand over its economic institutions to the Ministry of Finance similar to the Armed Forces. What is worse is that it did not include time scheduling for the merger.
We go back to what Kholoud Khairallah said in the Carnegie Center study: (The biggest winner from this agreement is the commander of the paramilitary RSF, Lieutenant General Mohammed Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” whom the agreement raises from Burhan’s deputy to his equal. This is a step that puts Sudan at a distance farther from civilian rule and closer to a possible civil war).
The army demanded that its vision and conditions be included in the committee’s recommendations and refused to sign the unfair and incomplete recommendations.
The RSF and civil forces that signed the framework escalated their position of rejecting any amendment to its provisions and issued a sharp threatening speech. Hemedti said at a Ramadan iftar in the Sheikh Al-Kabashi suburb, “If you don’t want this country to separate and fall apart, come with us in this framework agreement,” and Maryam Al-Sadiq said, “The political process is an option.” It is preferable for us, but if we stumble upon various obstacles, we will develop alternative options. Babiker Faisal said (the framework or war) and Mohammad Al-Faki said (the alternative to the framework is confrontation).
These statements coincided with the influx of the RSF, its convoys and equipment into Khartoum, which made it a serious military threat.

To be continued