Is “Fragmenting” the RSF the Safest Solution? (2–2)
Obaid Ahmed Murawih
In the first part of this article, we discussed some of the background surrounding the establishment of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in 2013. We argued that former President Omar al-Bashir’s decision to create the force was not made in isolation but emerged within the context of confronting the rebellion that had erupted in Darfur a decade earlier. In November 2011, that rebellion formed a military alliance known as the Revolutionary Front, bringing together the three armed movements in Darfur as well as the two factions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The alliance declared that its objective was to overthrow the government through armed struggle. It is well known that the alliance expanded its military operations, capturing Abu Karshola in East Kordofan and threatening the towns of Al-Rahad and Umm Rawaba, prompting the decision to establish the RSF.
We also noted that the RSF phenomenon is far more complex than a mere political decision to create an auxiliary military force to support the Sudanese Armed Forces against a particular insurgency, or a question of whether that decision was right or wrong. The issue is much broader and deserves in-depth historical and sociological studies. It is our hope that this two-part article may encourage interested scholars and researchers to undertake such work.
When examining the RSF phenomenon from an analytical perspective, several factors must be considered if one is to arrive at an objective understanding. These factors are closely linked to geography, history, and sociology.
From a geographical standpoint, one must consider the entire Sahel-Sahara region, particularly the belt stretching from Sudan’s borders with Chad and the Central African Republic westward through Niger, Mali, southern Libya, and Algeria to northern Nigeria and Mauritania.
From a sociological perspective, it is necessary to study the nomadic tribal groups that inhabit this vast desert space and to understand the cultural environment surrounding tribes such as the Tebu, Gouran (Quraan), Teda, Tuareg, and Azawad communities, as well as the Sudanese Baggara tribes, including the Rizeigat, Misseriya, and Salamat. It is equally important to examine the economic and social activities practiced by these tribal groups.
We should also bear in mind that nearly fifteen tribes are shared between Sudan on one side and Chad, the Central African Republic, and Niger on the other. Some are classified as being of Arab origin, while others are considered of African origin. Several of these tribes also extend throughout the wider Sahel region, a point whose implications will become clearer later in this discussion.
From a historical perspective, the story is extensive, but two aspects are particularly relevant.
The first concerns the political investment undertaken by the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi beginning in the 1980s among a number of these tribal communities. Gaddafi established the Islamic Legion under the leadership of Sheikh Ibn Omar to fight the government of Hissène Habré in Chad and attempt to overthrow it. He also recruited large numbers of young men from these tribes—particularly from Chad, Niger, and Mali—into the “Cadre School” associated with Libya’s Revolutionary Committees and the ideology of the Green Book. Through this process, revolutionary ideas that rejected both political systems and national borders became deeply entrenched.
The second factor is the extensive involvement of international intelligence services—including Israel—in the region and among these communities, particularly after extremist ideologies associated with groups such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram spread throughout the area. This was accompanied by expanding networks engaged in human trafficking, drug smuggling, arms trafficking, and irregular migration.
This fragmented and highly complex environment gave rise to a culture centered on a war economy—one that glorifies looting, plunder, and the seizure of whatever resources are available, while placing little value on social or moral restraints. Kidnapping, killing, and enslavement are often viewed as acts of valor worthy of admiration.
We witnessed aspects of this culture in the conduct of RSF elements, some of whom openly boasted about war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, before turning this observation into an absolute judgment, it is important to qualify it within the Sudanese context. Many of the ethnic groups that settled in Sudan centuries ago and emerged from branches of these tribes have undergone significant social transformation, and most of their members have long abandoned such practices.
In this regard, it is worth highlighting the valuable series of articles written by Dr. Al-Dirdiri Mohamed Ahmed in June 2023 under the title “The Arabs of the Diaspora and the Project of Their Resettlement in Sudan.” The series broadened public understanding of many dimensions related to these tribal groups and to what the author described as international plans aimed at addressing the instability they generate across the African Sahel and the southern Mediterranean region.
One may therefore conclude that the war that erupted in Sudan in mid-April 2023 was not merely an attempt to seize power, nor simply an armed uprising from the periphery against the central authority. Rather, it was a hybrid conflict involving multiple overlapping agendas, some domestic and others external.
At least in its initial phase, the conflict appears to have been intended to create a state of chaos that could facilitate the restructuring of Sudan’s political and social order after other methods of engineering change had failed, including efforts to bring in a United Nations mission for similar purposes. Each of the allied parties involved in the conflict has sought to reap the benefits of that disorder.
Within this broader framework, the RSF should be viewed not only as a transnational instrument utilized by multiple actors exploiting the ambitions of a leadership that emerged from and was shaped by the environments and cultures previously discussed, but also as a phenomenon that threatens stability throughout the entire Sahel region. What occurred in Sudan, under this interpretation, could potentially be repeated elsewhere across the Sahel and Sahara.
Against this backdrop, the efforts undertaken by state institutions—particularly Military Intelligence and the General Intelligence Service—to persuade civilian leaders and field commanders to return to the fold of the state acquire considerable importance. These institutions appear to recognize that the RSF is fundamentally a coalition of interconnected groups united by tribal ties, common ambitions, material incentives, and the aspirations of its leadership.
The more some of these individuals come to realize that the path they have chosen may ultimately lead to their destruction, and that their interests are better served by abandoning rebellion, the greater the likelihood of neutralizing the weapons currently directed against both the state and unarmed civilians.
Nevertheless, it is equally important for these institutions to recognize that such efforts constitute only a temporary remedy—a localized treatment for a much deeper problem. The issue has reached a stage that requires a more comprehensive and profound approach, one that extends beyond Sudan alone. Such an approach must take into account geography and history, diagnose the cultural environment in which RSF leaders and fighters emerged, and develop a holistic strategy rather than one based on piecemeal and fragmented measures.
The notion of fragmentation, in fact, is encapsulated in the Sudanese colloquial term “Shartama” used in the article’s title. The word is derived from the classical Arabic term “sharadhima” (scattered fragments or splinter groups) and is commonly used in Sudanese Arabic to describe disorder, disintegration, and fragmentation.
Anyone seeking a vivid illustration of the concept of shartama need only look at the map of Sudan and its southern borders after the secession of South Sudan.
