Sumood + Al-Hilu = Ta’sis (Establishment)

By Mohamed Wadaa

It is difficult to understand how the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N) under Abdelaziz al-Hilu can be accepted as a participant in the Sudanese–Sudanese dialogue, given that he serves as Hemedti’s deputy in the Ta’sis (Establishment) alliance—whose military forces include the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as well as the troops of Al-Hadi Idris, Al-Tahir Hajar, and Al-Hilu himself. The alliance has issued multiple joint military statements under the name Ta’sis, yet participation is denied to Ta’sis or any of its other member groups. Politically and militarily, there is no substantial difference between the forces of Al-Hilu, Al-Hadi Idris, Al-Tahir Hajar, or the RSF, given their shared record in what can be described as an aggression against the Sudanese people—marked by looting, displacement, sexual violence, and the deliberate destruction of infrastructure and the national economy. All of them bear responsibility for these acts.

Perhaps this was one of the rare instances in which journalist Ahmed Taha of Al Jazeera Mubasher appeared balanced in his exchange with Dr. Mohamed Zakaria, the spokesperson for the Democratic Bloc—or perhaps Zakaria was constrained in what he could say, which seems more likely. Either way, the outcome weakened the prevailing war narrative. This came as columnist Attaf Mohamed Mukhtar published a post stating that “there have been numerous communications and meetings between members of the Sovereignty Council and leaders within Ta’sis and Sumood.” Without delving into the credibility or implications of this statement, there appears to be a hidden link between Mukhtar’s post and Zakaria’s remarks.

These developments followed the failure of the African Union–sponsored Sudanese dialogue, after several invited groups withdrew their participation. One of the main objections was the AU Commission’s decision to invite Ta’sis to attend the meeting—an invitation reportedly opposed by both the Arab League and the United Nations, according to leaks.

Such efforts came on the heels of the “Quartet” statement, which placed the militia (RSF) and the army on equal footing, proposing either their joint inclusion in the political process or their simultaneous exclusion. This approach disregards the extensive documentation of RSF crimes, its recruitment of mercenaries, and its widespread atrocities.

These shifting scenarios and evolving positions appear aimed at merging the military and political tracks, or at least constructing a new narrative that would normalize the inclusion of part of the Ta’sis alliance under Al-Hilu’s leadership. So far, however, all such attempts—including that of Mr. Pauls, adviser to former U.S. President Donald Trump—have failed. Many observers interpret the Sudanese government’s silence regarding Pauls’ remarks about rapprochement with the militia as a deliberate decision to avoid falling into a trap. Any effort to “rebrand” Al-Hilu after his alliance with the RSF is bound to fail.

Sudanese people still have the opportunity to conduct an inclusive national dialogue free from foreign interference. That, perhaps, remains the only viable path for political and civil forces to play a meaningful role in ending the war.