The Auditor General… Out of Sight, Out of Mind

As I See

Adel El-Baz

1

It appears that the Auditor General is betting on a policy of burying his head in the sand, believing that it might prove effective. People used to say that the ostrich buried its head in the ground because it was cowardly and stupid, before it became clear that it did so in search of food and to turn its eggs, rather than out of fear or cowardice. Thus, humans have done the ostrich an injustice by attributing to it a behaviour that they themselves practise far more often.

Now, the Auditor General is burying his head among mountains of reports that he has not published since 2019, attempting to absolve himself by claiming that he is not responsible for making them public and that he has submitted them to the relevant authorities. According to this justification, those authorities are the ones concealing the reports and withholding them from public scrutiny.

We have pointed out on several occasions that Article 48 of the Auditor General Act empowers him to publish his reports. Yet, despite relying on this very law, he remains unable to enforce it. We have also called on the senior authorities holding these reports to take the initiative and publish them, and urged the government to exert pressure in the same direction so that it can clear itself of responsibility, if it has any sense of responsibility in this matter.

Withholding the Auditor General’s reports is not merely a minor administrative violation; it has extremely serious consequences.

First, concealing the reports provides cover for corruption networks and gives those involved an opportunity to escape accountability for crimes documented in official reports.

Second, this silence allows hundreds of state-owned companies to continue draining public funds. Some of these companies neither produce anything nor provide any genuine services, yet they spend billions of Sudanese pounds every month on their premises, perks, vehicles, and employees, not to mention other forms of plunder exposed in the reports.

The third danger concerns the erosion of the value of stolen funds. A substantial portion of public money was looted in Sudanese pounds and then converted into foreign currencies. As the years pass and inflation worsens, the real value of these funds declines. Some looters can then return the money to the public treasury in amounts that have lost most of their original value. This is what happened with those who stole billions from bank funds and returned them after the war as mere pennies. Some of them still refuse to return the money even at this drastically diminished value.

Publishing the reports without delay would therefore do more than ensure transparency. It would also enable the state to recover its money at its real value before inflation consumes it and the traces of the crime disappear.

Mr Auditor General, and officials responsible for these reports, you bear a grave responsibility for failing to publish them. You are violating the oath you took, a solemn oath, and betraying a nation in whose body you have allowed corruption to spread without taking the initiative to expose and eradicate it. You are also letting down the people who entrusted you with their money and charged you with safeguarding it.

I entrusted you with my trust, but you betrayed that trust.

2

Minister of Petroleum… Why Don’t You Resign Now?

I hope to read just one statement from the Minister of Petroleum that contains an important piece of information or announces a clear decision. Yet his statements continue to revolve around intentions and general meetings.

The minister travelled to Saudi Arabia and met with the Saudi Assistant Minister of Energy. We do not know why he did not meet with the Saudi minister himself, particularly following the announcement of a strategic partnership between Sudan and Saudi Arabia. The most important issue on which the Sudanese people are awaiting tangible results is the oil sector, and the minister was expected to resolve the matter of an agreement with Saudi Aramco.

But what has been achieved so far, apart from exchanging expressions of goodwill? The country is drowning in an economic crisis, while the minister speaks of a desire to cooperate. What is needed is a clear agreement with Aramco that addresses the exchange-rate problem and the depreciation of the Sudanese pound, since the fuel import bill is one of the biggest contributors to the trade deficit. Nevertheless, the minister has said nothing clear about the nature of the relationship with Aramco or the future of any agreement with the company.

When the minister returned, he found that the law establishing the National Oil Corporation had been issued and that President Abdel Fattah al-Burhan had transferred the oil portfolio to the corporation and assumed direct oversight of it. As a result, the minister appears to have little left to do beyond serving as the oil sector’s public relations minister.

Perhaps the president made the right decision by placing the portfolio within a new framework, given that most of the ministry’s previous attempts to reform the oil sector have failed.

There appears to be little hope for genuine reform of the sector as long as the same approach continues. The minister is a respectable man who does not need the ministry’s salary or to cling to his position. It would therefore be better for him to leave voluntarily rather than wait for a wall that is already crumbling to collapse, as it inevitably will.

3

Islamists and the Activities of the Committee for Preparing the Dialogue

I have been following the activities of the Committee for Preparing the Dialogue with interest, although I feel that the momentum with which it began is now waning. It also seems to me that the committee is devoting a substantial portion of its efforts to groups that already support dialogue and need little more than an invitation to participate, rather than lengthy campaigns to persuade them.

I therefore propose that the committee redirect its attention towards groups that reject dialogue or have not yet become involved in political conflicts. These include social organisations, professional and community groups, and other stakeholders who could lend broader legitimacy to the dialogue and take it beyond the confines of traditional political forces.

I do not know whether listening to the Islamists is explicitly included in the committee’s agenda, but I believe this is indispensable when discussing Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue. The Islamists are a political and social force that cannot be ignored, not only because of their contribution to the War of Dignity—a contribution that cannot be compared with that of many other political forces—but also because of their social and political weight, which qualifies them to participate in the dialogue table on an equal footing.

Moreover, the Islamists are repeatedly accused, both inside and outside Sudan, of obstructing dialogue with external parties, particularly with the Sumoud alliance, and of inciting the army not to engage in negotiations. Whether these accusations are true or not, ignoring the accused party and refusing to hear its perspective does little to clarify its position or create the conditions for serious dialogue.

Any attempt to isolate the Islamists or bypass them in the work of the Committee for Preparing the Dialogue, whether out of fear of external reactions or disregard for their contributions to the war and their social influence, will render Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue incomplete from the outset. It could also turn the process into a dialogue that serves external agendas and submits to outside calculations, particularly those of the Quad.

In doing so, the committee would commit a fatal mistake and condemn the dialogue to failure before it even begins. Serious dialogue cannot be achieved by excluding any influential political or social force. Rather, it requires listening to everyone according to the same standards, free from external pressure and calculations, while placing Sudan’s interests above all else.