Why Is It So Hard for Peace Missions to End Peacefully? Lessons from the UNAMID Mission in Sudan

Sudan Events – Agencies
Between 2019 and 2021, peacekeeping forces in Sudan’s Darfur region closed most of their mission camps and handed over the sites and infrastructure they had built to local governments and partners. But this didn’t last. Within days of the handover ceremonies, looters raided most of the camps, stripped them of furniture and equipment, and set the remaining structures on fire. Very little was left of the compounds that could have benefited the local government and Darfur’s population. So how could such a well-intentioned handover, planned over years, fail so badly?
Four years after the full withdrawal of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) on June 30, and with the possibility of more peacekeeping mission exits on the horizon, now is the time to delve into the structural and material dimensions of peace operation transitions, and examine the efforts made to transfer infrastructure to local communities.
For those following current events in Sudan, the situation feels like déjà vu. Since 2023, the country has been engulfed in a brutal civil war and a massive humanitarian crisis, following a series of coups that shook the nation after UNAMID’s departure. In retrospect, the failed mission transition seems to have contributed more to instability than to peace. But let’s unpack this step by step.
Three key insights from reviewing the planning around the end of the UN-AU hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID, 2007–2020) shed light on the ambitions and failures embedded in these efforts.
A Bold Mission with Broad Impact
UNAMID was established in 2007 in response to the dire humanitarian crisis in Sudan, marked by violent conflict and mass displacement. The mission was ambitious: it aimed to protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian aid, and support peacebuilding efforts in a region plagued by political instability.
Over its 13-year mandate, UNAMID built massive infrastructure to support its operations, including roads, airports, and communication networks. It constructed a network of camps across Darfur—some of them massive, resembling large university campuses or walled cities capable of housing hundreds of personnel. This infrastructure served the mission well. However, as the mission drew to a close, the challenge became how to sustainably transfer these assets to local control.
An Overly Narrow Understanding of Transition in a Militarized Environment
For many years, the United Nations has worked to improve its “transition” model—referring to the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces and the transfer of responsibility to local actors. But so far, its approach has focused on institutional and governance aspects, neglecting the physical, structural, and spatial dimensions of closure. Leaving this to engineers and logistics experts overlooks the political context of such efforts, especially in regions like Darfur with complex social, political, and environmental dynamics. Moreover, failing to effectively engage local stakeholders in planning processes resulted in missed opportunities for sustainable development and peace.
Over the decades, UN peace operations have grown in size and militarization. As a result, civilian areas surrounding peacekeeping camps have also become militarized. In other words, peace operations leave behind a militarized landscape. UNAMID’s fortified camps and security infrastructure inadvertently reinforced this militarization, which does not simply vanish when a mission ends—it becomes part of the mission’s legacy. As communities struggle to reclaim and repurpose these spaces for civilian use, mission planners must recognize and mitigate the long-term social and spatial consequences of their interventions.
Planning Failure Lies in the Process, Not Just the Outcome
Urban and regional planning theory suggests that “planning failure” refers not only to outcomes but also to the processes that lead to them. When looking at the closure of UNAMID, the looting and destruction that followed, and the unrealized hopes for legacy infrastructure, the failure is undeniable. But what does the process reveal?
Unsurprisingly, one major takeaway is the gap between international planning frameworks and local realities. The UN-AU mission spent years preparing for its closure, with strategies and plans to transfer responsibility for peace and security back to the Sudanese government. Yet the process was highly top-down, driven by international and national agendas, with little bottom-up participation or attention to the physical locations and uses of the infrastructure.
Embracing Social-Spatial Community-Based Planning
Despite the challenges, there is hope in alternative social-spatial planning approaches that prioritize local participation and sustainability. By shifting focus from international frameworks to local contexts, peace operations can better align their efforts with the needs and aspirations of the communities they aim to serve once the mission ends.
Genuine local ownership of infrastructure, integrating social and spatial considerations from the start, and adopting participatory methods that empower local stakeholders are just some of the ways to improve transition planning and prevent a militarized future where communities are left behind. Planners and policymakers must, at their core, rethink the UN’s approach to transitions and power handovers. Highlighting the social and spatial impacts of peace operations and calling for more inclusive spatial planning is essential to enable peace missions to meet the complex challenges of post-conflict environments.
Dr. Sylvia Danilack is an Assistant Professor at the Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University. Her work focuses on social-spatial planning, particularly infrastructure planning in conflict zones as part of peace efforts, and its integration with climate and environmental strategies. Her first book on infrastructure building in UN peace operations is due in 2026 from MIT Press. Dr. Danilack is a former Peace Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace and holds a Ph.D. in Urban Planning from MIT.