The Farce of the Conditions: A Reading of the “Somoud Alliance” Play

As I See

Adel El-Baz

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It seems that the theater of political absurdity in our country never ceases to produce more tragic and comic acts at the same time. Those who fought alongside the army and sacrificed thousands of martyrs have been excluded from the dialogue, while those who fought against the army, supported the militia, and accused the army of every crime under the sun are being courted and invited to participate in the dialogue, with all doors thrown open to them.

Have you been following this latest act of the farce of absurd performances on the political stage? But if those performances are tragic, then the reaction of those who supported the army represents the height of comedy—one that makes you laugh, if it does not drive you into the depths of madness.

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The government called for a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue. In an effort to demonstrate its credibility and create a conducive atmosphere, it took an important step: moving toward dropping charges against those who conspired against the army and the country and supported the militia.

The reaction of the militia’s supporters was astonishing and arrogant. The Somoud Alliance quickly rejected participation in what it called a “fake dialogue,” going even further in its arrogance by imposing conditions that even the armed militia itself could not impose and would never be able to impose, even if it and its militias and sponsor were to emerge victorious from the war.

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The first condition set by the Somoud Alliance is an “end to the war.” It emphasized that it “will not be a party to any false solutions that reproduce the crisis or grant political legitimacy to the war and its outcomes. There can be no credibility to any call for dialogue that does not prioritize a ceasefire. What kind of dialogue can take place under the roar of artillery?”

Look at this false condition! Somoud itself has participated in every dialogue with foreign actors and Sudanese political forces on Sudanese issues without demanding an end to the war. It took part in the London, Berlin, and Egyptian dialogues, and even signed a statement with the participants in the Quintet talks in Addis Ababa.

So what has changed that would require the Sudanese government and the victorious army to rush to halt the war merely because they want to speak with the emperors of the Somoud Alliance?

If the government and the army were truly subject to pressure, they would have yielded to the pressures of the Quadrilateral, the Quintet, the African Union, and the UN Security Council. They would also have accepted the conditions of the militia when it occupied more than half of Sudan.

Why, then, should the government or the army respond to Somoud’s demand for a ceasefire before it graciously agrees to sit down with them? Are these rational politicians who understand anything about the balance of power in politics or on the battlefield?

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The Somoud Alliance also demands that any negotiations be conducted independently of the domination of either side of the war, arguing that any process lacking such independence would entrench the realities and logic of war and fail to achieve peace in the country.

Yet this hypocritical alliance does not, at the same time, demand that the process be “independent” of the influence of foreign mediators, their agendas, their funding—or even their conditions!

How astonishing.

Once again, what compels the government to pack its bags and run after the scattered remnants of an alliance that has placed itself at the mercy of foreign agendas?

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The Somoud Alliance says: “Any talk of dialogue within areas under army control ignores the realities on the ground, where the country is experiencing an undeclared division, with control over its territory distributed among numerous armed forces. Consequently, this approach will entrench the partition of the country and sacrifice the unity of its territory and people—a crime in which Somoud will never participate.”

Yet Somoud can ally itself with the militia and sign agreements with it while it occupies Al-Jazira and Khartoum. It can also endorse the founding invitation for the Addis Ababa dialogue, while not considering the parallel “Founding” government to be an entrenchment of the country’s partition or a threat to its unity!

An alliance that claims to be deeply concerned about the unity of the country and senses danger if dialogue takes place in areas controlled by the army, yet fails to sense that same danger when a foreign-sponsored government is established to entrench division!

Honestly, when writing about these contradictions and recalling them one by one, you begin to feel nauseated. Indeed, you do.

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Somoud demanded the exclusion of the National Congress Party, the Islamic Movement, and their affiliated entities, arguing that they were responsible for igniting the war, obstructing efforts to stop it, and profiting from its continuation, and therefore could not be part of any dialogue aimed at achieving peace.

The government has now responded to that demand. This was the only condition to which the government hastened to publicly respond, along with another concession that Somoud dismissed: lifting sanctions against its leaders.

Free gifts to the Somoud Alliance have only made it more arrogant!

This national Islamist current is being excluded not because it started the war or because it is obstructing efforts to end it, but to satisfy Somoud, its sponsor, and foreign actors—and because it is fighting alongside the army against the militia allied with Somoud.

The objective is to drive a wedge between the army and the forces fighting alongside it, thereby enabling them to isolate the army and deal with it alone. That will not happen—far from it.

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An analysis of these conditions reveals a deep gap between the Somoud Alliance’s theoretical premises and the realities on the ground.

Its selective approach to accepting dialogue, its imposition of conditions and vetoes on participants in the national dialogue, contrasted with its absolute flexibility toward external tracks, places the credibility of this political discourse under serious scrutiny.

Overcoming the Sudanese crisis requires an objective vision that recognizes the existing balance of power and begins with the priority of preserving state institutions and sovereignty, away from the contradictions that obstruct genuine national consensus.

Ultimately, the ability to influence Sudan’s future remains dependent on the extent to which political positions are consistent with the national will and realities on the ground—not on subordination to political tracks that experience has shown to be disconnected from the aspirations of those inside the country.