The Gulf War… The Collapse of the Protection Myth

As I See 

Adil El-Baz 

1

The ongoing war in the Gulf has laid bare realities that were never entirely hidden, but were long shrouded in layers of false assurances, packaged rhetoric, and deliberate misdirection. At the first real test, the grand narrative crumbled: that American bases in the Gulf exist to protect the region’s states from external aggression.

This was the first falsehood — that “U.S. bases in the Gulf are there to defend the region against any foreign attack.” The facts are now unfolding with the first direct assault on those very states. During the initial confrontation between and six months ago — the so-called Twelve-Day War — bases were swiftly stripped of much of their weaponry and personnel as soon as hostilities began. Soldiers whose supposed mission was to defend the countries hosting them rushed either out of those states or into luxury hotel rooms in Doha, leaving their hosts — who had financed and facilitated their presence — exposed to Iranian attacks and, later, to Israeli strikes that violated Doha’s airspace and even reportedly targeted a Palestinian delegation engaged in negotiations with the Israelis themselves.

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Now, with the outbreak of a new round of war, the bases across the Gulf have once again been evacuated. Thousands of American troops have withdrawn abroad, relocated to naval installations, or moved to what were deemed safer positions. It has become unmistakably clear that the mission of these bases has little to do with protecting the states that host them. Their functions lie elsewhere — disconnected from the immediate security of Gulf nations.

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When both rounds of war erupted — between Iran, the United States, and Israel — there was no visible joint defense, no immediate deterrent posture, no protective shield safeguarding airspace and sovereignty. Instead, there was collective retreat, base evacuations, and the relocation of forces offshore or to secure sites. The very moment meant to test the doctrine of “protection” demonstrated that defending host nations is not the primary mandate of these installations.

This opens the door to pressing questions.

First: Were American bases in the Gulf ever truly intended to protect these states — or rather to safeguard American interests in the region?

The uncomfortable truth is that historically, their principal mission has been to secure energy flows, ensure freedom of navigation, and deter threats to American interests. Direct defense of Gulf capitals has always been conditional, governed by broader calculations tied to priorities rather than the immediate security needs of the region. Even the use of American — and Western — weaponry is subject to complex political and legal restrictions. This despite the fact that Gulf states collectively spend around $114.5 billion annually on defense. If hundreds of billions are devoted to arms purchases, why does a significant portion of that arsenal remain effectively immobilized within bases whose use is constrained by intricate political arrangements?

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The second question, likely to gain force once this war ends, is this: Why host these bases — and spend billions sustaining them — if they do not defend the countries that host them? Indeed, they have not even proven capable of defending themselves.

This question may not have been widely asked before. After recent events, however, Gulf officials must be prepared to answer it — and perhaps to pose it directly to the states maintaining bases on their soil: Why do we host you, finance your presence, and purchase vast quantities of weapons from your industries, if we are neither assured real protection nor granted meaningful autonomy to deploy the arms we have paid for?

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The current war will end, as previous wars have. But the enduring question will remain: What have Gulf states truly gained from hosting American bases? Is the answer to expel them and halt the spending immediately? Or to redefine their role with clarity and enforceable commitments? Or are there new strategies Gulf states can adopt to secure themselves and break the cycle of total reliance on foreign military infrastructure?

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In my view, the recent unified stance taken by the in condemning Iranian attacks signals the early formation of a collective Gulf security posture. The hope is that this evolves into a comprehensive regional security architecture — one not wholly dependent on an external power, but grounded in genuine regional defense integration, coordinated within a broader network of alliances both within and beyond the region, without being entirely contingent on the will of others.

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If Gulf states emerge from this war having fundamentally reassessed their security equation, that will be the greatest lesson of all. If not, the region will remain captive to a security paradigm that experience has shown does not guarantee automatic protection — one that failed to defend Gulf states and proved unable even to protect itself.