Alarm Bells Ring Across West Africa Over Sudan War
Al-Sadiq Al-Raziki
A major and rare conference addressing security, peace, peaceful coexistence, state stability, the fight against terrorism and extremism, reducing violence, and promoting moderation and tolerance was held in Cotonou, Benin, in West Africa, from July 25 to 28.
The conference was organized by the Union of Islamic Associations in West Africa, the Organization of Muslim Youth in West Africa (OJEMAO), the Association of Muslim Intellectuals in Benin (AIMB), and the Network of Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations in Benin (RAIB-BENIN). It brought together a distinguished group of experts and specialists, as well as leaders of political parties, Islamic organizations and associations, and prominent figures from across West African countries and communities. Participants included former foreign ministers, political leaders, ministers, and senior officials in the fields of security and defense.
The significance of the conference stemmed from the circumstances confronting this part of the continent and the pressing need for such a gathering. It attracted the attention of public opinion and governments because of the growing challenges facing West African societies and the nature of the social and political transformations sweeping across the 16 countries represented at the conference. A number of intellectuals, associations, and participating organizations have been working to confront these challenges and looming threats, strengthen collective commitments against the terrorism of armed extremist groups, combat the dangers they pose, establish the partnerships necessary to confront them, and develop urgent responses to curb their activities.
What concerns us here about the conference, beyond its important and comprehensive topics, discussions, key themes, and profound intellectual content, is its focus on violence and its severe repercussions in parts of Africa—East, West, Central, and North—as well as the rampant recruitment of young people in many Sahelian and sub-Saharan countries and the enlistment of large numbers of them to fight on behalf of groups and movements engaged in terrorism, violence, and armed conflict.
Among these conflicts is the ongoing war in Sudan, which has arguably become the continent’s largest hub for mercenary recruitment, attracting fighters from every direction, while international and regional actors recruit and deploy them within the ranks of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
In light of the conference and its discussions, including extended sessions devoted to the war in Sudan, participants examined the social and political environment in which violence and extremism have emerged across West and Central Africa—including eastern Nigeria, Chad, eastern and northern Cameroon, Benin, and Togo—where Boko Haram operates, as well as extremist groups in Mali, Burkina Faso, northern Niger, and the rest of the Sahel, where more than 100 armed terrorist organizations are estimated to operate.
Another issue discussed was the emergence of what might be described as “mobile fighters”—cross-border combatants whose numbers, according to international official estimates, have exceeded 350,000. This is the social and political environment, combined with external factors, that has produced what experts describe as the most brutal and dangerous manifestation of the threat to African societies: the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan. According to experts, the RSF represents the latest form of threat and fragmentation aimed at undermining the cohesion of states and societies in the region, while serving as a magnet for mercenaries.
There is broad agreement that the project represented by the criminal militia in Sudan and its regional alliances was originally conceived to build a military force from sub-Saharan African communities, with the primary objective of creating a new political and social reality in these countries. It interacts with the current dynamics of international and regional transformations and is reinforced by social, cultural, and ethnic interconnections, as well as similarities among tribal communities, creating a favorable environment in which such projects can emerge and advance.
This has now become a source of concern and alarm for governments, political elites, and academics in West Africa, all of whom are searching for effective ways to confront a phenomenon that has evolved from the extremism and radicalism of certain extremist movements into externally supported political projects aimed at reshaping Africa’s geopolitical and social landscape.
Among the issues examined closely and discussed extensively at the conference was the growing body of information concerning the rise of violence rooted in the social environment and the interconnectedness of extremist movements and the areas where fighters are recruited. The preparations made by the Rapid Support Forces before and during their April 2023 rebellion relied on the social ties connecting these movements today, as well as political propaganda targeting gatherings of “mobile fighters,” most of whom are remnants of Africa’s wars.
Mercenary fighters were brought in from several sub-Saharan African countries on the basis of geographic and social links, particularly from tribes that had long lived on the margins of political life because of their social structures, economic activities, and livelihoods. They apparently believed that an opportunity had finally emerged and that taking up arms alongside the RSF would fulfill their long-awaited ambitions.
The objective of the RSF project, designed by international and regional powers from outside the continent, was to seize control of the Sudanese state and its resources and capabilities, then extend that control to the rest of the region from Sudan, overthrowing governments through cross-border armed forces and groups. The common thread connecting this project has been the coordination and convergence between terrorist organizations and remnants of conflicts across the region—including Libya, Chad, Mali, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan.
It is no secret that armed groups across the Sahel routinely borrow fighters from one another. However, the RSF and those who created it expanded this recruitment and “borrowing” network across the entire continent, from one ocean to the other. It did not exclude extremist groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia, other movements in East Africa, or remnants of the former forces of Muammar Gaddafi, in addition to movements operating across the Sahel and West Africa.
Within the same framework, the Cotonou conference did not limit its discussion to extremism and violence as abstract theoretical subjects or to intellectual and religious debates aimed at addressing young people and protecting them from the appeals of extremist religious groups. It went further by issuing a strong warning about the danger posed by the Rapid Support Forces, describing them as a pandemic and a cancer spreading across the region and threatening its social fabric as well as its security and political resilience.
This danger is compounded by ethnic interconnectedness and the potentially rapid spread of ideological and social influences, as well as the cultural characteristics of Arab and non-Arab tribal communities whose fighters migrated to Sudan to fight alongside the RSF. At the same time, extensive recruitment and mobilization efforts are underway, accompanied by pressure on some countries in the region to support and facilitate this project and help ensure its success.
The warnings issued at the Cotonou conference therefore echoed growing concerns among West African governments whose representatives participated in the discussions. These included ministers and senior officials from foreign and interior ministries, intelligence agencies, and experts in security and strategic studies, all of whom placed these developments—and particularly the war in Sudan—under close scrutiny.
It is no secret that the groups fighting in northern Mali, the troubling activities in southern Libya and northeastern Niger, around the Lake Chad Basin and northeastern Nigeria, along the borders of Burkina Faso and Guinea-Conakry, and in the Central African Republic are all, in one way or another, feeding off the consequences of the war in Sudan.
These extremist and tribal movements and groups, whether operating under ideological or political slogans, are increasingly organized around a common combat doctrine. They employ similar methods of organization, warfare, and propaganda, rely on the same sources of weapons and military equipment, and move groups of fighters between different theaters of activity—from Sudan to southern Libya, northern Mali, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and the Lake Chad Basin.
There is also evidence of coordination, according to intelligence sources, which indicated that in preparation for the war in Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces sought to establish offices in southeastern Niger and western Chad to recruit fighters and issue Sudanese identification documents and national identification numbers. Officials in the Republic of Niger reportedly disclosed this information in May 2023.
In addition, representatives and brokers have been operating in several Sahelian African countries, recruiting young people from traditional artisanal mining areas, with the assistance of some tribal leaders in those countries.
Perhaps the most dangerous claim circulating among political circles and intelligence agencies in the region is that some Western countries—particularly European states—have covertly encouraged and facilitated the escalation of the war in Sudan, while turning a blind eye to its horrific violations and the recruitment of young mercenaries. The alleged rationale is a firmly held European belief that open wars and the activities of armed and extremist groups operating under political and religious pretexts, together with the involvement of young people in such conflicts, will curb irregular migration to Europe and reduce its successive waves.
Moreover, some European actors are reportedly seeking to use this “beast”—terrorism—that was created under their patronage to reassert control over African states in the Sahel once again, leaving these countries on a permanent powder keg.
