Thank You, Taqaddum… But!!

As I See 

By Adil Al-Baz

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Why the surprise? Taqaddum deserves thanks for this stance… but what stance? According to its official spokesperson, Mr. Bakri Al-Jack, Taqaddum has rejected the idea promoted by militia agents of forming a parallel government, a government-in-exile, or any so-called peace initiative. Officially, Taqaddum announced its disengagement from a group within the coalition led by Al-Taaishi, Nasr al-Din Abdel Bari, Al-Hadi Idris, and other leaders after this group declared its intention to form a parallel government in February in areas controlled by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

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The justification for this move is that establishing a parallel government threatens Sudan’s unity, as it “would put the country on the path to division,” according to Babiker Faisal. He stated that “the civilian camp should strive to preserve Sudan’s unity, both land and people.” This is a logical analysis supported by many indicators, and regardless of our differences with Taqaddum, this position deserves appreciation.

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However, perplexing questions arise regarding this commendable stance… The first question is about Taqaddum’s position on the militia itself—the very force that would establish this parallel government in the territories it currently occupies (if it still holds any land by February, the month in which the parallel government is supposed to be announced, according to Osama Saeed, who is eagerly chasing positions and blood-stained seats in this government).

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The parallel government is essentially a partnership between the splinter group from Taqaddum and the militia. This splinter group is weak, lacks grassroots support, has no significant military strength, and is bankrupt in every sense. These poor individuals will end up as mere employees under the militia, which already enslaves them. Thus, rejecting the parallel government because it threatens Sudan’s unity logically necessitates taking a stance against the militia—the official partner in this government—which also threatens the country’s unity. You cannot condemn Al-Taaishi, Osama Saeed, and the other opportunists without condemning the militia, as it shares and funds the same position calling for Sudan’s division!

How can you reject the stance of the employees in the parallel government but not reject the stance of their partner? The correct approach is for Taqaddum to denounce the position of all those advocating for and seeking to form this government—not only by refusing to join it but by rejecting the very idea itself. They should take a strong national stance against these advocates of Sudan’s partition, especially since Taqaddum constantly condemns the former regime (Al-Ingaz) for allowing South Sudan’s independence—even though it was the National Democratic Alliance in 1995, not Al-Ingaz, that first accepted the principle of self-determination.

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The second puzzling question… It is well known that the parallel government cannot exist without the approval of its sponsor, meaning that this sponsor is directly involved in threatening the country’s unity. This sponsor is the primary financier of its partition, as it is the official backer of all those pushing for the parallel government—from Al-Taaishi and Nasr al-Din Abdel Bari to mercenaries like Sandal’s factions and Al-Hadi Idris, who survive on the crumbs handed out by their benefactor.

This benefactor has a well-documented history of dividing and destabilizing other countries, as seen in Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere. Therefore, Taqaddum’s rejection of the parallel government should logically extend to taking a stance against this benefactor and its encouragement of Sudan’s division. Taqaddum should have rushed to condemn this sponsor—after all, there is no greater sin than betraying one’s country and tearing it apart… right? But Taqaddum has not condemned this sponsor. Why? Perhaps there is a valid reason. But why hurry? Let’s wait until the “Haftar-like” government is officially announced so we can see where it is based, who is participating, and who is funding it. Only then can we expect a clearer stance from Taqaddum.

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The third question… Why the ambiguous stance towards the group pushing for separation by advocating for a parallel government? For instance, the official position of Taqaddum’s Coordination Committee, according to Bakri Al-Jack’s statement to Sudan Tribune, is: “A committee has been formed to reach a formula for disengagement from most of the agreed-upon arrangements between the two sides so that each can operate independently, both politically and organizationally, while respecting the different choices made based on understandable reasons for each party.”

Khalid Omar Yousif said: “Our party belongs to the camp that rejects forming a parallel government, but every camp has the right to follow its own assessments without imposing them on others.”

He added: “We are confident that the disengagement process between the two factions will proceed in an atmosphere of cordiality and understanding.”

Babiker Faisal, head of the Unionist Gathering, stated: “The Civil Democratic Forces Alliance (Taqaddum) cannot continue in its current form while one faction calls for forming a parallel government.”

He added: “It is impossible for one faction to advocate for forming a government while another opposes it within a single unified coalition with shared organizational channels.”

These polite, hesitant, and diplomatic statements suggest that the faction rejecting the parallel government is unwilling to confront those rushing to establish it. They want to distance themselves amicably, and the reason for this hesitation stems from two factors:

First, the militia, which has always funded Taqaddum’s activities. A move like this would surely anger the militia, which has invested in Taqaddum, signed agreements with it, and made it its political wing. Therefore, Taqaddum chose to part ways with the militia’s pro-parallel government stance as smoothly as possible to avoid exposing everything.

Second, the position of the sponsor itself, who is undoubtedly in favor of forming the parallel government. Who would have thought Taqaddum would dare to reject the idea? That’s why the faction opposing it is careful not to escalate tensions—whether with the militia or the sponsor. This explains the calm and composed tone in their disengagement statements, despite the aggressive rhetoric from those seeking power.

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In any case, despite the observations, Taqaddum’s stance—refusing to follow the whims of a group of opportunists rushing to form a parallel government in February, which threatens Sudan’s unity—is an excellent one that deserves respect and encouragement. The only hope is that this stance is not merely a tactical maneuver, like the famous Sudanese saying: “You go to the palace as president, and I will go to prison as a detainee”, according to Mohamed Al-Mabrouk’s calculations.

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In conclusion, we call on Taqaddum to continue down this path, to uphold its independent decision, and to quickly sever its ties with the militia before it collapses entirely. We also urge it to step out from under the sponsor’s tent and soon breathe the free air of the homeland on Nile Street.