The Opportunism of the Scarecrow Narrative: Between Ending the War and Politically Exploiting It

By Amjad Farid Al-Tayeb

The remnants of the Forces of Freedom and Change, with their shifting alliances, along with other elements of the “Framework Agreement” coalition—like Ibrahim Mirghani (a founding member of TASSIS now), the Popular Congress, Mohamed Latif, Babaganuj, and every other opportunist—continue to adopt and promote a narrative crafted by so-called intellectual geniuses. This narrative portrays the ongoing war in Sudan as their mythical “Armageddon” against Islamists. In it, Hemedti and his militias appear as secondary players in a battle against what they call “the army of Islamists,” an entity they appeal to the world to fight, linking it to Iran, Hamas, ISIS, al-Qaeda, or even Hussein’s army at the gates of Kufa—if necessary.

This narrative has two main purposes. On one hand, it allows them to justify their authoritarian collusion with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in pursuit of power—a collusion that began during the misleading campaign to pass the Framework Agreement with all its explicit and hidden agendas. It also helps them defend the UAE’s support for the RSF’s massacres and displacement of Sudanese citizens, framing this foreign aggression on Sudanese sovereignty and people as a legitimate struggle by a “brotherly state,” as they say, against the specter of political Islam. This narrative plays on the accumulated fear of Islamism in Western imagination—an imagination that requires little provocation to offer financial and political support, as long as it carries an anti-Islamist label. It mirrors Israel’s use of the Iranian nuclear scarecrow. This is the first function of the narrative: a pretext for domination.

On the other hand, this narrative allows them to blackmail wide segments of the Sudanese elite: retired (or rather inactive) politicians, businessmen, paid journalists, isolated civil society groups, embassy staff, international organizations, and remote-working “Sudan specialists” who never hesitate to act as snitches, full of invention and fertile imaginations. These are the same people whose books failed to confront the Islamists when they were in power—and in fact, often aligned with them when it served their interests. Today, they see in this narrative a chance to whitewash their records through imaginary struggles that require nothing more than echoing the herd’s nonsense. Especially since, in their minds, victory is inevitable—as long as it is tethered to the UAE and the RSF militias, whose weapons must, according to their intellectuals, remain in place to counter the weapons of the “Muslim Brotherhood.” This, despite the obvious fact that confronting weapons with weapons only yields war—an outcome Sudanese people know all too well. And so their slogan “No to War” becomes nothing more than a false banner—a new Shirt of Uthman.

Then come the deals: whoever wants an anti-corruption commission, let them have it. Whoever seeks the Ministry of Energy, take it. As for the prime minister’s office… that fight is postponed, and speeches around it abound, claiming it’s only for “those waiting their turn.” This is the narrative’s second function: a pretext for opportunistic blackmail and bargaining.

In adopting this narrative, both the Hemedti alliance and the Hamdok alliance (steadfast in their foundations) converge—each claiming to represent the will of the Sudanese people while ignoring the glaring contradictions in their story. Sudanese people’s rejection of this war does not stem from complex historical injustices in the state’s foundation but from the realities of atrocities being actively erased: from El Geneina to Khartoum, from Nyala to Wad Madani, from Al-Amarat to Zamzam Camp.

Their narrative ignores facts, as if politics were unfolding on Mars and not in a Sudan that people experience daily. This reality is shaped by the RSF militia, empowered by its weapons and the political influence of its UAE sponsors. Hemedti is in no way a representative of Sudan’s marginalized peripheries. He is one of the tools used to oppress, impoverish, and exploit them—not a “new John Garang” as Nasr al-Din Abdel Bari and Yassir Arman tried to portray him in Paris 2024. Their job is now handled by youth from the SPLM. Their claim to oppose Islamists is further undermined by the fact that their own ranks are filled with them, and their continued alliance with the RSF—which still retains core elements from the former Islamic Front. Not to mention their ongoing submission to the UAE, which supported Bashir’s regime right up until its fall—see the reports of UAE’s hundreds of millions in aid in March 2019, just a month before his ouster.

This is epistemic confusion, completely ignoring the situation on the ground in Sudan:

The RSF occupies people’s homes and expels them.

Their spokespersons justify it by asking: “Where else should they go?”

The RSF rapes hundreds, even thousands, of Sudanese women.

Their allies issue press releases that distort the facts, fabricating incidents and blaming the army.

The RSF commits genocide and racial violence against the Masalit—documented globally and even recorded by RSF members themselves in racially-charged frenzy.

<span;>> Yet these groups blame the victims, accusing them of initiating the violence.

The RSF bombs IDP camps.

Their “civil society” rushes to declare those camps as military sites.

The UAE strikes power plants, dams, and civilian facilities with drones.

Hamdok responds by lamenting an anti-UAE media campaign—while praising their supposed generosity to Sudanese!

This war is not the natural extension of historical imbalances in Sudan’s state structure. It is a violent coup attempt by a fascist militia—the RSF—to seize power, supported by a decaying political elite that justifies the war while working out of RSF leadership offices to manage their political alliances. The war continues due to UAE aggression, which seeks to impose a new colonial model on Sudan—using military mercenaries (like Hemedti and his militia) or civilian proxies (like Hamdok and his cohort).

Yes, the Islamists are also exploiting the catastrophe for political gain—trying to repackage themselves. Their opponents, foolishly and shortsightedly, have made that possible with their misguided alignments. But the same applies to what remains of the Freedom and Change elite—whether in Taqaddum, Sumood, or Ta’sis—all guided by the same flawed compass.

This war must not be turned into an ideological battleground for settling scores under the guise of stopping it. Such conduct is blood profiteering, no less vile than the violence of those who fire the bullets. The war must end based on justice, accountability for crimes, and restoration of rightful claims—not in slogans that prepare for power-sharing and division of spoils, as if the people of Sudan are forever doomed to choose between two evils.

The true measure of each party’s position must be its alignment with the people’s interests, safety, and dignity. Tragically, what remains of the Freedom and Change elite has chosen to justify the killing, looting, rape, and foreign aggression against their homeland. They have no one to blame but themselves for the people’s anger—an anger they have earned by their indifference to Sudanese blood, honor, and sovereignty.