From Gaza to Sudan: When Wars Backfire on Their Policymakers — Lessons from the U.S. Elections and the Need to Rethink Sudan!

Ambassador Dr. Muawiya Al-Bukhari

The wars unfolding across the Middle East and Africa are no longer merely regional conflicts confined to their geographical boundaries, nor are they separate files that the United States can manage individually according to calculations of immediate interests and alliances. Their repercussions have increasingly extended beyond the military and humanitarian arenas in their respective regions, spilling over into American domestic politics, the balance of power between the Republican and Democratic parties, and the image of the United States and the credibility of its leadership in relation to the international order and the principles upon which it was founded.

The results of the U.S. midterm elections on November 3, 2026, and the Democratic Party’s sweeping victory in regaining control of both chambers of Congress, provide an important opportunity to reflect on this transformation and its implications. The outcome was not simply an electoral rebuke to President Donald Trump’s administration; it also reflected a cumulative buildup of domestic concerns, manifested in public dissatisfaction, rising living costs, the war with Iran, and the administration’s handling of foreign policy issues and its increasingly personalized approach to them. Initial analyses suggested that American voters had become more willing to link their everyday economic priorities to the cost of U.S. military involvement abroad in wars that do not serve their interests or priorities.

In this context, the positions consistently advanced by Senator Bernie Sanders regarding halting arms supplies to Benjamin Netanyahu’s government and holding those responsible for violations in Gaza accountable have acquired significance extending beyond progressive political rhetoric. In April 2026, Sanders announced that more than 80% of the Democratic caucus had supported initiatives to halt arms deals with Israel, a development reflecting the widening gap between segments of American public opinion and traditional U.S. policy toward Israel.

A fundamental implication emerges here: the American-Israeli partnership, despite its deeply entrenched strategic and military foundations, is no longer immune to political and moral scrutiny within the United States. The war in Gaza, together with allegations of grave crimes against innocent civilians, children, and the elderly, and the controversy surrounding the use of weapons and the political cover provided by Washington, has placed both Democratic and Republican administrations before an increasingly costly domestic test.

The Biden administration faced clear political repercussions over its position on the war in Gaza. The issue was among the factors that deepened divisions within the Democratic base and weakened its ability to attract segments of the electorate, although it was not the sole reason for the party’s defeat in the 2024 presidential election. Today, Trump and his administration find themselves facing renewed pressure, not only because of the continuation of the war and its repercussions, but also because of growing demands within Congress to review U.S. military assistance and hold the administration accountable for its regional policy choices and its unrestricted financing of killing.

This shift does not necessarily mean that American policy will be reversed overnight. It does, however, mean that the cost of continuing the previous approach is rising, and that alliances which once enjoyed almost absolute political immunity have become increasingly vulnerable to debate and scrutiny, with significant domestic implications for American voters.

Sudan: The Tragedy That Has Yet to Become a Strategic Priority

If Gaza has managed to impose its presence on the American public conscience and electoral politics, Sudan presents a painful paradox. The scale of its humanitarian catastrophe, the vast extent of destruction, and the killing, displacement, looting, infrastructure devastation, and widespread impoverishment inflicted upon Sudanese society—making it the world’s third-largest crisis—have not yet been matched by the level of political and strategic attention warranted by the gravity and dimensions of the war. Alliances and influence have come to take precedence over values and principles, beyond the reach of accountability and punishment.

The intention here is not to compare humanitarian tragedies or diminish the suffering of the Palestinian people. Rather, it is to highlight the imbalance in international priorities and the failure of American policy to recognize that Sudan is not merely another African battlefield, despite its immense capabilities and the historical potential of its people. Nor is it a country whose future can be reduced to ceasefire arrangements, humanitarian aid programs, or precarious truces.

