Who Smuggling Gold.. and Who Protecting the Smugglers? (3/3)

As I See

Adil El-Baz

Introduction

At last, the Prime Minister has turned his attention to the issue of gold smuggling—a welcome development. According to recent reports, Prime Minister Professor Kamil Idris convened an extensive meeting last Saturday involving several ministers and representatives from the police and security agencies to discuss challenges related to regulating the mining sector, as well as issues of gold and drug smuggling.

Before commenting on the details of the meeting, I would like to commend this linkage between gold smuggling and drug trafficking. A portion of the proceeds from smuggled gold returns to us in the form of tons of narcotics. Drug markets are, in fact, the same markets through which gold is traded—or at least the principal drug market in Sudan today operates within the gold markets, where cash is abundantly available. (We are currently working on an investigation that will reveal many startling details about drug trafficking within gold markets.)

Before summoning the security agencies, the Prime Minister should have seriously examined the challenges facing the mining sector. These are not primarily security-related challenges; rather, they stem from poor organization, flawed policies, mismanagement, and corruption. The role of security and law enforcement should come afterward.

I hope the Prime Minister adopts our proposal for the establishment of a unified National Gold Council, responsible for formulating all policies and decisions related to gold. Such a body should include the Ministries of Minerals and Finance, the Central Bank of Sudan, and the relevant security and legal institutions. Models such as Ghana’s Gold Board and the experiences of Tanzania and India’s Cashew Board demonstrate how centralized governance can successfully regulate strategic sectors.

One council should replace the current fragmented system in which each institution operates independently, producing contradictory and conflicting policies. To ensure effectiveness and avoid bureaucracy, the council should be granted independent executive powers and report directly to the Prime Minister’s Office.

1

In the first installment, we identified who smuggles gold: the government itself. It is also the government that provides protection for the smugglers. In the second installment, we reviewed the contradictory and conflicting policies issued by the government, often changing with changes in personnel and positions. These constant shifts revealed the absence of any coherent strategy governing the sector.

To solve the first problem, the government and its affiliated companies must stop smuggling gold.

To solve the second problem, we call for the adoption of a unified strategy for managing the sector and the creation of a national council responsible for policy formulation and decision-making.

All of this is necessary to halt the annual waste of billions of dollars—an estimated $8.5 billion every year.

2

Why Gold? Shocking Figures About the Economy

Gold is the lifeblood of the Sudanese economy. No other export resource comes close in importance. According to the 2025 Foreign Trade Brief issued by the Central Bank of Sudan:

Total exports: $2.64 billion

Official gold exports: $1.536 billion (58.2% of total exports)

Declared gold production (2025): 70 metric tons

Officially exported quantity: only 14.7 tons

Estimated unaccounted quantity: approximately 55.3 tons

Estimated annual loss: $8.5 billion

Imagine a squandered gold wealth worth three times the value of the country’s total exports. Yet we continue to stretch out our hands, morning and evening, seeking loans and assistance of $50 million to $100 million from near and far, whether such support is granted or withheld.

3

A Roadmap: How Can We Achieve a Surplus?

What would it mean to recover $8.5 billion for the state treasury?

It would mean achieving a genuine trade surplus.

Sudan’s current trade balance shows imports of approximately $6.5 billion against exports of $2.64 billion, resulting in a deficit of $3.86 billion.

If smuggling were brought under control, however, Sudan would move from a deficit of $3.86 billion to a surplus of $4.64 billion.

This dramatic shift illustrates the enormous impact that effective regulation of the gold sector could have on the national economy.

4

What Would Happen to the Economy If We Achieved This Surplus?

A surplus of $4.64 billion would bring about a structural transformation of the economy, with several major consequences:

Exchange-rate stability: Increased foreign-currency inflows would strengthen the Sudanese pound and narrow the gap between the official and parallel-market exchange rates.

Inflation control: A more stable currency would reduce imported inflation and lower the cost of importing strategic goods such as medicine, fuel, and food.

Financial sovereignty: The Central Bank of Sudan would be able to build strong foreign-exchange reserves, reducing dependence on borrowing or foreign grants.

A shift toward development: Resources currently consumed by daily crises could be redirected toward strategic development projects, including infrastructure, agriculture, and other productive sectors.

5

Is there any priority for the Sovereignty Council or the government—especially Prime Minister Professor Kamil Idris—greater than repairing the national economy?

Securing the gold sector—by ending smuggling, adopting a clear strategy, implementing sound policies, and establishing a National Minerals Council—is not an economic luxury. It is an existential necessity.

No war can be won if the battle for the economy is lost. History offers no example of a nation achieving military victory while its economy was collapsing.

Time is running out, yet the opportunity still exists.

Will we seize it?