Sudanese–Sudanese Dialogue… Toward What Horizon?

As I See

Adel El-Baz

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A few days ago, a delegation of senior journalists in Khartoum met with Prime Minister Kamil Idris. The most prominent takeaway from that meeting, as reported in the news, was the emphasis on a Sudanese–Sudanese dialogue as one of the key files the government is counting on at this critical stage. The Prime Minister said his government seeks to launch a comprehensive political dialogue by the end of next May, to precede free and fair elections subject to international, regional, and local monitoring. He added that the dialogue would not be limited to political elites, but would include all segments of the Sudanese people. He also clarified that the political process could begin in Khartoum or in any other city within the country. The goal, according to his remarks, is to reach broad consensus on the challenges facing the country, foremost among them security challenges and governance mechanisms.

Overall, these statements carry a degree of optimism, because any call for dialogue among Sudanese people is bound to receive support from across society after long years of polarization, conflict, and division. However, good intentions alone are not enough. The country cannot afford a repetition of past dialogue experiences that ended in elegant statements without real impact on the ground. What is required this time is not merely a call for dialogue, but a clear roadmap leading to tangible outcomes—one that answers, from the outset, the fundamental questions that will determine the fate of this process.

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The first of these questions concerns who sets the agenda of the dialogue. It is unreasonable for the government to call for a comprehensive national dialogue and then have a small group of government officials define its issues and trajectories. That would undermine trust from the outset and turn the dialogue into a closed, official platform. What would be more effective is to entrust this task to a group of respected figures—experts and national personalities known for their competence and independence—representing diverse disciplines, regions, and social sectors. This would help ensure that what is discussed truly reflects the people’s real concerns, rather than what the authorities deem appropriate.

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The second question relates to the nature of the agenda itself. I am not proposing a detailed list here, but it is important to stress that the agenda should remain confined to issues of the transitional period and not extend to major matters that require a full popular mandate. Participants in this dialogue, regardless of their stature, cannot claim to represent all Sudanese people definitively. Therefore, issues such as a permanent constitution, national identity, the form of governance, and the central relationships between regions should be left to elected institutions chosen freely by the people.

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What the dialogue should focus on now is more urgent and pressing: How can the war be ended? How should the transitional period be managed? How can state institutions be restored? How can conditions be prepared for the return of displaced persons and refugees? And how can free and fair elections be held at the end of this phase? If the dialogue does not produce a clear and specific timetable for elections, there is a risk that the transitional period will become an open-ended situation with no conclusion.

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The third question is: what will be done with the outcomes of this dialogue? This is the true test of any political process. There is no value in excellent recommendations that are shelved or reduced to media talking points. What is required from the outset is agreement on a clear implementation mechanism, beginning with the formation of an independent national government capable of managing the country with integrity, implementing agreed outcomes, and paving the way toward elections. If Prime Minister Kamil Idris’s government succeeds in leading the country to this horizon, it will mark a historic achievement for which it will be remembered—especially given the immense complexities surrounding Sudan.

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Political forces must also engage in self-reflection at this moment. This is not a time for competing over representation quotas, nor for calculations of positions and short-term gains. Sudan today is greater than all factions, and its crisis is deeper than being reduced to the share of this party or that movement. What is required is for political actors to approach this dialogue with the utmost seriousness, present their ideas with honesty and responsibility, and make modest concessions for the sake of the nation—so that the outcomes reflect the majority of Sudanese people rather than the desires of competing elites.

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Encouragingly, some segments of the civilian opposition have already begun returning to Sudan to participate in this process. This is a positive development that deserves support, because genuine dialogue can only take place in the presence of those who disagree—not only those who agree. It is also essential for extremist voices—those seeking to shape everything according to their narrow interests—to subside and recognize that the country is larger than any individual agenda.

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One indispensable element for the success of any dialogue is trust-building. This cannot be achieved through slogans, but through clear mechanisms of transparency and neutrality. The media must be balanced, dialogue sessions should be documented and their outcomes published transparently, and an impartial secretariat should be established to manage the process free from political influence. Only then can Sudanese citizens be reassured that what is taking place is a serious dialogue, not another staged performance.

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Today, Sudan stands before a rare—perhaps final—opportunity to move from the logic of war to the logic of politics, from conflict to consensus, and from deadlock to an open horizon. If this dialogue is well prepared and participants act in good faith, it could mark the beginning of a way out of the tunnel. But if it becomes a repetition of past experiences, it will be nothing more than another appointment with a familiar disappointment—one whose cost Sudan can no longer afford to bear.