Al-Burhan: The Legitimacy Debate and the Absence of a Vision

Dr. Al-Dardiri Mohamed Ahmed

Yesterday, Islamists realized that they had emerged from the ordeal of Abu Talib’s Valley. The boycott document issued against them—prohibiting interaction with them or inviting them to forums—had been consumed by termites, leaving only the phrase “In Your Name, O Allah.” Thus, the six-year boycott had ended, and they returned to the embrace of the people, with some of them showing affection, compassion, and solidarity. Even before they could utter a word in their own defense, prominent journalists such as Dr. Mazmoul Abu Al-Qasim, Al-Hindi Ezz Al-Din, Fawzi Bushra, Hassan Ismail, Suhair Abdul Rahim, Sandra Kadouda, and many others—who have no direct ties to Islamists—rallied to support them.

What seems to have shocked these figures is that while General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, invited those backing the militia to participate in a so-called national consensus for appointing a prime minister—provided they abandon their support for the militia—he explicitly excluded those supporting the army from participation. He suggested that if they chose to lay down their arms, they could leave, unthanked!

Perhaps what disturbed these journalists and opinion leaders even more was that this statement was made while the army’s supporters were still deeply engaged in battle, tending to their wounded, and burying their martyrs. They had not even expressed any desire to participate in power or engage in this anticipated consensus with the militia’s advisors and the remnants of the sinking “Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC)” and “Taqaddum” alliance.

While this was alarming to many, what compelled me to write this article was something even more striking: Al-Burhan’s complete lack of a vision regarding the legitimacy of his rule and his absence of any meaningful political project. This comes after six lean years in power, during which much of the nation’s stability and resources were consumed. Instead of presenting a clear vision, Al-Burhan seeks legitimacy and a political project from those gathered at the Coral Hotel in Port Sudan, along with those whom the militia and “Taqaddum” have already discarded.

What is even more astonishing is that Al-Burhan has not learned from the fate of those before him, who abandoned the Islamists at critical junctures, only to meet their downfall in the very place they sought salvation.

—

Al-Burhan and the Question of Legitimacy

Al-Burhan did not seize power through a coup. He came to rule as a result of the events following the April 2019 popular uprising, regardless of what one may call it or who may have initiated it. He is not the first leader to assume power by sheer circumstance rather than design.

Before him, General Ibrahim Abboud (1958) and Field Marshal Abdel Rahman Swar Al-Dahab (1985) ascended to power in similar ways. However, Abboud based his legitimacy entirely on the military, avoiding external political validation. He pursued national development while resisting communist influence, making his rule purely military and genuinely patriotic. When civilians demanded the restoration of democracy, he stepped down without bloodshed, allowing an inclusive transition—even for communists—before retiring with dignity.

Similarly, Swar Al-Dahab justified his rule under the “Doctrine of Necessity”—a principle in international constitutional law that allows temporary military control in cases of national security threats. According to this principle, the military must exclude civilians from governance except for technical experts, swiftly restore stability, and conduct elections open to all. The constitutional judiciary then assesses whether the military acted within the bounds of necessity.

(Those interested in legal details can refer to the 1977 ruling by Pakistani Chief Justice Anwar-ul-Haq during General Zia-ul-Haq’s takeover, as well as research by legal scholars such as David Dyzenhaus and John Yoo.)

While Abboud ruled for six years and Swar Al-Dahab for just one, Al-Burhan’s case is vastly different.

—

Lost Opportunities and Foreign Interference

Al-Burhan should have followed Swar Al-Dahab’s model by excluding political parties from power, setting a strict one- or two-year transition period, and preparing for elections without external interference. Instead, he succumbed to civilian factions eager to prolong the transition, creating an opening for foreign influence.

This allowed:

The UN envoy Volker Perthes to assert control,

The UAE to expand its leverage,

Regional African actors to exploit Sudan’s instability.

Al-Burhan missed a second opportunity after his October 25, 2021, corrective action. He could have returned full authority to the military, set a fixed transition deadline, and ensured elections for all. Instead, he entered another round of compromises, leading to the 2022 Framework Agreement with the FFC, further prolonging instability.

This delay allowed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to exponentially expand, leading directly to the current devastating war, the costs of which every Sudanese household has borne.

—

A Third and Final Opportunity?

After the war, Al-Burhan will have a third and final opportunity to restore legitimacy by establishing a purely military government for a strictly limited one- to two-year period before transitioning to elections without exclusion.

However, Al-Burhan refuses to take this path, repeating past mistakes. His recent meetings at the Coral Hotel suggest he is preparing to rehabilitate elements of the FFC and exclude Islamists from the post-war scene.

US diplomat Cameron Hudson leaked that Al-Burhan’s Coral Hotel meetings were part of a broader strategy to reintegrate some FFC figures and ensure Islamists remain sidelined. The plan includes:

Establishing a short “foundational period”

Extending a long “transitional period” with no clear end

Drafting a new constitutional document to legitimize his rule

Appointing a prime minister based on a deal with select civilians

Al-Burhan fails to realize that he cannot create civilian legitimacy through artificial maneuvers. His harsh rhetoric against Islamists aims to appease foreign powers, seeking their approval to stay in power.

This only reopens the door to foreign interference just as Sudan had begun to rid itself of such external manipulation through the defeat of the RSF and the collapse of the Taqaddum coalition.

—

Ignoring History’s Lessons

Despite his determination to cling to power, Al-Burhan overlooks a historical pattern:

In 1985, President Jaafar Nimeiri distanced himself from Islamists by arresting Hassan Al-Turabi. Within two months, his regime fell.

In 2019, President Omar Al-Bashir—himself an Islamist—announced his neutrality from political parties. Within two months, he was ousted.

In 2022, RSF leader Hemetti ignored Islamist warnings to remain second-in-command. He was manipulated into war, which ultimately destroyed both him and the RSF.

This is not because Islamists wield mystical power. Rather, they remain a major political force in Sudan, unmatched in organizational depth and grassroots presence.

The vast majority of Sudanese people—excluding the Coral Hotel attendees—share the Islamists’ general political outlook. Even those Islamists who opposed the RSF and Taqaddum are aligned with the broader national sentiment.

Anyone who alienates or underestimates them inevitably creates a deep rift between themselves and the Sudanese majority.

This is history’s lesson.
Whoever heeds it will survive.
Whoever defies it is doomed.

And to God belongs the ultimate outcome of affairs.