Sudan is a country with deep historical and institutional roots, Arab, African, and Islamic connections, and a national experience spanning more than seven decades. It possesses agricultural, water, mineral, and human resources that qualify it to play an influential economic and regional role. It also occupies an exceptionally sensitive geographical position at the intersection of the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, the Nile Basin, and the Sahel region. This makes its stability a significant factor in the security of all these interconnected areas, with far-reaching economic benefits.

Consequently, the continuation of the war threatens more than the Sudanese people alone. It creates opportunities for the expansion of arms networks, mercenaries, dangerous smuggling operations, and all forms of illicit economic activity. It further weakens border security, threatens the security of the Red Sea and commercial shipping routes, intensifies pressure on neighboring countries, and creates fertile ground for competition among regional and international powers, undermining Sudan’s ability to fulfill its national and regional role.

More dangerously, prolonging the war could transform Sudan’s crisis from one involving the state and its institutions into a geopolitical crisis in which competing influence projects, maritime corridors, natural resources, and the interests of rival powers become intertwined.

Washington and Abu Dhabi: A Test of Consistency Between Interests and Principles

One of the most significant indicators in the evolving American debate over Sudan is that the issue is no longer entirely absent from congressional circles, particularly since the end of the Salvation Era and the outbreak of the war imposed on Sudan in April 2023, whose repercussions continue to this day. Nevertheless, congressional attention has yet to translate into the required level of executive action.

In June 2026, Democratic Senator Chris Van Hollen introduced legislative amendments aimed at using American leverage to halt the UAE’s military support for the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF), including suspending arms sales to the Emirates as long as it continues providing material support to these forces. His proposals received backing from Democratic lawmakers and some Republicans, although they did not succeed in advancing through the legislative process at the time.

We highlight this important development for two reasons.

First, it confirms that Sudan’s case has begun finding its way into the oversight and accountability mechanisms of the American legislative institution. It also demonstrates the emergence of a current of opinion that believes calls for ending the war should not be separated from holding external parties accused of supporting the rebellion accountable for undermining the state and its existing constitutional legitimacy.

Second, it exposes a dilemma within American policy itself. It is difficult for Washington to speak about protecting civilians and ending the war while its strategic and economic relationships with certain regional actors remain exempt from serious scrutiny, even when those relationships conflict with its declared peace objectives.

Analyses by the British think tank Chatham House indicate that Washington’s relations with Abu Dhabi, along with its calculations concerning Gaza, Iran, and the Abraham Accords, influence the American administration’s willingness to employ available pressure mechanisms regarding Sudan. These analyses also point out that external flows of weapons, funding, and supplies have contributed to prolonging the war, and that cutting off these flows is an essential condition for any sustainable settlement.

Naturally, the UAE continues to deny providing military support to the rebel Rapid Support Forces, despite substantial international reports, foremost among them the 2024 report by the United Nations Panel of Experts, as well as investigations by major Western newspapers and human rights organizations. Nevertheless, the seriousness of the accumulated allegations, reports, and investigations demands that this issue be addressed on the basis of evidence, independent investigations, transparency, and accountability, rather than through diplomatic balancing or political statements alone.

The question Washington should ask itself is this: Can a stable regional policy be built upon partnerships in which the practices of certain parties contradict America’s declared objectives of protecting civilians and preventing state collapse? This is compounded by the erosion of trust caused by the region’s three-sided war and its repercussions across the Gulf, the Arab Levant, and indeed the wider world.

Strategic relations should not become a shield against accountability. Nor can economic and security interests justify ignoring the consequences of a war that threatens the security and stability of a country with its own history and sovereignty, as well as the security of the entire region.

What Do the American Elections Tell Sudan?

Three fundamental lessons can be drawn from the shift reflected in the American electoral results. These are lessons that should inform Sudan’s official and diplomatic thinking.

First: Foreign policy is no longer separate from domestic political calculations.

The American experience has demonstrated that foreign wars, when associated with military spending, human casualties, moral contradictions, and the interests of pressure groups, can become influential electoral issues. Consequently, betting on the continuity of American policy simply because traditional alliances remain intact is an unreliable strategy.

