The Republic of Kadamul: Predatory Approach (2-2)
Abdullah Ali Ibrahim
Summary
The book The Republic of Kadamul brings forth the concept of war discourse through a socio-economic analysis, which is a missing element in the war discourse in our context. You will not find anyone among the elites on either side of the war who integrates economics and society into their understanding of it. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in their analysis, are seen solely as a political-military phenomenon, completely disconnected from their economic implications and dynamics. Even the Communist Party, which holds that the economy drives history, only views them through a military-political lens, while other researchers mix their economy, politics, and military dimensions. The Global Witness organization described the RSF as a “militia-industrial complex,” and the Sudanese studies expert, Alex De Waal, called it a “private, transnational mercenary company.”
In January of the past year, a booklet titled The Republic of Kadamul (referring to the headgear of the RSF members) was published by Joshua Kries and Raja Makawi of the Small Arms Survey in their series of reports on preliminary human security assessments. The booklet was supplemented by a team of reporters from within Sudan, who conducted the research behind it. The report studied the economic mechanisms by which the Rapid Support Forces managed the cities they occupied. It described their economy, which is characterized by the transformation of military leaders into investors, as a “predatory political economy,” relying on looting, ransom from hostages, stolen money, and exorbitant taxes.
This predatory economy revealed by The Republic of Kadamul raises two critical issues. The first is the methodology regarding groups that cooperated with the Rapid Support Forces during their occupation of neighborhoods for about two years. The victims of these groups resorted to taking the law into their own hands after the army expelled the RSF from their neighborhoods, seeking revenge against them. The state, which is slowly recovering its machinery where the armed forces are present, warned against this uncontrolled vengeance and called for the prosecution of those accused of collaboration with the RSF.
An optimal understanding of this denied cooperation with the RSF can be traced back to the economy of political bullying revealed by the Republic of Kadamul. We see that “cooperation” was not a choice for those involved, but rather something they were forced into. The RSF built its operations on the ruins of an economy destroyed by labor networks that left no escape for the impoverished population under its rule, forcing them to fully integrate into this looting-based economy, either out of fear or the need for income. Some were coerced into recruitment by hunger and threats. For some, joining the RSF was a matter of self-preservation or safeguarding their families in the absence of any alternative systems of work.
The integration of war into the market, which has become the state’s and resource society’s business, tempted many to take up mercenary work as the only service offered in this market. A RSF informant reporting on the enemy might receive a small kiosk or cart to run a business, while workers would direct others to the homes of the wealthy, receiving their share of the loot. A class of thieves was tasked with looting homes. Many families benefitted from these jobs within the RSF. In this way, the RSF administration achieved control over systems of welfare through direct payments.
The book raised the question of whether the RSF, given its predatory economy, could commit to any peace agreement during the ongoing war. Although the RSF is responsible for paying its soldiers, according to the book, looting remains the largest source of income for its members. Looting, the book asserts, is not a temporary consequence of war but an integral component of the RSF’s wage system. Do not be misled, the book cautions, by their claims that they are merely looting the resources of a marginal state, as looting has also affected cities like Nyala and Zalingei in Darfur.
The book concludes that if looting is the backbone of the RSF’s economy, only an expansion of the war can ensure the flow of money necessary to meet their wages. Evidence of this can be seen in recent complaints from RSF members about not receiving their salaries for months, alongside calls for Hemetti to open up new regions for looting. The RSF, the book argues, has always been in a constant state of crisis and needs new territories to conquer. It remains haunted by the potential disintegration of its components unless it renews its predatory activities. The book warns that this “nature of the beast” is one of the concerns about the sustainability of any ceasefire or peace agreement.
The book provides a socio-economic analysis of war, an essential aspect that has been missing in war discourse in our context. No one among the elites on either side of the war has incorporated economics and society into their understanding of it. The RSF, in their analysis, are treated purely as a political-military phenomenon, with no consideration of their economic and dynamic realities. Even the Communist Party, which holds that the economy drives history, only sees the military-political face of it. In contrast, other researchers blend its economy, politics, and military dimensions. Global Witness called it a “militia-industrial complex,” and Sudanese expert Alex De Waal referred to it as a “private, transnational mercenary company.”
It is not far-fetched to say that the separation between the RSF’s economy and military policies in the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) led to this war. The FFC, in the context of security and military reform in the framework agreement (January 2023), decided to integrate the RSF into the army. This was a huge mistake because the wealth of Hemetti, which we have seen in networks under U.S. sanctions, would have been lost had the RSF not remained under his control, not the army’s. The RSF is the guardian of the treasure, and the FFC even went so far as to ban the RSF from engaging in the financial and business sectors. The FFC thought signing Hemetti onto the framework was a victory, not realizing that when he told them he would integrate the RSF into the army after 20 years, he was essentially telling them “You’ll find it with the inattentive.” The writer claimed that the FFC did not consider the full implications of the framework and ended up placing two major armed forces in a perilous situation that led to war.
