Geopolitics and the Diplomatic Implications of Al-Burhan’s Visit to China

– Al-Burhan’s visit to China was preceded by several visits from Jibril Ibrahim, the Minister of Finance, and Malik Agar, a member of the Sovereign Council.

– However, what distinguished Al-Burhan’s visit, which took place during a highly significant China-Africa summit, was that it occurred at the presidential level, where he met with the Chinese president. Agreements were reached with Chinese entities for investments in highly sensitive strategic sectors such as defense industries, energy, and mining.

– The U.S. administration must be watching all of this with concern and distraction.

– We have previously argued that the U.S. administration has no specific interests in Sudan.

– It despises the Janjaweed but does not oppose them beyond mere statements. All that matters to the U.S. is preventing China, Russia, and Iran from gaining access to our waters or beginning investments in our resources.

– As long as this trio remains distant, the U.S. leaves Sudan to its regional allies, as the interests of the Sudanese people are not worth disturbing its allies over.

– However, it’s important to note that power in the U.S. isn’t monopolized by the administration alone; there are wealthy and influential lobbies, as well as a media with its own agendas.

– For example, the secession of South Sudan was driven by the evangelical Christian lobby in alliance with other lobbies, and the resulting influence was more significant than the administration’s or the deep state’s position.

– Al-Burhan’s visit marks a turning point in the Sudanese war.

– There is no doubt that the implications of his visit to China will worry the U.S. administration and its Western allies. Previously, Al-Burhan’s connections with China and Russia were seen as mere moves to signal to the West that he had options, urging them to ease their stance on him.

– But this time, Al-Burhan’s visit to China, the agreements made, and the memoranda of understanding exchanged suggest that the matter has entered a new phase, no longer just a tactic to extract crumbs from the U.S. and the West.

– Just as Beijing intentionally engages with him, Moscow and Tehran will likely do the same.

– Al-Burhan also provoked the U.S. during the visit by reaffirming Sudan’s support for the unity and sovereignty of China, aligning himself with Beijing against Taiwan’s attempts for independence.

– Despite the improvement in Saudi Arabia’s relations with Iran and Russia, along with its increased trade with China and strong political ties, the kingdom will be uneasy with any Russian or Iranian presence in the Sudanese sea, just miles from its borders, exacerbating the headaches caused by the Houthi supporters from Yemen.

– There are two options before the U.S. administration in response to Al-Burhan’s agreements with China.

  – The first option is to try to contain Al-Burhan by offering significant concessions to improve his position in exchange for him slowing down or limiting his shift towards China in ways that do not disturb the U.S. and the West.

  – The second option is to attempt to remove Al-Burhan.

– I am not sure what the U.S. administration will choose, but removing Al-Burhan does not seem easy. Even if he is removed, this would mean the rise of the Janjaweed, whom the U.S. does not trust due to their connections with Wagner and their lack of discipline, making them unreliable, as discovered by Musa Hilal, Al-Bashir, and Al-Burhan. They are merely a gang that shifts towards any strong benefactor.

– If Al-Burhan is removed, his successor will face the same dilemma and the same choices amidst the contradictions of the current situation.

– Moreover, relying on the Janjaweed and cozying up to them carries high political and moral costs, especially with the presence of a global media that is not entirely tamed.

– An alliance with the Janjaweed tarnishes the image of any ally, weakening their soft power and damaging their global reputation, as many who allied with them have discovered.

– Al-Burhan’s visit, at a critical juncture in the Sudanese war, coincided with a military escalation between Egypt and Ethiopia. In this context, Egypt sent more than 10,000 soldiers to Somalia to prevent Ethiopia from obtaining a port in the separatist region known as Somaliland.

– The issue is not merely about a commercial port; Egypt fears Ethiopia gaining a military base on the Somali sea, which would give it the capability to disrupt operations in the Suez Canal and deprive Egypt of billions of dollars in revenue. This, in turn, would increase Ethiopia’s leverage in the conflict over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and water sharing.

– However, Egypt’s escalation with Ethiopia means increased support for Al-Burhan and implies that Egypt will not tolerate any harsh U.S. measures against him.

– Since Egypt is a highly important strategic ally of the U.S., the U.S. administration cannot completely disregard its wishes.

– Nonetheless, it’s hard to predict how U.S. policy, along with its allies, will react to what Al-Burhan has done in China, given the complexity of the region’s geopolitics and the recent weakness and confusion in U.S. foreign policy, which has even surprised concerned observers.

– Time will tell.