This requires Sudan to develop a political and diplomatic discourse that engages American institutions, both chambers of Congress, research centers, universities, the media, civil society organizations, and influential forces shaping public opinion, rather than restricting its outreach to the executive administration or traditional official channels.

Second: Wars cannot be ended by managing the balance of power among their parties; their underlying causes must be addressed.

The Sudanese experience has demonstrated that repeated calls for ceasefires, temporary truces, multiple initiatives, and the sponsorship of the military rebellion and its political supporters will not achieve sustainable peace unless the sources of weapons, financing, and external supplies are addressed, and unless there is a clear vision for the future of the state and its institutions.

A political settlement must not become a means of rewarding the use of force, legitimizing armed rebellion, or imposing a parallel reality upon the Sudanese state and its national institutions.

The peace Sudan needs is not merely a cessation of fighting. It requires restoring the state’s monopoly over weapons, protecting civilians, rebuilding institutions, and preparing for a political transition grounded in national will and Sudanese consensus.

Third: Sudan needs to reintroduce itself into American strategic thinking.

This may be the most important message Sudanese diplomacy should draw from the election results. Sudan should not be presented to Washington merely as a devastated country awaiting humanitarian relief, nor as a party to a military conflict requiring yet another mediation initiative. Rather, it should be presented as a country of strategic importance to the regional and international security equation.

A stable Sudan represents added value for Red Sea security, stability in the Horn of Africa, the security of the Nile Basin, and efforts to combat terrorism, human trafficking, and arms smuggling. It also contributes to securing international trade routes, in addition to possessing agricultural, water, and mineral resources that could make it an important partner in global food security and supply chains.

It would be a strategic mistake for Washington to view Sudan solely through the lens of competition with Russia or China, or to reduce its relationship with the country to Red Sea security calculations. Given its historical significance, strategic position, and wealth of resources, Sudan has independent national interests and can be a balanced partner of the international community without becoming an arena for settling great-power rivalries, external conspiratorial agendas, or schemes that gamble with its future.

Toward a New American Approach to Ending the War

The changes brought about by the American elections offer an opportunity to revisit the Sudanese issue from a different perspective, particularly with the Democrats securing majorities in both chambers of Congress and the oversight, legislative, and political accountability mechanisms this makes available.

This does not mean assuming that Democrats hold identical positions or that the Democratic Party alone possesses the keys to ending the war. President Trump still retains authority over foreign policy, and partisan divisions in the United States over the Middle East remain. Nevertheless, the emergence of a new congressional majority opens broader opportunities to review certain policies, reorder priorities, and exert institutional pressure on the administration, transforming the negative trajectory of policy and hostility into a positive direction upon which progress can be built.

In my assessment, any serious American vision for Sudan should be based on five complementary tracks:

1. Ending external interference: Using political, economic, and military leverage to halt the flow of weapons, financing, and supplies to the rebellion and its supporters, while holding accountable everyone proven responsible for fueling the conflict.
2. Protecting the state and its unity: Dealing with Sudan as one sovereign country with national institutions, and rejecting partition projects, parallel governments, and entities imposed through armed force.
3. A realistic political settlement: Supporting an inclusive Sudanese political process that is not imposed from abroad, does not equate the legitimacy of the state and its institutions with armed formations, and creates space for national civilian forces without exclusion or monopolization of political representation.
4. Moving from humanitarian relief to recovery: Linking the humanitarian response to the rehabilitation of infrastructure and essential services, the restoration of agricultural and industrial production, reconstruction, the creation of conditions for the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and the restoration of the regular functioning of state institutions.
5. Building a long-term strategic partnership: Developing an American vision for cooperation with Sudan in food security, energy, mining, water, healthcare, education, infrastructure, and Red Sea security, based on mutual interests and respect for national sovereignty.

Washington must therefore move beyond viewing Sudan as a subsidiary issue of its policies in the Gulf or the Horn of Africa. It must recognize that Sudan’s stability cannot be held hostage to bilateral regional understandings or the interests of external parties, regardless of the extent of pressure and exploitation.

From Reviewing Support Policies to Taking Responsibility for Restraining Escalation in Sudan

One of the most important political lessons Washington should absorb from the recent election results is that reviewing its foreign policies is no longer a political luxury. It has become a necessity imposed by changes within American society and growing opposition to the costs of unconditional alignment with U.S. allies.

If the Gaza issue has brought renewed attention to the debate over American financing and arms supplies to Israel, as well as the limits of political and military support for its government, the requirements of this review should not stop at the boundaries of the Middle East. They should extend to regional roles that contribute to fueling conflicts and prolonging them.

The Sudanese case stands out clearly in this regard. Washington’s responsibility is not limited to calling for an end to the war. It also includes using its diplomatic, political, and economic influence to restrain any external support that fuels its continuation, including the allegations and documented findings in international reports concerning the UAE’s role in supporting the Rapid Support Forces.

It is inconsistent for the United States to demand an end to the war in Sudan while its instruments of influence over relevant external parties remain below the level of responsibility required.

Moving from crisis management to addressing the causes of crises requires a clear American position: no financing, no arms supplies, and no political cover for any role that contributes to prolonging the war, alongside support for a peace process that safeguards Sudan’s unity, sovereignty, and national institutions.

Washington is also called upon to review its double standards in dealing with regional allies and partners. The review of American support for Israel should open a parallel debate about the military and political support received by regional actors and the consequences of that support in fueling conflicts beyond their borders, as is happening in Sudan.

Sudan Is Not a Marginal Issue in the International Stability Equation

The deeper lesson of the American elections is not simply that the Democrats defeated the Republicans. Rather, it is that American public opinion has become more aware of, and more willing to question, foreign policies that it does not perceive as reflecting its interests and values. Wars that appear geographically distant can become politically close, and alliances, regardless of their strength, are not immune to scrutiny.

From this perspective, Sudan has an opportunity to reframe its cause in the language of strategic interests, rather than solely through the language of victimhood. The suffering of the Sudanese people is documented in the scale of crimes and violations committed against victims, as well as in the destruction and displacement. However, this suffering needs to be transformed into a political and diplomatic project capable of convincing the world that ending the war is not merely a humanitarian obligation, but also a moral necessity for the security of the region and the world.

Washington, which is currently reassessing some of its calculations in the Middle East under pressure from domestic political changes, is called upon to look at Sudan through a different lens: one that recognizes that the continuation of the war threatens a country occupying an exceptional strategic position, and that leaving it vulnerable to fragmentation and external interference will produce nothing but a strategic vacuum over which regional and international powers will compete.

The United States is not being asked to adopt Sudan’s vision without scrutiny. Rather, it is being asked to deal objectively with Sudan’s national, geographical, and political realities, and to make ending the war and protecting the unity of the state and its institutions the benchmark for any policy or initiative concerning the country’s future.

Sudan does not need international management of its crisis as much as it needs an international position that helps it reclaim its state, which has been seized from it, halts the external interventions prolonging the war, and opens a safe path for its people to reclaim their homeland and rebuild their future.

“The most dangerous mistake international politics can make is not misjudging a country, but allowing its collapse to continue until it becomes a threat to the stability of an entire region. Sudan is not a marginal feature of the world’s geography; it is a cornerstone of the international stability equation. Ending the war there is therefore not a favor bestowed upon its people, but an investment in the security of the region and the international order.”

Ultimately, the credibility of American leadership is not measured solely by its ability to stop wars that threaten its own interests. It is also measured by its willingness to review its policies and hold its allies and partners accountable when their influence and instruments of support become part of the machinery that creates and sustains wars and conflicts beyond their borders. Sudan should be no exception to this rule.